[2000 JLR 221]
D. EVES and H.M. EVES (née BUCHEL) v. HAMBROS BANK (JERSEY) LIMITED
ROYAL COURT (Bailhache, Bailiff): June 19th, 2000
Courts—Royal Court—jurisdiction—inherent jurisdiction—inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process by enjoining vexatious litigants from commencing or continuing proceedings without leave
 The defendants sought orders enjoining the plaintiffs from commencing any proceedings or taking any further steps in existing proceedings against the defendants or any of their servants or agents without leave of the court.
 There was a long history of litigation between the parties going back to 1992. The defendants maintained that it had become vexatious and sought to control further proceedings, submitting that the Royal Court had always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought but, if it had not, then it should now claim that jurisdiction.
 The plaintiffs submitted in reply that (a) there was no inherent jurisdiction to make the order sought as the jurisdiction was limited to procedural matters already before the court, and that the court ought not to claim it since depriving a litigant of a right of access to the court was such a serious matter that it should only be done under statutory authority; and (b) the draft Civil Proceedings (Vexatious Litigants) (Jersey) Law being considered by the States would not have been necessary if the court had the inherent jurisdiction claimed by the defendants.
 The amicus curiae submitted that the absence of statutory provisions similar to those in England and Wales did not mean that the court did not possess inherent jurisdiction.
 Held, ruling in favour of the defendants:
 Approaching the matter from the standpoint of principle, paying close regard to precedent, the court did have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.
 (a) The absence of precedent was no bar to the existence of an inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought or to the assertion of such jurisdiction;
 (b) a court should enjoy such powers inherent to its jurisdiction as were necessary to enable it to act effectively and suppress any abuses of its process, which would include preventing a vexatious litigant from relentlessly bringing proceedings against another party;
 (c) a person had a legal right not to be subjected to vexatious litigation, which might be asserted by seeking to prevent the litigation being initiated without the leave of the judge; and
2000 JLR 222
 (d) inherent jurisdiction could co-exist with statutory jurisdiction, and the fact that a draft Civil Proceedings (Vexatious Litigants) (Jersey) Law was being considered by the States was not relevant, since even if it had been in force its provisions would not have been inconsistent with the inherent jurisdiction now being considered (page 228, line 38 – page 229, line 2; page 229, lines 21–39; page 230, lines 26–37; page 231, lines 6–17).
Cases cited:
  (1)    Bastion Offshore Trust Co. Ltd. v. Finance & Econ. Cttee., 1994 JLR 370, applied.
  (2)    Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau & Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corp. Ltd., [1981] A.C. 909; [1981] 1 All E.R. 289; [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 253; [1981] Com. L.R. 19; (1981), 125 Sol. Jo. 114, considered.
  (3)    Commonwealth Trading Bank v. Inglis (1974), 131 C.L.R. 311, not followed.
  (4)    Ebert v. Venvil, [1999] 3 W.L.R. 670, applied.
  (5)    Eves v. St. Brelade’s Bay Hotel Ltd., 1995 JLR N–8; further proceedings, 1998 JLR N–5, considered.
  (6)    Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] A.C. 435; [1977] 3 All E.R. 70; (1977), 121 Sol. Jo. 543, considered.
  (7)    Le Cocq v. de Gruchy, Royal Ct. (1909), 226 Ex. 204, unreported, considered.
  (8)    Le Couillard v. Renouf, Royal Ct. (1900), 220 Ex. 510, unreported, considered.
  (9)    Le Masurier (C.) Ltd. v. Alker, 1992 JLR 123, considered.
(10)    Mayo Associates S.A. v. Cantrade Private Bank Switzerland (C.I.) Ltd., 1998 JLR 173, applied.
(11)    Packer v. Packer, [1954] P. 15, dictum of Denning, L.J. applied.
(12)    Stewart v. Auckland Transp. Bd., [1951] N.Z.L.R. 576.
Additional cases cited by counsel:
Att. Gen. v. Picot, 2000 JLR Part 1, N–10.
Barette v. Le Moignan, Royal Ct. (1899), 219 Ex. 452, unreported.
Harbours & Airport Cttee., In re, 1991 JLR 316.
