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SHORTER ARTICLES AND NOTES

MONEY LAUNDERING AND TAX EVASION - THE PROSECUTOR'S TACTIC

Simon Howard

The banker's dilemma

In his article "Money Laundering and Tax Evasion - the Banker's Dilemma",[1] Alan Binnington has highlighted some of the main difficulties in the operation of the primary money laundering offences contained in the Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999 (“the 1999 Law”) in the field of tax evasion. Tax evasion per se does not constitute criminal conduct for the purposes of the 1999 Law and one has to resort to trying to identify in the scenario of a suspected tax crime the component elements of some other offence such as forgery, false accounting or common law fraud, which does fall within the definition of criminal conduct, as a basis for applying the 1999 Law to the scenario in hand.

Mr. Binnington also highlights difficulties associated with interpretation of the some of the terminology used in some of the primary money laundering offences of the 1999 Law particularly, in the context of fiscal offences, the question of what constitutes the "proceeds" of tax evasion and he alludes to the challenge presented to a prosecuting team by the complexity of the component elements of the money laundering offence. Proving that a person was suspicious about another with whom he was dealing is a perennial problem for prosecutors. It has been commented that "except where there is oral or documentary evidence (such as notes on a bank file) to support the allegation of suspicion or where there is a covert contemporaneous police investigation, it may be easy for defendants to put forward a credible argument that they were innocent facilitators".[2] In his conclusion Mr. Binnington states that for those who might one day find themselves charged with a money laundering offence relating to fiscal matters comfort may be drawn from the fact that some of the difficulties may hinder the prosecutor in securing a conviction and that clarity will only be brought to this area of the law when the first test case arrives before the Court.

We may however have to wait a long time for that first test case as a result of the legal uncertainties which beset this area of law and the consequential risks of mounting what may turn out to be an unsuccessful prosecution. But in the meantime bankers and others involved in the finance industry in Jersey cannot afford to relax their guard; the tactical advantage to the prosecutor of commencing proceedings for breach of the Money Laundering (Jersey) Order 1999 (“the 1999 Order”) rather than the Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999 must not be overlooked.

The subordinate legislation

The 1999 Order is a piece of subordinate legislation made under Article 37 of the 1999 Law. It tracks closely the provisions of the UK Money Laundering Regulations 1993. While the 1999 Law sets the basic agenda and makes clear through its inclusion of complex and severe offences and wide ranging investigation and co-operation powers that Jersey is serious about its commitment to combating money laundering, the 1999 Order serves to introduce within Jersey a common set of due diligence and compliance procedures which all financial services businesses in the Island are required to follow.[3] These due diligence procedures are designed to ensure that an audit trail exists in the event that a money laundering investigation is launched and to assist finance sector employees to detect suspicious transactions. In broad summary, the due diligence and compliance procedures comprise obligations to carry out client identity verification, the maintenance of proper transaction records, the implementation of internal reporting procedures in each business for the handling of suspicious transaction reports, and anti-money laundering employee training.

Complying with all these procedures and requirements is extremely onerous and depends upon all client-facing employees within a financial services business being diligent in following client take-on procedures set down by their employer. Compliance also requires that employees be trained and kept up to date with developments in best practice in this context. Busy banks and other financial services businesses working to short transaction deadlines and dealing with demanding clients provide a setting where slip ups can occur or where compliance procedures may sometimes be relegated towards the bottom of action lists. But increasing attention is being focused on the need to ensure compliance with these procedures as a result of the new regulatory controls and standards introduced for investment business and trust company business activities in Jersey under the Financial Services (Jersey) Law 1998 and related Codes of Practice.[4] The Codes of Practice include express reference to the need for registered financial services businesses to comply with the 1999 Order. The Jersey Financial Services Commission, as the regulatory authority in the Island, has signalled clearly its intention to police compliance with the due diligence requirements and has embarked on a consultation process which is likely to lead to an increased level and extended application of these due diligence procedures.[5] In addition to regulatory sanctions which may be applied by the Commission for breach of the requirements of the 1999 Order the criminal penalties under the 1999 Law for breach of the 1999 Order constitute a significant risk to bankers and other finance sector executives in Jersey.

