Return to Contents
When Is A Revenue Claim Not A Revenue Claim?
The (UK) Finance Act 1998 has many implications for offshore trusts. One of them is that it has significantly increased the importance of the statutory indemnity, available to a settlor or other person who has been obliged to pay UK tax in relation to a settlement, against the offshore trustees whom the UK Revenue has been unable to make directly liable. Section 86 of the (UK) Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 attributes chargeable gains, equal in value to an amount on which the trustees of a non-resident trust would be charged tax if they were resident, to a settlor of that trust in certain circumstances. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 to that Act provides that, in the case where a person has become chargeable to tax by virtue of s 86, and has paid it,
"The person shall be entitled to recover the amount of the tax from any person who is a trustee of the settlement".
A number of questions arise considering this statutory right to reimbursement for a tax paid. One is how far this statutory right of reimbursement is compatible with provision in the trust instrument excluding the settlor from any benefit thereunder. Another is whether it matters what is the governing law of the trust. A third question, more interesting for the readership of this Review, is whether such a right will be enforced against trustees in Jersey. This article concentrates on this third question, though it also touches on the second.
Suppose, then, a UK resident settlor is made liable for tax under s 86, and seeks to recover reimbursement of the amount paid under paragraph 6 from the Jersey resident trustees of that trust. If the trustees refuse to pay, he must either sue them in a jurisdiction outside Jersey (eg England), and then seek to enforce that judgment against trustees in Jersey, or go to Jersey and sue them there. The first e is in practice useless if the trustees do not submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign (eg English) court  . As for the second, will the Jersey court assist him?
Suing in Jersey
The first question to be asked is, What is his cause of action? Undoubtedly it is a statutory right conferred by an English statute. Will the Jersey courts entertain an action entirely based on a statute of another jurisdiction? I have not found any case in which the Jersey courts have refused to entertain an action on the ground meret it was based on a foreign statute. There may be specific objections in particular cases, such as public policy (including enforcement of foreign revenue laws) and so on, but nothing general. Indeed, in Guernsey States Insurance v Ernest Farley & Son Limited , the Royal Court specifically held that an action could be brought in Jersey against a Jersey company in respect of an accident which occurred in Guernsey when a Guernsey carpenter was working for the Jersey company on the construction of a bridge there. By Guernsey statute law, any cause of action which the carpenter had against his employer was vested in the Guernsey States Insurance Authority. One of the defences put forward by Ernest Farley & Son Limited before the Royal Court of Jersey was that the plaintiff had no title to sue, because the court should not give effect to the statutory right of the plaintiff under Guernsey law.
The Royal Court held that the should be overruled. It said: 
"This Court is also of opinion that this claim is not unenforceable in a Jersey Court by reason of the principles of private international law as understood and applied by this Court. In order to make it inadmissible upon that ground, it would be necessary to show that, though it is based upon a valid assignment, yet it falls within one of the categories of cases in which the law of the place where the case is heard, the lex fori as it is commonly called, refuses to give effect to a claim and overrides some system of foreign law connected with the claim, according to which the claim is valid and should be enforced, e.g. (I mention two instances only) where the lex fori says ‘I will not enforce this claim because it is contrary to my public policy’ or where it takes some narrow objection such as this, ‘I will not enforce this claim because it is not brought within the period of time which my law prescribes for the bringing of such actions’. This claim of the Insurance Authority falls within none of those categories. It would not, indeed, be consistent with the comity which should mark the relations of one country with the other in the realm of public international law if this Court should decline to give effect to this claim…"
Of course the statute in this case did not create a cause of action. It operated to transfer one to someone else. But the private international law point is the same. The plaintiff was allowed to sue in Jersey because the Guernsey statute permitted him to. Would it have mattered if the cause of action in Guernsey was one created by statute? Suppose that A has a cause of action under the (UK) Occupiers Liability Act 1984 against a Jersey company B in respect of its ownership of English land. Will the Jersey court refuse to entertain this action if B is properly served in Jersey? Subject to one point. I do not think so.
