IN THE EMPLOYMENT AND DISCRIMINATION TRIBUNAL
IN THE MATTER:
BETWEEN
|
JUSTINE WILKINSON
|
CLAIMANT
|
|
AND
|
|
|
FAIRWAY TRUST LIMITED
|
RESPONDENT
|
TRIBUNAL
JUDGMENT
Reference: [2020] TRE 091
Hearing Date: 18-21 January 2021
Before: Advocate Cyril
Whelan, Deputy Chairman
Appearance:
For the Claimant: Advocate
Nuno Santos-Costa, Collas Crill
For the Respondent: Advocate Huw Thomas, Carey Olsen
JUDGMENT
The claim for unfair dismissal is
unsuccessful.
The claim for wrongful dismissal
is unsuccessful.
REASONS
1. The
Claimant (“Mrs. Wilkinson“) is a senior financial services professional. She
was employed as a director by the Respondent (“the company”) for some four and
a half years. The company is a regulated financial services business.
2. During
her employment, a friendship developed between Mrs. Wilkinson and one of the
company’s male clients (“the client”) for whom she and her team provided
professional services. The entity associated with him is referred to as ‘P
Holdings’ in this judgment. The friendship included weekends away together and,
notably, a birthday present from the client to Mrs. Wilkinson of a carbon frame
bicycle worth some £1,200.
3. In
that way, a position of conflict arose between Mrs. Wilkinson‘s personal life
and the needs of the company that
employed her.
4. The
company has a written procedure governing conflicts of interest by which Mrs.
Wilkinson, as an employee, was contractually bound. She did not follow that
procedure. In failing to do so she placed the company in breach of its
regulatory obligations and rendered it vulnerable in other ways.
5. Full
disciplinary proceedings took place, including an appeal, and were properly
minuted. Those proceedings were unexceptionable.
6. As
to the statutory claim, the company says that in all the circumstances her
dismissal was fair. I have reached the same conclusion.
7. As
to the common law claim the company has characterized the conduct as gross
misconduct and again, I have reached the same conclusion. The company says that
the conduct has caused it to lose its trust and confidence in Mrs. Wilkinson. I
regard that outcome as practically inevitable given the facts of the case and
having seen and listened to the witnesses.
8. Mrs.
Wilkinson says that she did not hide the fact of her friendship with the client
and did alternative things sufficient to negate her breach of the company’s
written procedure. I disagree about the nature and effect of those alternative
things, and have found that her dismissal was neither unfair nor a breach of
her contract of employment.
Friendship
with Clients
9. I
preface the remainder of this judgment by emphasizing that the company has no
rule forbidding friendships with clients, (Article 8 ECHR considerations might
arise if it did so, but it does not). What the company reasonably required was
the opportunity to manage conflicts in a way satisfactory to all involved
including, in particular, the regulator.
10. On
the question of the relationship I am critical of persistent attempts by senior
members, particularly male officers of the company to get Mrs. Wilkinson to
expand on the nature of the friendship: “Was it physical?”, “Was it romantic?”
I respect Mrs. Wilkinson’s repeated refusal to descend into that sort of
detail. The known facts were patently sufficient to place the matter within the
requirements of the conflict of interest procedure, and that should have been
enough. In so far as friendships can be said to comprise a spectrum it was
clear on the known facts that this friendship lay at the upper end for conflict
purposes. Her refusal to be drawn into further detail has been characterised by
the Company as evidence of lack of cooperation; I do not regard it in that
light.
11. I
received submissions from counsel for the company arguing the relevance of the
physical/romantic line of questioning, but was unpersuaded.
12. I
have had closely to consider whether questions put by management to Mrs.
Wilkinson on this front have vitiated the fairness of the disciplinary
investigation / hearings of which she was the subject. I have studied the
papers with care and find that the relevant minutes, noticeably well kept,
demonstrate that Mrs. Wilkinson remained comfortably capable of putting her case
throughout and was properly listened to by those questioning her.
The Complaints
13. By
a claim form dated 9th June 2020, Mrs. Wilkinson brought the following
complaints:
a) unfair
dismissal;
b) wrongful
dismissal (failure to give notice to terminate employment).
The
Response
14. By
a response form presented on 2nd July 2020, the company denied the claims.
The Parties
The
Claimant:
15. Mrs.
Wilkinson was employed by the company from 12th October 2015 until 24th April
2020 when her employment was terminated by a finding of gross misconduct. At
the time of her dismissal Mrs. Wilkinson held the position of director.
16. She
has particular expertise in compliance matters and was one of the most senior
people employed by the company and related corporate entities. She was a
principal person and an authorized ‘A’ signatory. She was also the board member
with the oversight brief on compliance matters within the company. Part of her
role as director meant that she had responsibility for coaching and mentoring
senior team members. This meant acting as a role model for them as regards
standards and behaviours. She was part of the company’s span of control.
17. It
is right at this point to give a full indication of the reputation which Mrs.
Wilkinson enjoyed among some of her colleagues. Emma Craggs, one such
colleague, wrote to Matt Ebbrell, head of HR when this matter had become known,
in terms which included the following:
“I would maintain wholeheartedly that in my mind
Justine would never deliberately seek to mislead, cover up, or fraudulently
complete paperwork for her own gain. It would be incomprehensible to me that
she would compromise or jeopardize her position as a principal person with 30
years industry experience. I have worked with Justine since November 2001 and not
once have I ever felt that she was anything but honest, hard-working, and
supportive of our entire team and the business with which we have been employed
at together during this period. With regards to the COI form itself, I recall
discussion between Justine, Rebecca Taylor, and myself when Justine advised us
of a friendship outside of work with the client as to whether a separate COI
should be filed in order to note that we were aware of this friendship. As we
were however aware that a COI had been filed and the COI register updated by
the company secretary I rightly or wrongly presumed that a separate COI need
not be filed.”
The format in which that memo is written does not
enable me to note the date, but it appears in file two of the Hearing Files at tab
41 [references to those files will now be formulated thus: [2/41/ (followed by
a page number where appropriate)].
18. Also
included in that file is a letter of 22 October 2020 from Lorraine Wheeler
written in her capacity as President of the Jersey Association of Trust
Companies. Among other things, she says that she has known Mrs. Wilkinson for
17 years and that Mrs. Wilkinson always acted with honesty and integrity and
was a cooperative and attentive team player. It was a pleasure to work with her
during the time together as directors of another company. Additionally, Mrs.
Wilkinson has been a great support for the Jersey Association of Trust
Companies and gives a lot of time back to the industry in which she works. [2/88]
I have kept these assessments in mind throughout my deliberations on this case.