Prosecuting a breach

Where it can be proven that contravention of any of the due diligence requirements of the 1999 Order by a financial services business organised as a company or partnership or other unincorporated association was committed with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer, any person purporting to act in such a capacity, or in the case of an unincorporated association, a person concerned in the management or control of the association, then the relevant individual will be guilty of the contravention as well as his or her employing organisation.[6] The criminal offence therefore has the potential to apply across the whole of the management personnel.

The penalties for individuals convicted of any contravention of the due diligence requirements, while not as stringent as those applicable to the primary money laundering offences in the 1999 Law, are still sufficient to terminate a reputation and career in the financial services sector[7]. Furthermore, the fact that the offence can be committed where the breach of the due diligence requirement by the employing organisation is attributable merely to the neglect of the relevant individual widens these criminal provisions considerably.

To be attributable to the neglect of the relevant person the acts or omissions of that person must involve some causal connection with the contravention by the employing business, but the conduct of the relevant individual need not be the sole, dominant, direct or proximate cause or effect. A contributory causal connection is likely to be quite sufficient. Failure to exercise reasonable care on the part of a manager periodically to monitor compliance by junior employees with required procedures may expose the manager to the risk of prosecution if a contravention of the procedures materialises.[8]

It is therefore arguable that prosecuting a contravention of the 1999 Order may present a significantly easier route (if the requisite evidence is available) than commencing proceedings for a breach of one of the principal money laundering offences in the 1999 Law. In the context of a money laundering investigation which is complicated by issues of fiscal fraud, the prosecutor can avoid the need to wrestle with the jurisprudential difficulties that the fiscal element may introduce; problems of definition and evidential issues as to the proceeds of tax evasion can be side-stepped, as can the mine-field of assessing the evidence as to the state of mind of the potential defendant and whether he or she had the requisite knowledge or suspicion in order to sustain a of money laundering charge being preferred.

Prosecuting for breach of any of the due diligence and compliance requirements of the 1999 Order, while not entirely free from difficulties, is likely to be a more straight forward task. The due diligence obligations are for the most part reasonably clearly set out in the 1999 Order and the Anti-Money Laundering Guidance Notes issued by the Jersey Financial Services Commission. Construing terms such as "consent", "connivance" or "attributable to the neglect" should present lesser difficulties for the prosecution as there is a body of existing English case law interpreting these terms which can be drawn upon.

Also, the consent of the Attorney General is not required for the bringing of a prosecution for contravention of the 1999 Order; such consent is a necessary pre-condition of proceedings for any of the principal money laundering offences in the 1999 Law.

The alleged contravention of the due diligence or compliance procedures need not have any connection with the client whose affairs have sparked off a money laundering investigation under the 1999 Law. Incidental discovery of breach of the due diligence or compliance procedures in relation to other clients or transactions in the course of carrying out a money laundering investigation in the offices of a financial services business could lead to a prosecution for breach of the 1999 Order.

This last point highlights the potential which prosecutions for breach of the 1999 Order have in terms of protecting the reputation of the Island in financial and commercial matters and serving the public interest where a decision has been taken in favour of proceedings of some type being commenced. Without the need to mount a full blown investigation with a view to prosecuting one or more of the principal money laundering offences under the 1999 Law, media reports of a successful conviction for breach of the Money Laundering (Jersey) Order 1999 will serve the purpose.

Simon Howard is an advocate of the Royal Court of Jersey and a partner of Bedell Cristin, P.O. Box 75, 26 New Street, St. Helier, Jersey, JE4 8PP.

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CHILD ABDUCTION AND CROSS BORDER RECOVERY

Steven Pallot

The background

Removal of children from the jurisdiction of the courts in which they reside has long given rise to problems, but their scale has been magnified by the development of speedy international transport and also to some extent by a decrease in the formalities required in crossing many international frontiers[9]. Jersey is of course no exception. On September 25th, 2000 the Royal Court gave judgment in the case of E v W the ratio of which is summarised in the Jersey Law Reports[10] as follows:-

“When dealing with abduction cases involving countries such as Jersey which are not parties to The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the overriding principle is that the welfare of the child is paramount. The general approach is that the damage to the child’s interests which may arise from not making a summary order (i.e. alienation from its background, home, schools, friends, relations and, ultimately, from its country and its society and culture) has to be weighed against any adverse effects which may be suffered by the child if an order is made. It is the welfare of the child that predominates and the question is not whether the child will be ‘harmed’ by being sent back to the country from which he or she has been removed, but whether that course will best serve the child’s interests.”