Johnson v. Valks, The Times, November 23rd, 1999.
Pirunico Trustees (Jersey) Ltd. v. Jefferson Seal Ltd., Royal Ct., December 2nd, 1996, unreported.
Wooley, In re, 1991 JLR N–11.
Legislation construed:
Royal Court Rules 1992, r. 6/13:
 “(1) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any claim or pleading, or anything in any claim or pleading, on the ground that—
...
(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or
2000 JLR 223
...
(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court ...”
Supreme Court Act 1981 (c.54), s.42:
“(1) If, on an application made by the Attorney General under this section, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground—
(a) instituted vexatious legal proceedings ...
(b) made vexatious applications in any legal proceedings ...
the court may, after hearing that person, or giving him an opportunity to be heard, order—
(i) that no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the High Court be instituted by him in any other court ...”
Texts cited:
de Ferrière, Dictionnaire de Droit et de Pratique, vol. 1, at 685 (1769 ed.).
Houard, Dictionnaire Analytique, Historique, Etymologique, Critique et Interprétif de la Coutume de Normandie, vol. 2, at 714 (1780 ed.).
Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 23 Current Legal Problems 23 (1970).
Matthews & Sowden, The Jersey Law of Trusts, 3rd ed., at 204 (1993).
A.D. Hoy for the plaintiffs;
K.O. Dixon for the defendant;
P. Matthews, Crown Advocate, for the amicus curiae.
    BAILHACHE, BAILIFF:
 
   Introduction
   This summons was issued by Hambros Bank (Jersey) Limited
30 (“Hambros”) in the context of proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs,
David Eves and Helga Maria Eves (“the plaintiffs”) in May 1998. The
summons seeks orders—
     “(a) that pursuant to the Royal Court’s inherent jurisdiction the
    plaintiffs should ... be jointly and severally enjoined from
35     commencing any proceedings or taking any further steps in existing
    proceedings (whether in the Royal Court or the Petty Debts Court)
    whatsoever against [Hambros] and any of its servants or agents
    unless the plaintiffs have first obtained leave from the Royal Court
    to commence and/or take further steps in such proceedings; and
40      (b) that the plaintiffs pay the costs of and incidental to this
    summons on a full indemnity basis.”
   There is a long history of litigation between the parties which goes
back to 1992. When the summons came before the court for the first time
it was ordered to be served upon the Attorney General in order that he
45 might act as amicus curiae. The Attorney General has been represented
2000 JLR 224
by Crown Advocate Matthews, who adopted a neutral role having regard
to the fact that both parties were represented by counsel. I am indebted
both to Mr. Matthews and indeed to Mr. Dixon and to Mr. Hoy for their
researches and for their very helpful submissions. It was agreed between
5 the parties that the summons raised two issues which should be dealt with
separately, namely whether, as a matter of law, the Royal Court has
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, and, if so, whether the relief should
in fact be granted. This judgment is concerned only with the first issue.
 
10    Hambros’s contentions
   Mr. Dixon’s submission was that the Royal Court has and has always
had an inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought but, if not, that it
should now claim that jurisdiction for itself. The Royal Court was a
creature of the customary law and had an inherent jurisdiction to regulate
15 its own procedure. This was epitomised by the maxim “La Cour est toute
puissante.” This inherent jurisdiction allowed the court, in counsel’s
submission, a plenitude of judicial power in all matters concerning the
general administration of justice.
   Mr. Dixon asserted that the court had in the past exercised its inherent
20 jurisdiction to declare litigants hors de cour with the result that they were
forbidden to litigate further. He cited the cases of Le Couillard v. Renouf
(8) and Le Cocq v. de Gruchy (7). Mr. Dixon derived some support for
this assertion from a short passage in Matthews & Sowden, The Jersey
Law of Trusts, 3rd ed., at 204 (1993), where it is stated “indeed, litigants
25 may even be declared hors de cour and hence forbidden to litigate
further.” I think, with respect to the learned authors, that this statement
goes a little too far. The procedure of declaring litigants hors de cour was,
according to De Ferrière, 1 Dictionnaire de Droit et de Pratique, at 685
(1769):
30      “... une prononciation dont se sert le Juge pour renvoyer les
    Parties, sur le fondement que l’affaire a été intentée prématurement
    avant l’échéance de la dette, ou avant l’évènement de la condition
    de laquelle elle dépendoit.