That one pocerns characterisation  and choice of law. Because this is a case involving foreign factors, the Jersey Court must characterise the claim in order to know what choice of law rule to apply. For example, the law applied in cases of breach of contract may be s via a different rule t in tort cases. So, if the Jersey Court characterised an Occupier’s Liability Act claim as a claim in tort , it might apply the test o proper law of the tort, or thex loci delicti commissi  , or even the much criticised "double actionablity" rule , or some other test entirely , to choose the law governing the claim. We do not need to resolve that point now.
But the same enquiry is also relevant in our case. How is the statutory claim to reimbursement to be characterised, and what is the choice of law rule that follows? Plainly the settlor’s claim against the trustees is not in contract, nor in tort. Nor is it a claim for breach of trust. But is it a claim u trust (like a tenant for life who is entitled to the income) ? If it were, it might be relevant to know what was the proper law of the trust  . But I do not think it is. The settlor did not confer the right. Parliament did. It is more a claim "under the trust", than the UK Revenue’s statutory claim to tax from (UK resident) trustees is a claim "under the trust", or a claim against trustees by a third party in contract or tort is such a claim. 
Essentially, this is a claim to an indemnity for a liquidatm of money paid, i.e. a debt. It is very similar to a claim in restitution, e.g. where A is compelled to pay B’s debt, and A sues B to recover the sum paid  . When is the choice of law rule? In English law the restitutionary choice of law rule seems to be the proper law of the obligation  . And, since the UK statute confers the right on a settlor who will normally be UK resident, and pays tax in the UK, that must surely be the relevant legal system of the UK, i.e. English, Scots or Northish. In the absence of express legislative sanction (and there is none relevant here that I know of), Jersey follows English conflict of laws principles  . So it seems that Jersey will apply the relevant UK Law, ie the statute conferring the right.
Accordingly, it seems to me that in principle a statutory cause of action such as this should be recognised in Jersey. However, it is also necessary to consider specific objections, such as the objection on grounds of enforcement of a foreign revenue law. Every state regards it as a hallmark of its own independent sovereignty that it alone should collect taxes from the people who live, work and operate within the state. As Rowlatn King of the Hellenes v Brostron ,
"It is perfectly elementary that a foreign government cannot come here - nor will the courts of other countries allow our Government to go there - and sue a person found in that jurisdiction for taxes levied and which he is declared to be liable to in the country to which he belongs."
This proposition has been repeatermed by the House of Lords , and also ap in Jersey .
If the Jersey court gives effect to a statutory right of reimbursement of tax paid, will this amount to enforcement of a foreign revenue law? It is of course plain that there is a connection between this statutory right and the payment of tax. It is because the settlor has paid the tax to the UK tax authorities that he has the statutory right at all . If he had not paid the tax, he would not have the right. On the other hand, that is not to say that the claim which is being made by the settlor is the tax liability itself. The UK tax authorities are not interested in the slightest in the success or failure o action. They have been paid. They are not bringing the action in Jersey, or intervening in it or supporting it. 
As mentioned above, Jersey courts tend to follow the English principles of the conflict of laws. So it is worth looking briefly at the English authorities on the point before turning to the Jersey cases. Dicey and Morris put the matter this way:
"English courts have no jurisdiction ertain an action… for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign state…." 
Direct enforcement is cleaugh. The foreign state sues  (or deds by reliance)  on a cause of action created by its penal, revenue or other public law. That is not our case. But what about enforcement? This occurs, according to Dicey and Morris, 
"Where the foreign State (or its nominee) in form seeks a remedy, not based on the foreign rule in question, but which in substance is deso give it extra-territorial effect  ; or where a private party raises a defence based on the foreig in order to vindicate or assert the right of the foreign State.  "
But it is not indirect enforcement of a foreign revenue law trmation to be provided which may enable the making or enforcement of a revenue claim elsewhere  . Nor is it so if the claim is made by a person who is not the foreign State or its nominee, and is not seeking to assert its rights, but his own. Th trustees who had been personally compelled to pay tax in another jurisdiction could s the aid of the English court to be indemnified out of an estate in England  . Indeed, in Williams and Humbert Ltd v W H Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd (a case involving alleged foreign penal law) the majority of the House of Lords defined the limits of indirect enforcement in very stark terms, thus:
"No countenance was given in Government of India v Taylor, in Rossano’s case… nor in Brokaw v Seatrain UK Ltd to the suggestion that an action in this country could ever be properly described as the indirect enforcement of a penal or revenue law in another country when no claim under that law remained unsatisfied. The exis of such unsatisfied claim to the satisfaction of which the proceeds of the action will be applied appears to me to be an essential feature of the principle enunciated in the Buchanan case… for refusing to allow the action to succeed." 