Whilst a judicial remedy to recover children from another country may be available, action through the courts inevitably will be costly and all too often ineffective. It may be so time consuming that the interests of the children might have been damaged by the sheer delay and deprivation of contact with the parent from whom they have been abruptly parted. As it was put in the 1985 edition of Current Law Statutes Annotated:

“The difficulties faced by the custodial parent of an abducted child are formidable. There is a delay and expense involved in tracing the child and in bringing the case before the court or relevant administrative body of the State of refuge, and that court or administrative body might have a different approach to issues of child custody than authorities of the country from which the child was abducted. These difficulties have led parents of abducted children to set up self help groups such as The Children Abroad Group and to resort to employing private detectives to ‘snatch’ the child back.”[11]

The United Kingdom is party to two international conventions which seek to provide remedies in cases of the removal of children from one state to another and which were given effect in that country by the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 and, to an extent, by the Family Law Act 1986 which prevented conflicts of jurisdiction within the United Kingdom and provided machinery for reciprocal registration and enforcement. Under the earlier Child Abduction Act 1984, the wrongful removal of children from the control of those entitled to control them had already become in certain circumstances a criminal offence.

The Conventions concerned are:-

(a) the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, signed at the Hague on October 25th, 1980 (“the Hague Convention”) and

(b) the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on the Restoration of Custody of Children, signed in Luxembourg on May 20th, 1980 (“the European Convention”).

The underlying principle in both Conventions (which may appear axiomatic) is that it is in the interest of children that parents and others should not abduct them from one jurisdiction to another, and that any decision relating to the custody of children is best decided in the jurisdiction of their habitual residence. The main conceptual difference between the Conventions is that the Hague Convention is based upon wrongful removal or retention of a child in breach of rights of custody (whether or not any court order has been made to determine or give effect to those rights) whereas the European Convention seeks to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to custody of a child.

The Hague Convention offers practical and financial advantages to a person whose custody rights have been breached by an abduction. It is possible under Article 29 for that person to take direct action in the State of refuge. An application under the Convention must be made to a central authority[12]. If the central authority believes that the child is being cared for in another contracting state, it must transmit the application to the central authority of that State[13]. If the whereabouts of the child are unknown, the central authority will take steps to find it. Once this has been done, the authority will attempt to secure the voluntary return of the child[14]. If this attempt fails, obligations are imposed on the authority to assist the applicant in instituting the court proceedings and securing the safe return of the child.

The Hague Convention also sets out a basis upon which, if a child has been abducted, the court of the contracting state where the child is located must order its immediate return subject to certain exceptions[15]. The obligation to return the child arises when less than a year has elapsed from the date of the abduction to the date when the proceedings were commenced. After that period the child has to be returned unless it is demonstrated that the child has become settled in its new environment. Thus, the intention is to secure the immediate return of the abducted child. The Convention assumes that the merits of the custody dispute are best left to the State of the child’s habitual residence to decide. If an investigation as to the merits of the case is being undertaken in the State to which the child has been abducted, those proceedings must be stayed on the court being notified of the abduction[16].

The European Convention on the other hand is intended to give a person who has obtained in a contracting State a decision relating to the custody of a child the right to apply for that decision to be recognised and enforced in another contracting State. If a person has obtained a custody order in a foreign contracting State and wishes to have that order enforced in the United Kingdom, an application for registration must be made either to the High Court or Court of Session. The central authority[17] must offer the applicant assistance[18] if a request is made by the applicant or by the central authority for the contracting State where the custody order was made. Such assistance might include taking steps to discover the whereabouts of the child, securing the recognition or enforcement of the decision and, if enforcement is granted, arranging for the safe return of the child. It is for the courts of the contracting States and not for the central authority to consider whether a decision should be registered and, if the decision is registered, how it should be enforced. Decisions registered in the United Kingdom are enforced as if they have been made in the United Kingdom[19].

The contracting States both in relation to the Hague Convention and the European Convention are listed in S.I. 1998/256. The text of the relevant Schedules is set out for ease of reference in the appendix to this article.

The way forward for Jersey

There can be no doubt that Jersey must have legislative apparatus enabling it to achieve the aims of both the Hague Convention and the European Convention. The delay in enacting legislation to some extent flows from the work involved in the extensive reforms of the Children (Jersey) Law 1969 which are on the cusp of enactment.