     Un Juge peut encore mettre hors de Cour, lorsque l’affaire ne lui
35     paroît pas assez instruite de part et d’autre, faute par les parties
    d’éclaircir les faits, ou de justifier les moyens de droit qui peuvent
    servir à la décision de la cause ...”
   The parties were not necessarily forbidden from returning to court.
Once the cause of action had matured, it was open to them to
40 recommence the litigation. It was not in those circumstances a “chose
jugée.” Houard, 2 Dictionnaire Analytique, Historique, Etymologique,
Critique et Interprétif de la Coutume de Normandie, at 714 (1780) defines
the procedure more succinctly but perhaps less clearly. “En matiere civile,
le hors de Cour se prononce lorsque les deux parties paroissent avoir un
45 tort égal.” Against the background of those definitions, it is clear that the
2000 JLR 225
court in Le Couillard v. Renouf (8) and Le Cocq v. de Gruchy (7) was not
inventing a new jurisdiction, nor indeed exercising any jurisdiction to
deal with vexatious litigation.
   Counsel was not able to produce any authority tending to show that the
5 court has previously exercised the precise jurisdiction which would need
to be invoked in order to grant the relief sought. The court has, of course,
invoked its inherent jurisdiction in various other ways to prevent abuses
of its procedures, for example by striking out and by granting quia timet
injunctions. But in the end counsel for Hambros was really driven to rely
10 substantially upon a recent decision of the English Court of Appeal,
where a High Court decision to grant relief very similar to that set out in
the summons was upheld. The case was Ebert v. Venvil (4). The headnote
to the report in the Weekly Law Reports is in the following terms ([1999]
3 W.L.R. at 670):
15      “The plaintiff, who had been made bankrupt, commenced a series
    of vexatious proceedings in the High Court against his trustee in
    bankruptcy, the bankruptcy petitioner and a bank. In the first action,
    the judge made an order which prohibited the plaintiff from making
    any further applications or taking any steps concerning matters
20     involving or relating to the bankruptcy proceedings without the
    leave of the court. In the second action, the judge prohibited the
    plaintiff from issuing any new proceedings in the High Court or in
    any county court against the bank or its legal representatives
    concerning any matters involving or relating to the bankruptcy pro-
25     ceedings. In both cases, the judge refused the plaintiff’s applications
    for leave to appeal.
     On the plaintiff’s applications to the Court of Appeal for leave to
    appeal:—
     Held, dismissing the applications, that the High Court had an
30     inherent jurisdiction to prevent the initiation, without the leave of
    the court, of civil proceedings which were likely to constitute an
    abuse of process; that, as part of the High Court’s supervisory
    jurisdiction in relation to the county court, such an order could, in
    appropriate circumstances, apply to county court as well as High
35     Court proceedings, that the order needed to be sufficiently certain so
    as to enable the person at whom it was directed to know what he
    was, and was not, entitled to do; and that, accordingly, since the
    orders made by the judge met that requirement, leave to appeal
    would be refused.”
40    Lord Woolf, M.R. declined to follow decisions of the High Court of
Australia in Commonwealth Trading Bank v. Inglis (3) and of the
Supreme Court of New Zealand in Stewart v. Auckland Transp. Bd. (12).
He stated ([1999] 3 W.L.R. at 679):
     “We prefer to approach the issues from a standpoint of principle.
45     Doing so, the starting point must be the extensive nature of the
2000 JLR 226
    inherent jurisdiction of any court to prevent its procedure being
    abused. We see no reason why, absent the intervention of a statute
    cutting down the jurisdiction, that jurisdiction should apply only in
    relation to existing proceedings and not to vexatious proceedings
5     which are manifestly threatened but not yet initiated. In this
    connection we have gained considerable assistance from the article
    by I. H. Jacob, ‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1970) 23
    C.L.P. 23. Reading that article as a whole, we find it strongly
    supportive of the approach that we have indicated.”