19. Further,
Mrs. Wilkinson has been in the financial services industry for 30 years, for
almost 20 years of which she has held Principal Person status. During that time
there have been no blemishes of character or reason to doubt her honesty or
integrity. That is how she put it at the disciplinary appeal hearing held on
Friday 22 May [2/55/2]. It was not disputed.
The Company:
20. The
company is a regulated financial services business offering trust, fund, and
pension services. The evidence has satisfied me that this was a company which
worked hard properly to meet the regulatory obligations to which it was subject
and had good written procedures in place which had been designed to achieve
that aim. It was apparent that every member of the Company who gave evidence at
the hearing had a firm grasp of the principles of conflict management and took
them very seriously. Regular training had been provided by the company.
What is Disputed?
21. There
is no difficulty about the events of the friendship itself between Mrs.
Wilkinson and the client. It involved weekends away together in London, wining
and dining and the receipt by Mrs. Wilkinson of a £1,200 carbon frame bicycle.
Nothing of that is in dispute. It is not disputed that this gave rise to a
position of conflict. In an email of 19th April 2020 to the dismissing
officers, Mrs. Wilkinson herself speaks of her ‘conflicted position’ [2/78/1].
What is disputed is the detail of Mrs. Wilkinson‘s duty to the company in these
circumstances, and the severity of the disciplinary sanction – summary
dismissal. As counsel for Mrs. Wilkinson put it in opening, she had made some
mistakes but the punishment did not fit the crime. Loss of employment and a
finding of gross misconduct were disproportionate sanctions. What she had done
did not amount to gross misconduct, he said.
Conflicts
of Interest; Policy and Procedure; Mrs. Wilkinson’s Defaults
22. The
company has a written conflict of interests policy. It emphasizes the need
formally to declare conflicts, it explains the risks to which non-compliance
gives rise, including regulatory risk, it gives examples, one of which reads as
follows:
“accepting a gift, benefit, or
hospitality\entertainment from a client (please refer to the 4.06 gifts and
benefits policy and procedure)” Counsel for Mrs. Wilkinson was to rely on this
pathway, as will be seen.
23. In
this written conflict of interest procedure, reference is made to the governing
regulatory provisions, including the Trust Company Business Code of Practice,
the JFSC‘s Code of Conduct and “Dear CEO” letter. Reference is also made to the
Corruption (Jersey) Law 2006 and the UK Bribery Act 2010.
24. The
document includes a procedure, one of the main features of which requires a
person identifying an actual or potential conflict of interest to notify the
company secretary within 1 working day. Mrs. Wilkinson did not do this.
25. Under
the procedure, the employee is required to use the conflict notification form
part of which requires inclusion of details of parties affected and the
proposed or already implemented risk management measures, and action taken (a
specimen example is provided.) Once the form is completed the affected employee
must sign and date the form to evidence their satisfaction with the proposed or
actual management measures. Mrs. Wilkinson left this part of the form blank.
26. Crucially,
the completed form must be passed to the “employee’s overseeing director and\or
the relevant client services director to evidence that those affected by, and
concerned with, the oversight and management of the conflict are aware and are
satisfied with the company’s management of it.” Mrs. Wilkinson did not do this
or cause it to be done.
27. Next,
the form had to be passed to an independent director for review and sign off.
The rationale and importance of this are explained. Mrs. Wilkinson did not do
this or cause it to be done.
28. The
policy sets out examples of how conflicts could be easily managed. That part of
the policy includes the following:
“where a particularly
unusual or complex conflict situation arises, it is important to discuss the
risk management measures with the Co. Sec. and it may be necessary to seek
compliance advice to ensure risk management measures are adequate.”
The policy
contains extensive provisions for the taking of advice, the disclosure of the
conflict to all directly affected parties, and for the review and monitoring of
conflicts.
29. As
a result of Mrs. Wilkinson’s conduct, none of these provisions was engaged as
required by the policy. There is no dispute about the fact that Mrs. Wilkinson
is contractually bound to meet the requirements of this policy and procedure.
Paragraph 6.4 (d) of her contract of employment refers. [1/17/8].
30. Plainly,
the company placed great importance on the declaration and management of
conflicts as one would expect of a reputable financial services provider in a
properly regulated international finance centre. The policy is helpfully
drafted, collaborative in tone and the procedure to be followed is set out as
clearly as may be.
31. Counsel
for the company led Mrs. Wilkinson through the form, and the series of
deficiencies which I have just described was apparent.
Mrs.
Wilkinson’s Alternative
32. So
much for what Mrs. Wilkinson should have done, but left undone. I now turn to
what she did, and consider her proposition that what she did was an adequate
alternative to following the procedure by which she was contractually bound.
33. Mrs.
Wilkinson claims in her written submission and evidence to have done the
following things. They are set out from paragraph 9 onward of her written
submission and confirmed by her in evidence. I take them from the written
submission as follows:
“From the
offset the Claimant discussed matters with Christine Jervier who is both the
group head of compliance and risk, and the money laundering reporting officer
at Fairway.
On the 18
December 2019, the Claimant sought advice from Ms. Jervier as to whether or not
the Claimant had to disclose a conflict as a result of the friendship with (the
client). Ms. Jervier initially advised the client that a conflict of interest
form did not need to be submitted.
On 1st
January 2020, the Claimant sent an email to Ms. Jervier with a view to
repeating her thoughts following the discussion on 18th December 2019 in
relation to the conflict of interest and also to confirm that she was adhering
to Fairway’s policies. [2/64]
Ms.
Jervier spoke with Matt Ebbrell, HR director at Fairway and following his
response on 7th January 2020 [2/66] Ms. Jervier changed her mind and advised
the Claimant that having thought about it she would like to discuss the
conflict of interest further. [1/10/4.6]
Following
this further discussion with Ms. Jervier, the Claimant completed a conflict of
interest form. [1/23]
The Claimant
sent Ms. Jervier a conflict of interest form for review on 8 January 2020
[1/23] and Ms. Jervier responded with some amendments including ticking the box
for “personal relationship”, which Mrs. Wilkinson had left blank. [1.24]
Mrs.
Wilkinson had, however, included this narrative on the form “FTL took on a new
entity in Q2 of 2019 for which I am the Director responsible. I have been
developing a friendship with an individual connected to that entity and we met
up in London for a weekend at the end of November 2019. Following this, I met
with Christine Jervier, MLCO, on 18 December 2019 and discussed the potential
conflict of interest. At that time Christine did not think that a conflict
notification was required.