The enactment of legislation similar to that of the United Kingdom ought not to be an unduly difficult task. In terms of both the Hague Convention and the European Convention, the Attorney General would discharge the functions of the central authority. In terms of the Hague Convention, the Royal Court would have jurisdiction to entertain applications under that Convention. In terms of the European Convention, recognition would be given to decisions relating to custody given in a contracting State. The Royal Court would assume a jurisdiction similar to that set out in section 15 of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 of the United Kingdom, thus providing a mechanism for challenging recognition on any of the grounds set out in Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention[20].

Again in the context of the European Convention, there would be provision enabling a person who had been granted custody rights by a judicial or administrative authority in a foreign contracting State to apply to the Royal Court to have the decision registered. The central authority[21] would be required to assist that person to make the application if a request for assistance were made by that person or by the central authority of the contracting State in question.

Under section 25 of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 of the United Kingdom, if a custody decision is registered pursuant to these powers, any United Kingdom custody order, supervision order, care order or parental rights resolution ceases to have effect. A similar provision would need to be made in respect of similar orders by Jersey courts.

It is difficult (without usurping the function of the Law Draftsman) to specify the further detail of the legislation. Certainly, intricate matters of procedure concerning variation and revocation of registered decisions, interim reports, suspension of the powers of the court and provisions for Rules of Court would figure in the projet de loi. The priority would be to ensure that Jersey take its place alongside other jurisdictions which already have legislative apparatus easing the burden (indeed the agony) of parents suddenly parted from their children.

There will also have to be specific provision clarifying criminal liability in relation to child abduction. The offence of kidnapping may well require to be defined in this context. The purpose of a Law which might be entitled “Criminal Law (Child Abduction) (Jersey) Law 2001” would be to provide that a person connected with a child under the age of 16 would be guilty of an offence if he or she took or sent the child out of the Bailiwick without the consent of the custodial parent or person ranking as a custodial parent. Again the precise detail of the statute is a matter for consideration, but ought to include the further offence of abduction by a person who is not the mother, father or guardian of a child or who is not a person who has custody.

Conclusion

It is submitted that the need for statutory reform is patent. There are three essential needs:-

(i) to facilitate judicial procedures when a child is taken and detained abroad;

(ii) to facilitate reciprocal recognition between jurisdictions of custodial orders;

(iii) to clarify criminal liability attaching to the abduction of children.

The legislation which would address these needs (whilst complex in certain respects) ought not to be too difficult. It is to be hoped that the necessary legislative apparatus may be in place before next year is out.

APPENDIX

CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION, THE HAGUE, OCTOBER 25th, 1980

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS CONCERNING CUSTODY OF CHILDREN AND ON THE RESTORATION OF CUSTODY OF CHILDREN, LUXEMBOURG, MAY 20TH, 1980

Steven Pallot is an advocate of the Royal Court and is a legal adviser in the Law Officers’ Department, Jersey.

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THEIRS IS NOT TO REASON WHY

Paul Matthews

In the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, caselaw is the key to the future, and reasons for judgment are the key to caselaw. Without the reasons, the judgment by itself is almost valueless. And the reasons avail nothing, if we do not know the facts.[22] Consider: if the judge says “A must pay a thousand pounds to B because he so promised”, in evaluating the significance of the decision it matters enormously whether A and B are two hard bitten businessmen who negotiated long and hard before concluding a contract under which A promised that sum to B in return for B’s performance, which has now occurred, or whether A is four years old and B was his mother who was threatening to confiscate his favourite toy if he did not agree.

Apart from the difficulty of ascertaining the significance of the decision in legal terms, there is the practical problem of making it difficult, if not impossible, for an appellate court to deal with any appeal against the order made. It is obvious, therefore, why the courts should not only give adequate reasons for their decisions, as the Jersey Court of Appeal has held,[23] but should also set out the facts, without which those reasons make no sense.

All the more regrettable, then, is the judgment given by the Commissioner in the case of In the Matter of the Westbury Settlement.[24] This was a case – to judge from the very short judgment delivered by the presiding judge – where there was some kind of mistake in recording the intention of the settlor in creating a written settlement, and an application was made to rectify the error.