10 Later in his judgment Lord Woolf stated (ibid., at 680): “The general
approach of the courts in recent years has been not to restrict the inherent
jurisdiction of the court but to adopt a broad approach where this is
appropriate.”
   Mr. Dixon invited me to adopt this approach and to claim a similar
15 jurisdiction for the Royal Court. He submitted that I might take comfort
from a dictum of Southwell, J.A. in proceedings involving the same
plaintiffs when he stated in Eves v. St. Brelade’s Bay Hotel Ltd. (5):
     “It is a matter of concern that in cases of this kind litigants in
    person may pursue too large a number of applications or actions and
20     appear before the courts on too many occasions, without good
    effect. I say that, not specifically in relation to Mr. Eves, but as a
    general matter. I think that there would be something to be said for
    the authorities looking generally at the position of litigants in
    person, and considering whether there should be any filter by which
25     they are enabled to come to the courts to pursue actions and
    applications.”
 
   The plaintiffs’ contentions
   Mr. Hoy submitted that there was no inherent jurisdiction to make the
30 order sought, and that the court ought not to claim it. It had never been
done before. He contended that the deprivation of a right of access to the
court was such a serious matter that it should only be done under statutory
authority. Counsel referred me to the judgment of the High Court of
Australia in Commonwealth Trading Bank v. Inglis (3), in which the court
35 stated ([1974] 131 C.L.R. at 314–315):
     “In our opinion, it is not surprising that the courts do not appear
    (so far as we have been able to discover) to have taken the further
    step of intervening in a summary way to prevent the commence-
    ment, except by leave, of actions and other proceedings by a
40     particular person or persons but have limited themselves to
    exercising their powers in relation to proceedings which have been
    taken in a court and have thus been placed under its control. It may
    be that the exercise of supervision, by means of a requirement that
    leave should be obtained for the bringing of proceedings, could have
45     been justified logically as a proper safe-guard against abuse of the
2000 JLR 227
    court’s process in cases where it was shown to be probable that a
    person would continue bringing groundless proceedings. But, in our
    opinion, it is apparent that the courts, both in England and in this
    country, have declined to regard themselves as having power to do
5     so, except where such power has been conferred upon them by an
    Act of Parliament or by rules promulgated under statutory
    authority.”
     And (ibid., at 319):
     “But the making of unwarranted and vexatious applications in an
10     action which is pending in the court is, in our opinion, a matter over
    which there is an inherent power in the court to exercise control.
    There is an essential difference, in our opinion, between regulating
    the conduct of such an action so as to prevent the court’s process
    from being abused, on the one hand, and impeding a particular person
15     in the exercise of a right of access to the court, on the other hand.”
   Counsel submitted that I should follow the Australian approach rather
than that of the English Court of Appeal. Mr. Hoy contended that the
exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction should be limited to
procedural matters which are before it. He cited the judgment of Lord
20 Diplock in Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau & Maschinenfabrik v. South India
Shipping Corp. Ltd. (2), where his Lordship stated ([1981] 1 All E.R. at
295):
     “The High Court’s power to dismiss a pending action for want of
    prosecution is but an instance of a general power to control its own
25     procedure so as to prevent it being used to achieve injustice. Every
    civilised system of government requires that the state should make
    available to all its citizens a means for the just and peaceful
    settlement of disputes between them as to their respective legal
    rights. The means provided are courts of justice to which every
30     citizen has a constitutional right of access in the role of plaintiff to
    obtain the remedy to which he claims to be entitled in consequence
    of an alleged breach of his legal or equitable rights by some other
    citizen, the defendant. Whether or not to avail himself of this right
    of access to the court lies exclusively within the plaintiff’s choice; if
35     he chooses to do so, the defendant has no option in the matter; his
    subjection to the jurisdiction of the court is compulsory. So, it would
    stultify the constitutional role of the High Court as a court of justice
    if it were not armed with power to prevent its process being misused
    in such a way as to diminish its capability of arriving at a just
40     decision of the dispute.
     The power to dismiss a pending action for want of prosecution in
    cases where to allow the action to continue would involve a
    substantial risk that justice could not be done is thus properly
    described as an ‘inherent power’ the exercise of which is within the
45     ‘inherent jurisdiction’ of the High Court.”