We have
arranged to meet up for [sic] in London for a further weekend towards the end
of January 2020. As a result I sent an email to Christine on 1 January to
confirm the above discussions and to notify her of our plans to meet up again later
this month.
Following
a further meeting on 8 January 2020, Christine recommended that I submit a
Conflict of Interest Form to note the developing friendship as noted above.”
As to
foreseen repercussions, Mrs. Wilkinson entered this on the form: “No foreseen
repercussions at this stage as we are developing a friendship. In order to be
transparent I wish to note the file accordingly.”
“On 9th
January 2020, the Claimant emailed the conflict of interest form to Sara de Sa
Leao [1/6/4] the company secretary for the company, noting that it been signed
by both the Claimant and Ms. Jervier and requesting that it be placed on the
conflict of interest register.
On the
same day as the Claimant filed a conflict of interest form, she discussed a
conflict with Mark Andrews, a director at Fairway. The claimant advised Mr.
Andrews who the client was and of the developing friendship. The Claimant
explained to Mr. Andrews that in relation to P Holdings, Fairway were not
appointed directors of the entity and nor were they on the bank mandate; also,
P Holdings was a fixed fee client.
The
conflict of interest register was presented to the Fairway board for its
quarterly meeting on 7th February 2020. As the Claimant was abroad on a
business trip at the time of the quarterly meeting, she spoke with Mr. Andrews
beforehand and asked that he provide the board with any details in relation to
the conflict of interest which she had disclosed.
Upon the Claimant’s
return to the office on 13th February 2020 she asked Mr. Andrews whether any
issues had been raised in relation to the conflict of interest. Mr. Andrews
confirmed that no issues or questions were raised.”
34. Mrs.
Wilkinson also sets out that while in the Middle East on a business trip with
Graeme Fairlie she mentioned to him the gift of a bicycle which she had
received and together they looked up the company’s handbook and found that
while gifts from clients are mentioned, personal gifts are not.
35. Even
supposing that these things could sensibly be taken as an alternative respectively
to the requirements of the Conflicts of Interest and Gifts and Business
Benefits policies, should what Mrs. Wilkinson says be taken at face value? To
examine that, I turn to the detailed evidence of those named by her. I see no
alternative, despite the effect on the length of this judgment.
Christine
Jervier
36. The
statement and evidence of Christine Jervier are to the following effect. She
joined the company in 2016 and her job is Global Head of Compliance and Risk
Management. Throughout her time with the company she has known Mrs. Wilkinson
who was the lead director (oversight) for all compliance matters. She worked
closely with Mrs. Wilkinson reviewing group policies and procedures. Mrs.
Wilkinson was also mainly responsible for reviewing and approving any group
policies and procedures. In fact it was Mrs. Wilkinson who had reviewed and
approved the Conflict of Interest policy and procedure. Her knowledge of
regulation was excellent, and she was
the company’s representative on the Jersey Association of Trust Companies. Mrs.
Wilkinson would consult with Mrs. Jervier about potential new business, and on
any matters raised in connection with existing clients. Mrs. Jervier would also
seek Mrs. Wilkinson’s opinion on compliance matters and new regulatory requirements.
They would discuss these things routinely.
37. Mrs.
Jervier says that she and Mrs. Wilkinson had a good relationship and would
occasionally meet outside work for dinner and a drink and to discuss aspects of
their respective private lives. They occupied a comparable level at the
company; neither was senior to the other.
38. This
question of the rank of their respective posts was to be addressed later in the
hearing by those at the head of the company. Alistair Rothwell and Mrs.
Bracken-Smith gave evidence to like effect on this point. As to the comparative
positions of Mrs. Jervier and Mrs. Wilkinson within the organization, Mrs.
Wilkinson was senior. Mrs. Jervier reports to the Board of Directors of which
Mrs. Wilkinson is a member. Mrs. Wilkinson is the director with the special
remit for compliance (other directors have a special remit covering other areas
of the business – IT and Business Development were given as examples). Mrs.
Jervier was subordinate to Mrs. Wilkinson and all other directors. She reported
directly to Mrs. Bracken-Smith as regards one-to-one management.
39. I
interpose to say that among the emails in the main file is one signed off by
Mrs. Wilkinson to Mrs. Jervier with a friendly kiss. I take this to support
Mrs. Jervier’s description of the friendly relationship between them. [
2/65/1]
40. Mrs.
Jervier goes on to say that staff receive six monthly reminders via email of
the Gifts and Business Benefits policy and procedures. Moreover, all staff
receive bribery prevention online training on an annual basis. Staff must
complete an annual staff declaration directed to the various company policies
and procedures. All staff must declare their awareness and understanding of the
policies.
41. The
evidence of Mrs. Jervier went on to show that 18th December 2019 was her last
day in the office before Christmas annual leave. That was the day of her
Christmas team lunch and on her return to the office at around 3pm Mrs.
Wilkinson asked to speak to her. She replied that she was under some pressure
to complete tasks before leaving for the holidays. Mrs. Wilkinson appeared quite
emotional, so Mrs. Jervier relented and they went to a coffee shop near the
office at Mrs. Wilkinson‘s suggestion. This was unusual as they would normally
meet within the office.
42. During
the meeting Mrs. Wilkinson was tearful. She wanted advice on whether she should
declare a conflict of interest. She explained that in November 2019 she had
been on a weekend away with someone whom she had originally met as a client of
the company. She said that she was “developing a relationship with him” but at
this time it was in a purely professional capacity nothing more. I interpose to
say that the contradiction is self-evident, if indeed that is what was said.
43. It
transpires that Mrs. Wilkinson was talking about the client and P Holdings. She
says that Mrs. Wilkinson did not tell her that the client was a director of P
Holdings, or name him; Mrs. Wilkinson’s evidence was that she did.
44. She
went on to tell Mrs. Jervier that the company provided only limited services to
P Holdings, providing no more than company secretary and registered office
services. The company did not provide directors of the entity and had no bank
account mandate. Mrs. Wilkinson was not in a position to influence the affairs
of the entity in question. In those circumstances Mrs. Jervier told Mrs. Wilkinson
that a conflict of interest form was not needed.
45. On
1st January 2020, Mrs. Wilkinson emailed Mrs. Jervier from her personal email
address summarising the conversation which had taken place between them on 18
December in the coffee shop, adding that the client had invited her to London
for a second weekend together, planned for late January 2020.