In our case, which is one of statutory indemnity, the indemnity is given only when the UK Revenue has been paid. So ex hypothesi when the person to whom the indemnity has been given brings his action, there is no unsatisfied Revenue claim in existence. Hence the action according to the House of Lords, one for the indirect enforcement of a foreign revenue law  .
Having looked at the English aties, there are four Jersey cases that I have found which may be thought to bear upon this point. In Herzog v Toia  , the plaintiff sued the defendant in respect of personal injuries suffered as a result of the defendant’s admitted negligence in running over the plaintiff in Jersey. The only part of the plaintiff’s loss which was still in issue was the plaintiff’s claim for loss of earnings. The plaintiff was a German, employed in Germany. Under German law(unlike English or Jersey law), damages for loss of earnings were subject to tax as if they were the earnings themselves. The plaintiff therefore sought a gross rather than a net sum for loss of earnings, on the basis that he was going to have to pay tax on it in his hands in Germany (in fact, his employer appears to have indemnified him against an assignment under the cause of action, but nothing seems to turn on this). The defendant argued that it was wrong to award the plaintiff a gross sum for loss of earnings, which would then suffer deduction of tax in Germany because this would be indirectly to enforce German revenue law. The plaintiff argued that he should have a gross sum, otherwise he would suffer double taxation, firstly by only receiving a net sum in Jersey, and secondly by being taxed on that net sum in his hands when it was returned to Germany. The court agreed with the plaintiff rather than with the defendant.
The cou said 
"We deal first with the argument of counsel for the defendant that even if it could be said that any award which we might make would be subject to German tax in the hands of the plaintiff, we should ignore that fact became this case is governed by Jersey law and under that law damages for loss of earnings are not taxable.
We think that that argument is misconceived.
A tortfeasor must take his victim as he finds him and must pay such damages as will properly compensate for his loss, having regard to his particular circumstances.
According to the second rule in Gourley’s case, upon which counsel relied, one of those circumstances is the incidence of income tax upon any lost earnings. Having regard to existing tax rates, that incidence will vary according to whether the victim of an accident in Jersey is, for example, resident in Jersey or England. Counsel did not dispute that in an action for damages for loss of earnings before a Jersey court a tortfeasor would, if the second rule were applied, be entitled to claim the ‘benefit’ of the higher rate of income tax in England if his victim were resident in England. But that situation must work both ways. If, for example, damages for loss of earnings were taxable in England but not in Jersey, how could it properly be argued that the Jersey court should ignore that fact? In such event, an English court would not apply the second rule in Gourley’s case, as we have seen, for to do so would be, in effect, to tax the damages twice. Why then should a Jersey court do so?
We can find no authority in ‘Dicey and Morris’ The Conflict of Laws (eighth edition) for the proposition that although the incidence of foreign income tax is a matter to be taken into account in assessing damages, the liability of the award to foreign tax is not…
We can find no ground of public policy for disregarding the liability to foreign tax of an award of damages for loss of earnings. Indeed, we think it would be contrary to public policy to disregard it."
Another example would be where a UK resident sued a Jersey accountant specialising in UK tax avoidance in the Jersey courts for negligence in advising that a certain course of action (since implemented) would not give a rise to UK tax, where in fact it did so. Could the negligent accountant resist compensating the taxpayer by arguing that to do so would indirectly enforce UK revenue law? Surely not. The taxpayer had to pay the tax. That is his loss, caused by the adviser’s negligence.