We say “some kind of mistake in recording the intention of the settlor” (etc) as an educated guess, because we are not actually told in the judgment what the mistake was. Indeed, that is in fact the least of our ignorance. In addition we are not told (ii) the terms of the settlement as recorded, (iii) the terms of the settlement as intended, or (iv) what evidence there was of either. Nor are we told (v) where the settlement was made, (vi) where any of the parties came from, (vii) any of the circumstances leading up to its creation, including (viii) the settlor’s motives for creating it, (ix) what was the proper law of the trust, or even (x) (and amazingly) what order was being sought by the representor. You might have thought that most of these pieces of information were important, and you would be right. Indeed, the judgment not telling us these things is shorter than this note so far.

Instead the judge generously treats us to his view (presumably he has seen all the documents, and is accurately summarising this; but we are of course hypothesizing) that this is a

“straightforward application to rectify an error in the Deed of Settlement[25] which, if the rectification were not agreed by the Court would exclude those whom the Settlor wished to benefit. That would clearly be a nonsense.”

We must take his word for it. We know nothing of the error, or whom the settlor wished to benefit, or why the error would exclude those whom etc etc. And the idea of a “straightforward application to rectify an error”, however pleasing to a judge, is one to strike terror into the heart of an offshore jurisdiction’s financial services marketing department (“Jersey welcomes straightforward rectification actions”). As for the “nonsense”, well, as many of this jurisdiction’s brightest practitioners know, one man’s nonsense is another man’s tax planning, and perhaps someone else’s school fees as well.

What we do find out, from the heading to the decision, is that, in addition to counsel for the Representor (no, no clues; you’ll have to work out who that is), there also appeared “counsel for the unascertained beneficiaries” (no chance of finding out who they are, obviously), and “counsel for the ‘Cousins’” (sic). The judge does not explain what these latter persons are doing there, why they have been convened, or what part their constituents play in the trust. Although the judge makes clear that there are other beneficiaries (including the settlor), none of them appears to be present or represented. Was notice of the application given to them? We do not know.[26] As the King of Siam might have said, “It is a puzzlement”.

In the result, the Court acceded to the application. We do not complain at this. No doubt it was the just response. But, for lawyers, and the public generally (and after all they pay for the legal system), to derive any meaningful benefit from this precedent, the question is, Why?

We all know, even if we do not entirely believe, that it is not one of the purposes of courts’ sitting in public to retail interesting titbits about rich and famous people (although occasionally it does this as well); instead, and less excitingly, it is rather to keep judges up to the mark, by requiring their pronouncements to be subject to public scrutiny.[27] Plainly, this cannot happen if the judges do not make any public pronouncements, or (which comes to the same thing) on the whole the ones that they do make are so thin as to be inscrutable. This judge’s remarks are inscrutable, in the best sense of the word, because we are unable to tell from them what he was doing and why.

We have already dealt with the facts. As for the law, the judge in his judgment deals only with two[28] of the (very many[29]) Jersey cases on rectification of trust instruments. But what he says about those cases is practically unintelligible. First the judge says that

“There were a number of tests laid down by this Court, for allowing such a rectification”.

You might therefore imagine that this would give way to an analysis of the cases. It does not. There is not even a single citation from them. Instead the judge simply mentions the two cases already referred to, and then makes three remarks, none of which has anything to do with the question in hand (ie what is the appropriate test to apply to a – completely unexplained – mistake – of an unknown nature - by an unidentified person).

The three remarks are:

(i) one of the present counsel was in one of the cases;

(ii) he (the judge) was in the other;

(iii) the latter case was a tax case, and therefore “not very much in point”.

Only then does the judge summarise (not quote) what he says is the test to be drawn from one of those cases (which of them is not made clear), and follow it. Although it is quite uncertain which case is being referred to, the context unfortunately suggests that it isthe one that the judge just stigmatized as “not very much in point”. This test does not take into account (how could it?) the cases that were not mentioned, and in particular the latest of them,[30] which had expressly laid down the principles to be followed by the Royal Court in cases of this kind in future. Fortunately, there is not much difference between the test laid down in that case and that applied in this.

There will not of course be an appeal, because the parties have got what they needed. A regrettable error - whatever it was - has been corrected. The water has closed over the head of the erroneous – and now weighted and jettisoned - trust instrument, and the parties have closed ranks against – let us be realistic here – the relevant foreign Revenue authority. The file can be put away.