46. Mrs.
Jervier felt uncomfortable with the position and on her return to the office
after Christmas leave, she spoke with the head of HR, Matt Ebbrell. His view
was that Mrs. Wilkinson should complete a conflict of interest form and that it
should be processed in accordance with the
conflict of interest procedure. He confirmed this in an email of 7th
January 2020. [2/66] Accordingly, Mrs. Jervier emailed Mrs. Wilkinson that same
day to tell her that she should complete a conflict of interest form.
47. That
same day Mrs. Jervier and Mrs. Wilkinson met to discuss the conflict of
interest. Mrs. Jervier advised that the account should be moved to another
director within the firm to remove the conflict of interest. Mrs. Wilkinson
replied that the client had said that if this happened, he would transfer the
account to another service provider. I
interpose to say that Mrs. Wilkinson said the contrary in an email of 19th
April 2020 to the dismissing officers [2/78/1].
48. During
this meeting Mrs. Wilkinson said that she had let two members of her team know
the position about the friendship. Mrs. Wilkinson also said that the client was
not a director on the client entity
account. She still had not named him.
49. On
about 9th January 2020 Mrs. Wilkinson sent Mrs. Jervier a conflict of interest
form, part of which she had filled in. Mrs. Jervier reviewed it the same day
but noticed that some of the information was missing – the box for “personal
relationship” was not ticked and information about what warning would be placed
on the company’s client data system [NavOne] was also missing. The form noted
that members of Mrs. Wilkinson’s team were aware of the friendship with the
client and that Mrs. Wilkinson would not be required to sign on behalf of the
entity or to release payments.
50. Mrs.
Wilkinson approached Christine Jervier at her desk and asked her to sign the
conflict of interest form. Christine Jervier describes this as ‘unusual’
because normally the relevant director would sign the form. I interpose to say
that this was an express requirement plainly set out on the form.
51. Mrs.
Jervier told Mrs. Wilkinson that she should get a director or her line manager
Mrs. Bracken - Smith to sign it as well, before submitting it to the company secretary
in accordance with the procedural requirement. Mrs. Wilkinson replied that she
did not want to be asked any questions by Mrs. Bracken - Smith about the
relationship or to give any personal details. Mrs. Jervier went ahead and
signed the form and, in her evidence, accepts that in hindsight she should not
have done so. The evidence demonstrates that she has since been disciplined by
the company for having done so.
52. On
about 13th of February 2020 on returning from a business trip Mrs. Wilkinson
discussed with Mrs. Jervier having received a bicycle from the client - again
not mentioned by name – and told her that it was a birthday present sent to her
home address. She gave the example of some wine having previously been declared
on a conflict of interest form and said that at the time a distinction had been
drawn between gifts sent to the office and gifts sent to the home address. The
latter were to be regarded as personal gifts and would not need to be declared.
Mrs. Jervier says that she would not expect a Director to mislead her and did
not question the matter further. No declaration was made in respect of the
bicycle which, it will be recalled, cost some £1,200 pounds.
53. On
2nd April 2020 Mrs. Jervier received an email unexpectedly from Mrs. Wilkinson
asking her to confirm the conversations outlined above. [2/74]
54. Four
days later, on 6 April 2020 Mrs. Jervier was interviewed by Alastair Rothwell,
Chairman of the Fairway group of companies, as part of an internal
investigation. Following that investigation she realized that Mrs. Wilkinson
had not been completely open with her. Mrs. Wilkinson had given her the
impression that other team members would deal with the day-to-day running of
the account. She had never named the client and it was only during the
investigation that Mrs. Jervier became aware of his identity. She says this: “I
feel that she used and manipulated me because of my personal friendship with
her – I based my decisions on what she told me as a director. It was only
during the investigation that further information was disclosed to me.”
55. She
goes on to say that around May 2018 the client file review showed that the P
Holdings account had discrepancies in the take-on. The source of wealth and
source of funds details for the client were missing, the business rationale was
unclear and not reflected in the tax advice received, various documents had not
been signed, not enough information was held regarding the business or its
assets and there was no list showing the comprehensive portfolio of properties
under management by the P Holdings structure. Mrs. Jervier remarks that this
was unusual as Mrs. Wilkinson always maintained high standards with her other
clients. These faults have now been corrected and another director is
responsible for the account.
56. I
interpose to point out that in evidence it emerged that take-on arrangements
were dealt with by a team of people, including the New Business Committee. The
blame for any defects could not fairly be attributed exclusively to Mrs.
Wilkinson. What is more, Mrs. Wilkinson had received an email from Mr. Rothwell
itemising the alleged deficiencies; she had replied with reasoned answers in a
document of her own. I asked for that document to be produced at the hearing;
it was, it forms part of the evidence, and I have taken account of it.
57. At
this point, then, there is evidence of a form signed by a person with no
authority to sign it, unaware of all the facts, in particular the client’s
identity and status within the client structure, a friend who had been
approached to depart from the required procedure, in respect of a client
structure about which there was insufficient information.
58. At
the 18th December coffee shop conversation, Mrs. Wilkinson had mentioned the
November trip away but was emotional and Mrs. Jervier thought that she just
needed a friend to talk to. Mrs. Wilkinson gave her no background information –
no name was volunteered and no mention of the fact that the person in question
was a Director of the client entity. Had she known that a Director was the
person Mrs. Wilkinson was speaking about, Mrs. Jervier’s reaction would have
been very different, she said in evidence.
59. On
her return to work after the Christmas holiday, she received the email sent by
Mrs. Wilkinson as a record of the coffee shop meeting, felt uncomfortable with
it and consulted Mr. Ebbrell, but without naming Justine Wilkinson.
60. When
a conflict of interest form was to be filed eventually, Mrs. Wilkinson had come
to her desk and asked her to sign because no other directors were around. Mrs.
Jervier had done so.
61. On
the question of the bicycle Mrs. Jervier did not know why Mrs. Wilkinson had
approached her, but on the latter’s account that gifts sent to a personal
address did not need declaring, Mrs. Jervier had accepted that no gift
declaration need be made. Mrs. Wilkinson was a Director, had always had high
standards and Mrs. Jervier did not believe that she would mislead her. It was a
case, said Mrs. Jervier, of having to drop what you were working on in order to
listen to Mrs. Wilkinson. I find as a fact that Mrs. Jervier did not know the
name of the client or his status vis a vis the client entity.
62. The
form, such as it was, was passed to the company secretary, and it is at this
point that the evidence of another director, Mark Andrews, becomes relevant.
Mark
Andrews
63. He
recalls that on 9 January 2020 he and Mrs. Wilkinson had been to lunch with a
client, a lunch which included a couple of bottles of wine shared between four
people. He says that when walking back to the office from that lunch Mrs.