Further assistance is gained from the mnt case of Le Marquand v Chiltmead Limited  . The defendant company had been put into liquidation in England. The liquidator obtained judgment in the High Court against one of the directors of the company for misappropriation of assets etc. The liquidator registered the English judgment in Jersey. The plaintiffs, who had obtained judgment against the same director in Jersey, sought to set aside the registration of the English judgment on the ground (inter alia) that, as the debts of the company as to 97% were to the UK Inland Revenue and Customs & Excise, the liquidator was indirectly seeking to enforce a revenue claim by foreign tax authorities.
The Royal Court in fact hel had no power in the circumstances to set aside the English judgement that had been registered in Jersey. But the Bailiff, Sir Peter Crill, said 
"In my opinion the liquidator is under a duty to collect all the company’s assets and, as is clear from the extracts I have quoted, he cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as an agent or tool of the Inland Revenue. The fact that if he does collect money in Jersey, some of it, or even most of it, will, when returned to the United Kingdom, be applied towards the satisfaction according to English law of a revenue debt, does not by itself where other claims are involved, even if in proportion with the revenue claim they are very small, render the exercise of tracing the money to Jersey and obtaining it the indirect enforcement solely for the purpose of paying an Inland Revenue claim…"
So, even if the liquidator had a duty to hand over 97% of the funds received from the judgment registered in Jersey, the enforcement of that judgment in Jersey did not amount to the indirect enforcement of a Revenue claim. Our case is a fortiori that case in one sense, in that in our case the tax has already been paid. If in the Chiltmead case the liquidator had found a bank foolish enough to lend him the money to pay the tax authorities on the security, say, of the judgment against the director, I cannot think that the result would have been different. Of course, the right of reimbursement is for 100% of the tax claim. t if the test is (as the Bailiff suggested) whether the plaintiff is an agent of the foreign Revenue authority , the answer is clear: he is not.
A third case is Ralmsley  . This case concerned a testator who died domiciled in Jersey, but whose estate was subject to a claim by the UK Revenue in relation to arrears of UK income tax and capital gains tax. The Court was asked to rule whether the executor was bound or entitled to pay the claim to the Inland Revenue. course of ruling that he was not, the Deputy Bailiff, Mr Peter Crill, quoted a long passage from Wheatcroft & Whiteman, Capital Gains Tax  . The extract as cited begins as follows:
"The authorities discussed above established four principal propositions as a matter of English and international law".
The last of these points was stated in the extract as follows:
"Finally, a trustee or personal representative is entitled to be indemnified out of the assets of the trust or estate (as the case may be) situated in the United Kingdom for any foreign taxes or duty which he has paid under the law of the foreign state in question, provided that the liability to pay that tax or duty could have been enforced against him. Such indemnification does not constitute the enforcement of foreign revenue laws, for whether or not the trustee or personal representative is indemnified does not affect the tax or duty collected by the foreign government, because, as indicated, it could always have enforced its claim (the Reid case and the Lord Cable case.)"
On the facts of the particular case, this final pe did not apply, because the executor had not in fact paid the taxes in question. Nonetheless, the Deputy Bailiff said: 
"I am satisfied that it would be proper to apply the four principles I have cited to the position of executors or trustees in Jersey faced with a claim for an unenforceable debt arising (for example) from a taxing statute in another jurisdiction."
The same passage wd again by the Rourt in Clapham v Le Mesurier and i X’s Settlement  . In the latter case the Bailiff, Sir Peter Crill, having cited the same long extract, ending with the same fourth point, said: 
"The Court in that case [i.e. Re Walmsley] accepted that passage and we have had regard to it in coming to our decision this afternoon".
The facts in Re X’s Settlement were different from those in Re Walmsley. The executor of the deceased settlor whose estate might be liable to foreign tax was actually resident in the foreign jurisdiction concerned. However, a further difference was that the settlement conferred express power to trustees to pay unenforceable taxes of this nature. Ultimately the Court concluded that it was proper for the trustees to pay these taxes.