From the point of view of the consumers of offshore services in this jurisdiction, and therefore of the taxpayers of this jurisdiction, whose relatively happy fiscal circumstances are in part the result of those services being in demand internationally, it would be comforting to know that the costs of this – straightforward - application (which will not have been less than five figures, and may even have been six) will fall upon the pockets of the (undoubtedly professional, and therefore insured) person or persons who made the mistake, and not upon the trust fund itself (ie the monies brought by the – undoubtedly not local - settlor into the jurisdiction from outside). But even that modest comfort is not to be. The judgment says nothing about any costs order that may have been made.

It used to be said that the only appeal from a decision of the House of Lords was a note in the Law Quarterly Review. Where (as here) there can be no appeal, this is the local equivalent.

Paul Matthews is a solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales and a consultant with the firm Withers, 16, Old Bailey, London, EC4M 7EG.

[1] [2001] 5 JL Review 7

[2] Levi "Incriminating Disclosures. An Evaluation of Money Laundering in England and Wales"; European Journal of Crime 1995 (2) p 206

[3] See also "Anti-Money Laundering Guidance Notes for the Finance Sector" issued by the Jersey Financial Services Commission

[4] "Trust Company Business Codes of Practice" issued by the Jersey Financial Services Commission

[5] "Overriding Principles for a revised Know Your Customer Framework - Consultation December 2000" issued by the Jersey Financial Services Commission

[6] Article 37(4) to (7) Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999

[7] Breach of the due diligence and compliance procedures made under Article 37 of the Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999 carries penalties for individuals of imprisonment for up to two years and/or a fine

[8] Walsh v Rother District Council [1978] 1 All ER 510 at page 514 per Donaldson J.; Wotherspoon v H.M. Advocate 1978 J.C. 74

[9] See as an introductory Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edition) Volume 5(2) para 977

[10] 2000 JLR N-58. For the full judgment see series of unreported judgments, September 25th, 2000. [Both Jersey and Belgium in this case were not parties to the Convention]

[11] Just such a case occurred when children were abducted from Jersey to Germany (see the case of Dr Uwe Eichner reported in Jersey Evening Post on June 23rd, 2000)

[12] In England and Wales the central authority is the Lord Chancellor; in Scotland it is the Secretary of State.

[13] See Article 9 of the Convention

[14] Ibid Article 7

[15] Ibid Articles 12 and 13 under which the abductor must establish one of the exceptions

[16] Ibid Article 16

[17] The Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State (see footnote 4 above)

[18] See Article 5 of the Convention

[19] See section 18 Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985

[20] Articles 9 and 10 provide grounds for refusing an application to recognise or enforce a custody decision

[21] The Attorney General

[22] See Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495 at 506, per Lord Halsbury

[23] Todman v Black 1980 JJ 255 at 257

[24] Royal Court, March 26th, 2001 unreported

[25] Not an expression known to Jersey law: is this a clue as to the proper law of the trust?

[26] Compare the position in Re Representation Détente Ltd, November 26th, 1998 unreported, Royal Ct (cited by the present court), where this point is made clear on the face of the decision

[27] Scott v Scott [ 1913] AC 417, HL; Re JW Rosedale Investments Ltd 1995 JLR 123 at 126-127; cf Re Esteem Settlement 1995 JLR 266 (Beddoe application)

[28] Re Moody ‘A’ Settlement 1990 JLR 264; Re Representation Détente Ltd, November 26th, 1998 unreported

[29] Those not dealt with by the judgment – presumably not cited – include Re Williams (1975) 262 Ex 261, Re McCreery (1978) 265 Ex 87, Re Bazley (1979) 266 Ex 360, Re Seale, July 22nd, 1983 unreported, Re Coleman, July 12th, 1985 unreported, Wimborne v Abacus (CI) Ltd 1987-88 JLR N-22, Re the GJ Saunders Children’s Jersey Settlement, April 4th, 1991 unreported, Re Representation Abacus (CI) Ltd, Trustees of the Anvar Trust, December 4th, 1991 unreported, Re Representation Madeley, March 30th, 1992 unreported, Cansolt Trustees Ltd v Madge (1994) 14 Trust Law International 111, Re Chase Bank and Trust Co (CI) Ltd, June 2nd, 1998 unreported, and Re Representations Le Sueur and Raleigh Nominees Ltd (1999) 1 WTLR 137. Cansolt Trustees made clear that the settlor’s ignorance of his advisers’ mistake was an important consideration, but the present case does not address that issue

[30] Re Representations Le Sueur and Raleigh Nominees Ltd (1999) 1 WTLR 137