Wilkinson told him that she was building a relationship with a third-party that
she had met through the office. She said that the person concerned was not an
actual client of the company but was “more an intermediary” I interpose to say
that at the hearing, Mrs. Wilkinson denied having said that.
64. Mr.
Andrews recalled a general discussion with Mrs. Wilkinson confirming that a
conflict of interest form had been submitted. He does not remember discussing
the name of the client structure or the individual to whom Mrs. Wilkinson was
referring. He does not recall any mention of trips to London.
65. Later
that afternoon, he recalls a brief discussion about the conflict of interest
and that Mrs. Wilkinson would be away at the time of the next board meeting. He
says this:
“I don’t recall the exact conversation or whether
I’d been asked to provide more detail should it come up at the board meeting. I
do know, however, that if I had, I would’ve received the conflict of interest
prior to the meeting and made notes etc. so I would’ve been prepared.”
66. His
evidence about the company’s board pack for the quarterly meeting is that it
would run to some 250 pages and his practice was to pick out what was relevant
to his role.
67. In
the event, the conflict of interest was not discussed at the February board
meeting, and Mr. Andrews cannot remember whether Mrs. Wilkinson followed up
with him on her return from the business trip which had kept her away from the
board meeting.
68. Sometime
after that, Mr. Andrews recalls another informal conversation in the kitchen at
work. On that occasion Mrs. Wilkinson mentioned having received the gift of a
bicycle from the client and Mr. Andrews recalls saying: “make sure it’s
declared and follow the procedures.” The conversation did not go much further
than that because Mr. Andrews was not Mrs. Wilkinson’s line Manager:
“Mrs.
Wilkinson was the director in charge of compliance. I used to go to her for
compliance advice, so I didn’t feel it was necessary for me to say more than I
did.”
When she mentioned the bicycle
during the kitchen conversation Mr. Andrews still understood that it had come
from ‘an intermediary’ and not a client. Mr. Andrews gave evidence that having
mentioned the need to follow the procedures, he had no interest in the matter.
69. He
also gave evidence that there were quite informal Directors’ meetings at work
from time to time over sandwiches. Mrs. Wilkinson attended these but had never,
to Mr. Andrews’s knowledge, mentioned the client or the conflict.
70. I
find as facts that Mr. Andrews was not asked to provide extra information to
the February quarterly board meeting should the need arise; that he advised
Mrs. Wilkinson to declare the gift of the bicycle and to follow the necessary
procedures; that she described the client to Mr. Andrews as not a client but
more an intermediary; that she attended the directors’ informal sandwich
lunches from time to time.
Graeme
Fairlie
71. The
evidence of Graeme Fairlie is relevant at this point. He is the business
development manager of the company and says that he knew Mrs. Wilkinson
socially even before she joined the company. “We had a good relationship as we
knew each other quite well and were chatty when we were together.”
72. He
speaks of a business trip to the Middle East together. In his statement, he
speaks of a conversation during which Mrs. Wilkinson became very emotional and
spoke about a client of hers. In the course of the evidence he spoke of tears
in her eyes as she spoke of the gift of a bicycle and not knowing what to do.
He regarded this conversation in a hotel lobby in Oman as Mrs. Wilkinson
confiding in him as a friend and colleague because she did not know what to do
about an expensive gift coming from a client. He knew the identity of the
client
73. Mr.
Fairlie went on to say in evidence that he is not a compliance man, his field
being business development, but to try to help her in her emotional state he
suggested that they check the company’s Gifts Policy. They did so by going
online to the company’s intranet together. He did this out of friendship and
care for Mrs. Wilkinson’s wellbeing. They read the Gifts and Business Benefits
Policy together. It was clear that client gifts had to be declared. The client
was a client and she was the Director working on the account. It seemed plain
to Mr. Fairlie, but as he put it in evidence “Why ask me? I’m just the business
development guy.” In any event he told her that if she declared the gift, she
would be doing the right thing. She thanked him, and he left her to do the
right thing. They agreed that she would need to follow the procedure and
declare the gift to protect herself.
74. He
recalls her mentioning a trip to London with the client and talk of opera,
champagne and dinners. It seemed to him that more and more ‘red flags’ were
appearing, and he believed that Mrs. Wilkinson would do the right thing and
follow the company’s policies and procedures.
75. During
this conversation Mrs. Wilkinson told him that the client had given her a
bicycle and that she felt compromised. She mentioned:
“Other gift of sorts,
for instance, she and the client had a trip to London during which he hired out
of box at the Opera. There were four seats in the box but just the two of them
attending. She also said they had stayed at a hotel; it wasn’t clear if they
had shared a room and I didn’t pry. But I recall her saying something about him
buying her a very expensive glass of champagne for around £70, which she seemed
to be very impressed about. She spoke fondly of the client and I had the
impression she cared about him.”
76. Of
particular surprise to him had been Mrs. Wilkinson’s account of having collected
the bicycle from the shop and having taken it home without declaring it. His
approach would have been to leave it where it was and gone to his line manager,
such would have been the direction set by his moral compass, as he put it. Mr.
Fairlie told her that given that she had already accepted the bicycle she would
need to disclose it. She replied that she agreed and said words to the effect
that she would do so.
77. Mr.
Fairlie’s indignation and hurt at having been drawn into this matter by Mrs. Wilkinson’s
approach to him were apparent as he gave his evidence. This whole business had
nothing to do with him and he had simply tried to help and advise her at a time
of her evident distress, he said.
78. They
returned to Jersey and shortly after Mrs. Wilkinson went on a family holiday to
Mexico. Mr. Fairlie assumed that she had declared the gift of the bicycle. He
produced in evidence a WhatsApp exchange around February 2020. His part reads:
“hey – that’s good news, you did the right thing and all is fine. Nothing to
worry about – go and enjoy your holidays X.” Her part reads: “it is good news.
I chatted to the client about it yesterday and then spoke to Christine this
morning and she says it is all blown up and is a non-issue for her. Just wanted
to let Mark know as he had signed off the conflict form with me X.” [ 2/90]
Once more, an exchange of friendly kisses gives some indication of the
relations between them.
79. Clearly,
Mr. Andrews had not signed off the conflicts form with Mrs. Wilkinson. She
explained during the course of her evidence that rather than an untruth this
was a typographical error – ‘he’ should be read as ‘she’.
80. Shortly
after Mr. Fairlie’s return from the trip abroad, the Company’s finance
department called him to say that Mrs. Wilkinson had a large roaming bill on
her telephone and when questioned about it she said it was because he, Mr.