The importance for us lies in the approval in both cases (albeit obiter, since the executor or trustees had not in fact made payment and were not now seeking an indemnity) of the fourth principle stated by Wheatcroft & Whiteman, namely that a trustee or personal representative is entitled to be indemnified where he has been required actually to pay the tax because he is amenable to the jurisdiction concerned. The case we are considering is not that of a trustee or a personal representative, but of a settlor. However, according to the statute, he can be made liable for the tax concerned. And he is (also by statute) given then a right of reimbursement from the trust. And what is significant for our purposes is the justification given for allowing a trustee or personal representative to be indemnified from the trust or estate assets. This is that the indemnity does not constitute enforcing a foreign revenue law,
"for whether or not the trustee or personal representative is indemnified does not affect the tax or duty collected by the foreign government, because, as indicated, it could always have enforced its claim…"
This is exactly the case with regard to the settlor who is made to pay the tax by virtue of the foreign statute. It therefore seems that the Royal Court accepts that indemnity being given to a person who has been required to pay tax does not constitute the enforcement of a foreign revenue liability. Although it is the settlor who is made to pay (and who is given the indemnity) rather that the trustees, that should make no difference. What matters is whether he can be compelled personally to pay. Nor does it matter that the indemnity is statutory. Indeemost certainly be a right of indemnity under the general law even if the statute did not confer one. 
A glance across the water
It is also worth mentioning that in a recent e before the Guernsey Court of Appeal, Majormine Limited v Lindmar Trust Company Limited  , the defendant was seeking to set aside registration of a judgment of the English High Court, which had been registered in Guernsey. The judgment was in respect of costs incurred in the English proceedings. Those costs involved a VAT element. It was argued in part by the defendant that in any event the VAT element in the judgment could not stand, because it amounted to indirect enforcement of a foreign revenue obligation. The response was; this is your debt to me. That it partly reimburses tax I have paid in my country is irrelevant. The Court of Appeal did not in fact have to pronounce on this point, because the defendant abandoned it during the course of the argument (a fact which was, however, recorded in the judgment of the Court of Appeal). But it is an indication of the difficulties involved in arguing the point. Our case seems to me to be very similar.
For completeness, I should mentio cases of Re Tucker and Rarlton  . In the former an English trustee in bankruptcy sought an order from the Royal Court in aid of the English High Court, which was seeking information about the bankrupt’s affairs. The order sought was for the bankrupt’s Jersey lawyer to be examined, and for him to produce documents. The Bailiff (Mr Peter Crill) held that such an examination, with or without documents, when the UK was the sole creditor in the bankruptcy, amounted to an indirect enforcement of a foreign revenue law and the court had "no jurisdiction to grant the request of the trustee". He added that he would have taken the opposite view if there had been even one ordinary creditor in addition to the UK Revenue.
But in Rrlton  , Commissioner Hamon took a rather different view, in a case where English criminal courts sought the production of evidence in Jersey for use in England in prosecuting offences of cheating the public revenue. The court distinguished Re Tucker as a decision on a different statute, and one where evidence was sought for civil, rather than crimings. But in addition, as the court pointed out, the House of Lords had since then given judgment in Re State of Norway  , in terms inconsistent with the reasoning in Re Tucker, ie that supplying information for use in another jurisdiction could amount to enforcement of a foreign revenue obligation. The House said it was not. The Royal Court made the orders sought, rather cryptically adding the Re Tucker was still be considered "good law".
Neither case is much help on the present question, save only that Re Charlton shows that the more liberal approach of Re State of Norway (confining the ‘foreign revenue’ exception more narrowly) applies also now in Jersey. There may, of course, be other authorities of which I am not aware, which bear on this point, and which compel a different conclusion. But on the whole it seems to me, looking at the materials which I have discussed, that it is at least highly arguable - if not more probable than not - that the statutory right of reimbursement conferred by paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 should not be defeated in the Royal Court of Jersey by any argument that it amounts to the indirect enforcement of a foreign revenue law, or otherwise on public policy grounds.