2000 JLR 228
   Finally, Mr. Hoy referred to the draft Civil Proceedings (Vexatious
Litigants) (Jersey) Law, which was before the States. Such legislation
would not have been deemed necessary, he submitted, if the court had the
inherent jurisdiction which was now being claimed by Hambros.
5 
   Contentions of the amicus curiae
   Mr. Matthews drew attention to the statutory power to restrain
vexatious litigation in civil proceedings which had been possessed by the
English courts for over 100 years. That power was now contained in s.42
10 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. It was clear, however, from the judgment
of Lord Woolf in Ebert v. Venvil (4) that the English courts had acted to
restrain vexatious litigants from instituting fresh proceedings before
statute had intervened. The present statutory position in Jersey was that
the court could, by virtue of r.6/13 of the Royal Court Rules 1992, strike
15 out any claim or pleading which was, inter alia, vexatious or an abuse of
the process of the court. There was, however, no statutory equivalent in
Jersey to the “Civil Proceedings Order” in England and Wales. Counsel
submitted, however, that the absence of any such statutory provision in
Jersey did not mean that the court did not possess inherent jurisdiction to
20 restrain vexatious litigants.
   Generally, Mr. Matthews supported the contentions of counsel for
Hambros, and I need not repeat them.
 
   Conclusion
25    It is on the face of it surprising that the researches of counsel have
unearthed no previous instance of the court’s acting to prevent vexatious
litigation from being instituted. Even acknowledging that this is a small
jurisdiction, one might have expected to find some such cases. Perhaps
the reason is that until relatively recently litigants were obliged to employ
30 the services of counsel and the oath of the advocate provides a filter
against abuse. The relevant part of the oath provides: “Vous n’entre-
prendez ni ne soutiendrez, soit en demandant ou défendant, aucune cause
qui vous paroîtra denuée de tout droit, on intentée on soutenue par
méchanceté.”
35    Be that as it may, it seems to me that I should approach the matter from
the standpoint of principle paying close regard, naturally, to the
jurisprudence of the Island, by which I mean the decisions of the courts.
The absence of precedent does not mean either that there is no inherent
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought or that such jurisdiction should not
40 be asserted. I respectfully adopt the celebrated dictum of Denning, L.J. in
Packer v. Packer ([1954] P. at 22):
    “What is the argument on the other side? Only this, that no case has
    been found in which it has been done before. That argument does
    not appeal to me in the least. If we never do anything which has not
45     been done before, we shall never get anywhere. The law will stand
2000 JLR 229
    still while the rest of the world goes on; and that will be bad for
    both.”
   What then is to be gleaned from the jurisprudence as to the inherent
jurisdiction of this court? In C. Le Masurier Ltd. v. Alker (9), Blom-
5 Cooper, J.A. stated (1992 JLR at 130-131):
     “What is the true nature of an inherent jurisdiction? The locus
    classicus on this subject is to be found in the speech of Lord Morris
    of Borth-y-Gest in Connelly v. D.P.P. ([1964] A.C. at 1301):
        ‘There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a
10         particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to
        enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. I would
        regard them as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction. A
        court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of
        practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to
15         defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.’ [Emphasis
        supplied.]”
   And (ibid., at 132):
    “It can readily be seen that the invocation of the inherent jurisdiction
    is limited to practice and procedure but within the adjectival part of
20     the litigious process it is a virile and viable doctrine.”
   It is clear that the court’s inherent jurisdiction can co-exist with a
statutory jurisdiction. Thus in Bastion Offshore Trust Co. Ltd. v. Finance
& Econ. Cttee. (1), Neill, J.A. stated (1994 JLR at 382):
    “One feature of the inherent jurisdiction is that it can exist alongside
25     an identical or similar rule of court. The court does not lose its
    power because a rule is made (though there may be many cases
    where the court will have no need to look outside the text of the
    rule). Striking out pleadings is the classic example of overlap of
    powers. The fact that the Rules of the Supreme Court in England
30     make express provision for striking out and dismissing an action or
    pleading has been held not to displace the court’s inherent power to
    do so. As Sir Jack Jacob said in his lecture: ‘The inherent
    jurisdiction of the court is a most valuable adjunct to the powers
    conferred on the court by the Rules.’ ”
35    It does not therefore seem to me to be relevant that the States are about
to consider a draft law entitled Civil Proceedings (Vexatious Litigants)
(Jersey) Law. Even if such a law had been adopted and were in force, its
provisions are not inconsistent with the inherent jurisdiction which the
court is now being asked to exercise.