Fairlie, had been on her phone. He told finance that he had not used her phone
he had no reason to do so. An itemized bill showed that the charges were actually
incurred during Mrs. Wilkinson’s family holiday trip to Mexico. She paid what
was necessary and nothing further came of it. The only significance of this
incident is the part which it plays in the continuing narrative as follows.
81. On
about 20th of March 2020 during a casual conversation out of hours with
Alastair Rothwell about the telephone bill Mr. Fairley said something along the
lines “you know how it started though, right? Justine had been given a present
of a bike from the client, so we went on to check the company‘s policies and
procedures.” Mr. Rothwell clearly had not known about this and Mr. Fairley was
shocked that this should be so, and told him that he thought it had been
declared. It became clear that no disclosure has been made about the gift.
82. I
find as a fact that Mr. Fairlie and Mrs. Wilkinson consulted the Gifts and
Business Benefits policy online together and that Mr. Fairlie advised Mrs.
Wilkinson to follow the Gifts policy and declare the gift of the bicycle; I
find as a fact that she did not do so.
Matt
Ebbrell
83. Matt
Ebbrell is the Chief Operating Officer of the company; at the material time he
was head of HR. His evidence is that he has enjoyed a good working relationship
with Mrs. Wilkinson. He was one of the dismissing officers, and Mrs.
Bracken-Smith was the other. He confirmed Mrs. Jervier’s evidence as to the
advice sought by her and given by him.
84. The
Conflicts of Interest form is a protective measure for both the company and the
individual. While filling in the form did not remove the conflict, it enabled
the Company to be aware of it and to take appropriate measures to manage it. He
pointed to the defects already described, and said that given Mrs. Wilkinson’s
known capabilities – she was very good at her job – he found it difficult to
accept that these errors were unintentional.
85. He
and Louise Bracken-Smith had been the dismissing officers and in looking for
mitigating circumstances so that alternative sanctions could be considered he
had found none. Mrs. Wilkinson’s post and background were very senior and this
gave rise to high level expectations which had not been met.
86. Mr.
Ebbrell was taken to the Gifts and Business Benefits Policy [1/16/2; para (b)] it
is in these terms:
“In the event a staff member receives a gift above
the threshold [£150] or has in the last 3 months received gifts which
cumulatively surpass the de minimus value they must inform Compliance (also
using the notification Gifts and Benefits Notification Form attached below)”.
Counsel for Mrs. Wilkinson submitted that the
obligation on Mrs. Wilkinson had been to notify compliance about the gift and
that is what she had done – indeed she had notified the Head of Compliance.
However, it is clear again that a procedure had to be followed by use of a
particular notification form. Mrs. Wilkinson did not follow that procedure. The
bicycle was never declared under the Gifts and Business Benefits policy.
87. Mr.
Ebbrell had become aware from Mrs. Jervier that Mrs. Wilkinson / the Client
wanted to keep the friendship confidential and he was prepared to explore
whether this wish for confidentiality and the reporting needs of the company
could both be accommodated, for example by the use of Chinese walls. The
requisite reporting measures still needed to be in place.
88. It
was put to Mr. Ebbrell by counsel for Mrs. Wilkinson that only two people were
involved with the client structure, one of them a female. It followed that when
Mrs. Wilkinson spoke about a friendship ‘with an individual connected with that
entity’, it was not difficult to establish who that was, or the position he
occupied.
Mrs.
Bracken-Smith
89. At
this point I turn to the evidence of Mrs. Bracken-Smith. I do so firstly for an
appreciation of the risk involved in Mrs. Wilkinson’s approach to the conflict
situation. Mrs. Bracken - Smith is the current Chief Executive Officer of
Fairway group and, among other directorships within the group, she is a
director of the company. She describes Mrs. Wilkinson as a director of the
company and therefore part of the span of control with other directors of the
company board. Mrs. Bracken – Smith describes Mrs. Wilkinson as one of the most
senior employees in the company, a principal person, and an ‘A’ signatory. She
says that Mrs. Wilkinson was the appointed compliance - facing director on the
board. Mrs. Wilkinson was also responsible for drafting and approving policies
and procedures with Mrs. Jervier and she had specific responsibility for the
business risk assessment, a key document outlining the risk appetite of the
business. Mrs. Wilkinson was also involved with training staff on new policy
and procedures, the new business take - on process, and assessment of risk.
90. Mrs.
Bracken-Smith describes the Conflict of Interest policy and Gift and Benefits
policy as critical. She says this:
“As a regulated financial services business i.e.,
regulated by the JFSC for among other things trust company business and
insurance mediation business, and as a service provider, all employees are
susceptible to money laundering and bribery risks. All members of staff must
declare any gifts from client (sic) because for instance they could become
subject to bribery and corruption and which could be a criminal act and carry a
custodial sentence. Additionally clients could potentially bribe service
providers to encourage preferential treatment. As a service provider we must
remain independent and act in the best interest of the business.
Our
regulated status means that we are required to act with integrity and in
accordance with the Codes of practice issued by the JFSC. Our core values are
positive, authentic, commercial, and trusted. All staff must comply with
policies and uphold these values.
Linked to
the above and to the fact that independence is integral to our business it is
essential that the board have an open and transparent dialogue between them so
that they can trust each other. In order to do this, the board must be given
the opportunity to mitigate the risk of any conflict of interest by having full
disclosure. Failure to comply with the conflict of interest and Gift and
Benefits policies was therefore a disciplinary matter.
All staff
are trained on the relevant compliance policies and surrounding issues. There
is also online training for all staff for bribery and corruption reminding staff
of the rules and regulations. Justine has completed this training.” [1/12/2]
91. Mrs.
Bracken - Smith goes on to describe her relationship with Mrs. Wilkinson. She
was Mrs. Wilkinson’s direct line report and they had regular meetings involving
just the two of them. The meetings did include inquiries about Mrs. Wilkinson’s
personal well-being and Mrs. Wilkinson would frequently get upset and tearful
during the meetings. Mrs. Bracken - Smith knew that Mrs. Wilkinson had a lot
going on in her personal life with an acrimonious divorce and the trials of
being a single mother. She says that she was very sympathetic and supportive
towards Mrs. Wilkinson because she was a key member of the leadership team. She
felt the relationship was good and characterized by open dialogue. Sometimes
Mrs. Bracken -Smith had to relay negative feedback to which Mrs. Wilkinson did
not respond well but Mrs. Bracken - Smith did her best to support Mrs.
Wilkinson. She gave examples of ways in which she had tried to support her,
including the company paying for personal coaching/mentoring for Mrs.