Submission to UK Law
But if I am wrong about this, there is one further point. This is the argument that, where UK non-residents agree to act as trustees of a trust governed by one of the UK legal systems, they must be taken to have submitted themselves to the relevant UK laws governing the substance and administration of the trust, including the settlor’s statutory right of reimbursement. On this argument paragraph 6 would be construed to apply to UK non-resident trustees of a trust governed by a UK legal system, but not intended to apply to UK non-resident trustees of a trust governed by a foreign legal system.
This approach distinguishes resident from non-resident trustees, instating them all in the same way. Some support for it can be found in Re Lord Cable dec’d where Slade J said: 
"The will trustees doubtless accepted their trusteeship in the belief…that Indian law was the proper law of the trust…In my judgment…the court would not compel the will trustees to commit…a breach of the currency laws of India…[I]t is difficult to see how the will trustees could possibly be in breach of trust in complying with the provisions of that system of law which the testator…selected to regulate the rights of the parties under the trusts constituted by his will."
The trouble with this reasoning is, where do you stop? Does it apply only as between trustee and beneficiaries or as between a trustee and non-beneficiaries (as in our case)? Does it apply only to trust law rights, or does it extend to currency laws, copyright laws, the rules on dog licences? Do the trustees accept the UK law only as it stood at the time they accepted trusteeship (so that the date of such acceptance is relevant) or do they accept it for the future as well, however many statutory changes may occur? Nevertheless the principle is clear. The argument is relevant in considering the acceptability of the extra-territorial effect of the statutory right in the Jersey court. That court might find it acceptable to apply the right to a UK law trust and yet not acceptable to a Jersey law trust.
Breach of trust
That therefore raises the question of breach of trust. I will not deal with this in detail, but a few comments can be made. If we assume that the statutory right extends to a particular case, and therefore the trustee of the trust resident in Jersey could be sued in Jersey on that statutory right, it would not normally be a breach of trust for the trustee to pay the settlor, any more than it would normally be a breach of trust for the trustee to pay any other genuine third party debt. If, on the other hand, the statutory right does not extend to the particular case, so that the trustee could not in fact be sued in Jersey, then the position is more difficult. If the trust were a UK law trust, perhaps reliance could be placed on the dicta in Re Lord Cable already cited. Otherwise, it would, of course, be necessary to look at the scope of the powers conferred on the trustee by the terms of the trust instrument. For example, there could be a provision permitting the trustees to pay, directly or indirectly, or reimburse, tax liabilities even though not enforceable against the trustees in Jersey. It would thus not automatically be a breach of trust for the trustees to make such payment to the settlor. This would depend on whether, on the particular facts of the case, it was an appropriate exercise of the particular power. Even if there we such power contained in the terms of the trust, the trustees could seek the directions of the court. This has been done on a number of occasions in Jersey, some of which are reported. 
The statutory right of reimbursement given to the settlor of an offshore trust for tax which he has been required to pay to the UK Revenue raises a number of problems. The one examined here in detail has been whether a claim for reimbursement against the trustees in the Jersey court would be barred on the basis that it amounted to enforcement of a foreign revenue law. On principle and supported by the (admittedly limited) English, Jersey and Guernsey case law discussed above, it is submitted that the answer is No. This may at first siem surprising but, in an era when international co-operation is increasing generally, and is beginning to deal with fiscal matters in particular, the trend is clear  . In this climate it would be a brave offshore jurisdiction whose courts in the face of existing caselaw rowed steadfastly in the opposite direction, and refused to enforce an indemnity for tax already paid.
Paul Matthews is a solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales and a consultant with the firm of Withers, 12, Gough Square, London, EC4A 3DE.