40    In Mayo Associates S.A. v. Cantrade Private Bank Switzerland (C.I.)
Ltd. (10), Smith, J.A., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal,
while stating (1998 JLR 173) that there was “no unifying principle from
which the boundaries of inherent jurisdiction may be divined” went on to
cite with approval the following extract from an article by Sir Jack Jacob
45 (1998 JLR at 188):
2000 JLR 230
     “... [T]he essential character of a superior court of law
    necessarily involves that it should be invested with a power to
    maintain its authority and to prevent its process being obstructed and
    abused. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior court; it is its very
5     life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such a
    power, the court would have form but would lack substance. The
    jurisdiction which is inherent in a superior court of law is that which
    enables it to fulfil itself as a court of law. The juridical basis of this
    jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the judiciary to uphold, to
10     protect and fulfil the judicial function of administering justice
    according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner.”
   Smith, J.A. continued (ibid.): “In our view, the vital clue to the nature
of inherent jurisdiction in its procedural setting ... is necessity. The court
has a particular procedural power because it has to have it to be a court in
15 any meaningful sense.” The court went on to observe that that approach
was antithetical to a definition of inherent jurisdiction based upon fairness
or perceptions of justice. Fairness and justice would be major factors to
take into account when deciding whether or not to exercise a discretion,
but they could not determine whether or not an inherent jurisdiction
20 existed.
   While I might perhaps strain at this leash, I must accept that, for the
time being at least, the inherent jurisdiction of the court is circumscribed
by the doctrine of necessity. I observe in passing that this approach is
arguably more restrictive than that recently adopted by the English Court
25 of Appeal in Ebert v. Venvil (4), but I should nevertheless apply it.
   Is it necessary, therefore, for the court to assert an inherent jurisdiction
to prevent its procedure from being abused by proscribing vexatious
litigants from pursuing another party without the leave of the court? In
my judgment the answer must be in the affirmative. It cannot be right to
30 contemplate a state of affairs where a vexatious litigant can relentlessly
pursue another party, causing him to incur expense and perhaps to suffer
anxiety and distress, but where the court is powerless to act unless
proceedings are actually in train. The court must have the power to
prevent its process from being abused in this way. This is not merely a
35 question of fairness and justice; this is, in the words of Sir Jack Jacob, “a
power to maintain [the court’s] authority and to prevent its process being
obstructed and abused.”
   It is true that on one view the relief sought by Hambros would perhaps
go beyond what Smith, J.A. in Mayo thought was the legitimate area of
40 exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The learned Judge of Appeal found
that that area was to be defined by reference to the function of the court in
civil proceedings. He quoted Lord Diplock in Gouriet v. Union of Post
Office Workers ([1978] A.C. at 501):
     “The only kind of rights with which courts of justice are con-
45     cerned are legal rights; and a court of civil jurisdiction is concerned
2000 JLR 231
    with legal rights only when the aid of the court is invoked by one
    party claiming a right against another party, to protect or enforce the
    right or to provide a remedy against that other party for infringement
    of it, or is invoked by either party to settle a dispute between them as
5     to the existence or nature of the right claimed.”
What is in question here is the power of the court to prevent a person
from invoking its jurisdiction at all, unless of course he obtains leave to
do so. The court in Mayo, however, was not concerned with vexatious
litigation but with the proper ambit of the inherent jurisdiction (if it was
10 there) in the context of existing proceedings. Furthermore, a person does
have a legal right not to be subjected to vexatious litigation. He asserts
that right either by seeking to strike out the litigation or, as I have found,
by seeking to prevent the litigation from being instituted without the
leave of a judge.
15    In my judgment the Royal Court does have jurisdiction to grant the
relief sought by Hambros and the first question should therefore be
answered in the affirmative.

Order accordingly.
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