Wilkinson.
92. I
interpose to say that contained in the main file is an exchange of
correspondence between Mrs. Bracken - Smith and Mrs. Wilkinson which very much
demonstrates the former’s account of offering complete support to the latter.
[1/22] Equally, at the hearing, Mrs. Wilkinson produced an email of 2017 in
which Alistair Rothwell referred to unacceptable behaviour by Mrs.
Bracken-Smith towards Mrs. Wilkinson which had included a ‘verbal lashing’.
Mrs. Bracken-Smith was unable to recall the occasion without being given a
context but whatever had happened it would have been an anomaly in a long
pattern of support. She relied on the examples which she had given.
93. Mrs.
Wilkinson gave evidence that Mrs. Bracken-Smith was changeable and not someone
with whom she enjoyed an easy relationship.
94. There
is a need to use the phrase again: Mrs. Bracken-Smith gave Mrs. Wilkinson a
verbal lashing throughout the course of her evidence to the Tribunal and had
difficulty holding her invective in check.
95. Having
seen and heard from both ladies I have sympathy for the proposition that Mrs.
Wilkinson might not have thought of Mrs. Bracken-Smith as the easiest person
with whom to have the necessary conversation about the conflict. As against that, Mrs. Bracken-Smith gives
evidence that Mrs. Wilkinson had previously asked her to sign off on her
personal conflict of interest forms as a relevant director. She recalls signing
two such forms in 2017. This accords with the evidence of Mr. Rothwell. These
forms did not, though, concern personal sensitivities.
96. That
does not provide Mrs. Wilkinson with an answer – nothing prevented her from
taking the matter to another director; nor does it mean that Mrs. Bracken-Smith
gave evidence of no value. I have already referred to her evidence of the
company’s strong approach to its regulatory responsibilities.
97. Mrs.
Bracken-Smith recalls an issue over the gift of bottles of wine of which much
was heard over the four days of the hearing. The client sent them to Mrs.
Wilkinson (and an identical gift to one other) at the office by way of thanks
for the work they had done for him. Mrs. Wilkinson was not going to share hers
with the team, saying that they were a personal gift. Mrs. Bracken-Smith
replied that had they been just for her they would have been sent to her
private address. Mrs. Bracken-Smith observes with emphasis that this does not
mean that the gift would not need to be declared.
98. In
addition to the shortcomings on the conflict of interest form identified by
other witnesses, Mrs. Bracken-Smith points to its lateness. It should have been
filed the moment the client became a client of the company. In fact the form,
such as it was, was not presented until months later.
99. She
also describes the disciplinary process and the decision taken by her and Matt
Ebbrell summarily to dismiss Mrs. Wilkinson at its conclusion. She speaks of
the breach of the policies which could have had serious ramifications with the
JFSC as regulator; she speaks also of a complete loss of trust.
100. In
the latter regard, she records her view that throughout the process it appeared
to her that Mrs. Wilkinson had tried to divert the blame onto colleagues – Mrs.
Jervier for the compliance advice (despite the fact she did not have the full
facts); Mark Andrews for not having disclosed the conflict of interest to the
board (despite him not being fully aware of the situation); Graeme Fairlie (who
tried to help her with the policies and procedures). At the hearing, she
described Mrs. Wilkinson as having tried to cover up the truth because of her
greed – she wanted to keep the client as a matter of business in order to keep
her revenue figures up, she wanted to keep the gift, and she wanted to continue
the personal relationship with the client.
101. In
answer to counsel she described how the form should, and might easily, have
been completed. Even the most junior member of staff could be expected to have
understood the obligation, she said. It was true that the entry on the conflicts
register went before the Board at the February board meeting, but Mrs.
Bracken-Smith regarded this as Mrs. Wilkinson’s attempt to slip it through,
under the radar.
102. Mrs.
Bracken – Smith goes on to say that she
is not aware of any other member of staff being disciplined or treated
differently from Mrs. Wilkinson for failing to declare a conflict of interest;
nor is she aware of any material dealings in relation to the Conflict of
Interest or Gift and Benefits registers where matters had not been fully
disclosed.
103. She
concludes by saying that cost cutting was never a consideration in the
dismissal of Mrs. Wilkinson. The latter ran a very successful portfolio and was
responsible for 6 team members. The costs incurred in dealing with the
investigation and disciplinary processes far outweighed the costs of keeping
Mrs. Wilkinson on the board. In addition, her dismissal would put additional
strain on the remaining directors of the company. The directors never discussed
Mrs. Wilkinson’s management shareholding as a reason for her dismissal.
104. I
find as a fact that cost-cutting played no part in the decision summarily to
dismiss Mrs. Wilkinson.
Alastair
Rothwell
105. I
turn next to the evidence of Alastair Rothwell, who is a shareholder and the
Chairman of the Fairway Group. He is also a member of the Fairway group risk
committee. In his role as chairman, he is responsible for the group’s strategic
direction. He confirms that the company is a regulated business and is required
to have various policies and procedures in place and to comply with legislative
and regulatory requirements. This is in addition to the core values to which
the company subscribes as a business, values of openness, honesty, and
transparency.
106. He
confirms that the events now under discussion came to his attention only
informally in a social context as described by Mr. Fairlie.
107. He
emphasizes the crucial nature of the relevant policies and procedures - the
requirements under legal and regulatory rules; the need for presentation and
tabling of conflicts at board meetings, giving the Board of Directors the
opportunity to review and discuss all such disclosures. In addition, the
procedures help to ensure all parties to a conflict of interest or a gift issue
are fully aware of the implications; and that there is in place a clear
document trail to prove to third parties, for example the JFSC, that the
company is complying with its obligations and all other parties are protected.
108. He
describes how limited services engagements of the sort undertaken with P
Holdings presents a higher level of risk, in the sense that the company is not
providing executive services such as being on the board of the company. It is
potentially unsighted on the administration of the company and does not manage
either the receipts or payments. That situation means that there is an
inherently higher risk of money laundering and / or terrorist financing. This
higher risk can be effectively managed by additional controls, for example
enhanced due diligence at take - on and enhanced monitoring during the lifetime
of the relationship. In this case, Mrs. Wilkinson gave the company no
opportunity to control matters in this way, or at all.
109. Moreover,
Mr. Rothwell said that his investigatory work on P Holdings showed a pattern of
one to one contacts between Mrs. Wilkinson and the client on business matters.