Footnotes - (Top)
 - Cf. Presh v Royal Bank of Canada Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd, December 17th, 1998, English unreported, where Judge Howarth QC (sitting as a High Court judge) held that leave to serve the Jersey trustee out of the English jurisdiction was not required, pursuant to RSC Ord 11 r 1(2)(b). But quaere whether the Jersey court would enforce any resulting judgment: Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) (Jersey) Law 1960, Art 6(1)(a)(ii), (2); Adams v Cape Industries plc  Ch 433 at page 550
 - 195 JJ 47
 - Ibid, -53
 - Dicey & is, The Conflict of Laws, 12th ed 1993, ch 2
 - Ibid84-1486
 - Ibid, 1482
 - Ibid, 03
 - Eg the of the forum
 - Dicey & p cit, ch 29
 - Cf. Preh v Royal Bank of Canada Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd, December 17th, 1998, English unreported, where Judge Howarth QC, on an application to set aside a writ for lack of jurisdiction held that a claim for reimbursement of tax paid could not be treated as a claim to execute the trusts under RSC Ord 11 r 1(1) (j)
 - See eg Brof and Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Bros  1 KB534
 - Dicey & Morrisit, 1471; for detailed discussion, see Rose (ed), Restitution and the conflict of laws, 1995, chs 3,5
 - Official Sor v Clore 1983 JJ 43 at page 51, 1984 JJ 81 at page 99,CA.
 - (1923) 16Ll Lt page 193
 - Government of In Taylor  AC 491; Clark v Oceanic Contractors Inc  2 AC 130; Williams & Humbert Ltd v W & H Trademarks (Jersey) Ltd  AC368
 - Re Walmsl83 ) JJ 35; Le Marquand v Chiltmead Ltd 1987-88 JLR 86; Re Tucker 1987-88 473; Clapham v Le Mesurier 1991 JLR 5; Re Charlton 1993 JLR 360
 - Unless the giv a certificate under paragraph 6 (3) of Schedule 5 can be regarded as support: since there is a statutory duty on the Revenue to supply the certificate, I do not think so.
 - The Conflict s, 12th ed 1993, Rule 3 (page 97)
 - Re Visser [1 Ch 877
 - Brokaw v Sein UK Ltd  2 QB 476
 - O 99
 - Peter Buc Ltd v McVey  IR 89,  AC 516n
 - Banco de Viya v Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria  1 KB 140
 - Re State of Norwlication (Nos 1 and 2)  1 AC 723
 - Re Lor  1 WLR 7; Re Reid (1970) 17 DLR (3d) 199
 - [19 368
 - Ibid, 440-441, per Lorkay of Clashfern
 - Cf. Presoyal Bank of Canada Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd December 17th, 1998, English unreported, where Judge Howarth QC, on an application to set aside a writ for lack of jurisdiction, held that RSC Ord 11r 1 (1)(b) applied in part because "it was clear that as a matter of private international law any foreign court would not be prepared to enforce a para 6 (2) claim". Moreover the court could give leave to serve out under RSC Ord 11 r 1(1)(n) because the claim was one "brought in respect of a claim by the [Inland Revenue] for [tax]", notwithstanding that the tax had been paid and the claimant was not the Revenue
 - 1970 J11
 - Ibid at 19-1621
 - 1987-88 R 86
 - Ibid, at ps 93-943
 - See also and Morris, op cit, 98, 99
 - 198 35
 - 3rd ed, se 20-50, at page 624
 - 1983 JJ ae 41
 - 1991 JLR 5, a 13-14
 - Decided on 1984, and reported at 1 BOCM 608
 - See Brook’s d Bull Wharf Ltd v Goodman Bros  1 KB (excise duty)
 - November 3rd 1997, unrepoted  2 JL Review 179; the members of the court were Southwell, Collins and Bailhache JJA
 - 1987-88 J 473
 - 1993 J
 - 1993 60
 -  1 AC 723, follogh Court of the Isle of Man (in favour of the UK Revenue) in Re the Petition of McLean (1997) 1 OFLR 818
 -  1 R 7
 - Ibidage23
 - Re Mark Bolan Ch Trust 1981 JJ 117; Re Walmsley 1983 JJ 35; Re X’s Settlement (1994 ) 1 BOCM 608
 - E.g. international insharing, extradition for tax crimes (cf. 2nd Additional Protocol to European Convention on Extradition 1978, art 2), and harmonisation of taxation (cf. draft EU directive on savings income, May 20th 1998) and so on: see generally the article by Colin Powell at page 22 above