110. He
notes that during interviews, Mrs. Wilkinson tried to allege that the limited
services relationship meant that she had no real involvement in the client
structure. She also said that the client was different from other clients due
to his shareholding on declaration of trust, together with the fact that he
resigned as a director of P holdings in January 2020. In fact, Mr. Rothwell
says, the client remains relevant as joint ultimate beneficial owner of the
client company and continued to have day-to-day involvement with it.
111. Mr.
Rothwell enumerates the faults which he found in Mrs. Wilkinson‘s conduct: the
conflict of interest was not notified immediately; the form eventually submitted
was incomplete; the form was signed off by an unauthorized person; Mrs.
Wilkinson did not discuss matters with Mrs. Bracken-Smith, her line manager;
the gift of the carbon frame bicycle was not disclosed; her account of
discussing matters with other directors and members of staff was insufficient
given that nobody she mentioned had received the full facts; the client’s
indication that if Mrs. Wilkinson was removed from his account he would take
his business away from the company was never disclosed to the board.
112. Mr.
Rothwell repeats that the impact of nondisclosure on the company could have had
huge regulatory implications. The correct administration of a conflict of
interest is fundamental to proper governance and regulatory accountability. It
is the subject of numerous commentaries from the JFSC and specific “Dear CEO”
letter guidance.
113. The
magnitude of the irregularities surrounding the issues being discussed led Mr.
Rothwell to call in an experienced ex-JFSC compliance specialist who works for
the company on a contract basis. Mr. Rothwell passed over all his work and
comments on the matter on 14 April 2020 so that a deeper investigation could
take place.
114. Mr.
Rothwell confirms that cost cutting played no part whatever in the decision
summarily to dismiss Mrs. Wilkinson.
115. He
spoke of the relationship between Mrs. Wilkinson and Mrs. Bracken-Smith. He
described the latter as supportive of the former and only wanting the best out
of her. His apologetic email of 27th October 2017 was put to him. It includes
the following:
“Would I be right in
concluding that you just came out of the meeting feeling shredded by Louise’s
verbal lashing and left basically discouraged and disconsolate? I don’t
actually have the answers to sorting it in any easy way but I’m really sorry
she acted like this – it isn’t the behaviour we expect from anyone in the
business, let alone a senior member of staff. I honestly don’t think she
realizes the aggressive manner in which she comes over and how demoralizing
this is for anyone on the receiving end of it.”
116. I
have already noted that it is equally true that in evidence was an entirely
supportive email to Mrs. Wilkinson from Mrs. Bracken-Smith some two years or so
later showing absolute support.
117. Mr.
Rothwell gave evidence that Mrs. Wilkinson struggled to keep her personal life
separate from her business life. He described the ‘verbal lashing’ as having
been ‘brutal’ and copied to HR his email of apology to Mrs. Wilkinson, in case
she wanted to take the matter further. She had not done so.
118. In
20 years’ business experience, Mr. Rothwell had never experienced a conflict of
this nature but described how easily it could have been managed to the
satisfaction of all, had the facts been transparently disclosed. He gave
readily comprehensible examples. Mrs. Bracken-Smith would have helped Mrs.
Wilkinson, he said, ‘she had her back’.
119. He
describes the limited services to P Holdings as including nominee shareholder
arrangements. He points to the fact that on a £5,000 fixed fee service
agreement, Mrs. Wilkinson had accumulated work in progress fees of some £25,000
which had been written down to £15,000. This indicated an involvement by Mrs.
Wilkinson in areas of client business in which there should have been none.
120. He
went on to describe Mrs. Wilkinson as ‘intellectually superior’ to Mrs. Jervier
in the matter of compliance, and Mrs. Wilkinson should not have involved her in
the way she did. I interpose to say that my own observations during the hearing
suggested to me that Mrs. Jervier was nothing like as assertive and
self-assured as Mrs. Wilkinson.
121. Mrs.
Wilkinson had completed these pro forma declarations in the past, always
properly, and in fact Mrs. Bracken-Smith had signed such forms when presented
by Mrs. Wilkinson. The present episode was ‘way out of line’. He spoke of the
heavy emotional toll which the episode had taken on Mrs. Jervier. Mr. Rothwell
described Mrs. Wilkinson as a person of very great senior experience, occupying
a position at the top of the firm; there had been no reason for her to have
drawn Mrs. Jervier in as she had done.
122. He
too spoke of the informal director sandwich lunches, which do not involve Mrs.
Bracken-Smith, which would have been a perfect forum for Mrs. Wilkinson to make
full and frank disclosure of the conflict position.
123. Mr.
Rothwell said that he had concluded that Mrs. Wilkinson’s conduct in the whole
matter had amounted to deliberate deception. He had feared that money
laundering might actually be taking place. Certainly, there was breach of the
Regulatory Codes of Practice, which could lead to a regulatory sanction,
particularly given the seniority of Mrs. Wilkinson. It was on this basis that
he had referred to the matter as ‘incredibly serious’ more than once during the
course of the hearing.
Cross- examination
and re-examination of Mrs. Wilkinson
124. Although
she was the first witness to give evidence at the hearing, the flow of argument
has been best described by recounting her evidence at this point of these
reasons. Counsel for the Company had opened his case by saying that Mrs.
Wilkinson had a particular expertise in compliance. It was the Company’s case
that she was aware of the rules but chose not to follow them. The sanction
adopted by the Company had been proportionate.
125. Counsel
put it to Mrs. Wilkinson that there was no room for confusion between a client
gift and a gift from a client who was a friend. It would mean that if an
exception were to be made in that way it would be easy to categorize any gift
as personal, opening the door wide to bribery and corruption. Mrs. Wilkinson
agreed that structurally that might be so, but the question was one of personal
integrity and hers was of the highest. In any event she had no control over P
Holdings, given that the Company provided only limited service. These were to
be key arguments of hers throughout, together with the stance that if gifts /
hospitality were received in the context of a personal friendship they were not
properly to be categorized as being received from a client qua client. They
were given within a personal and private friendship – witness for example that
the bicycle had not been delivered to the workplace. She referred to the time
when Mrs. Bracken-Smith had taken her to task for not sharing wine given to her
by the client (which she had declared on the Gifts register) saying that had it
been a personal gift to Mrs. Wilkinson it would have been delivered to her
home. She agreed that limited service client entities were in the highest risk
category.
126. Counsel
put it to her that there was conflict on three fronts: commercial (potential
reluctance to have difficult conversations about service provision and
charges); crucially, potential difficulties as regards AML and a possible
diffidence about making Suspicious Activity Reports as well as tipping-off
possibilities; duties to the other beneficial owner of P Holdings. Mrs.
Wilkinson accepted those categories but repeated that her standards and
integrity were of the highest so that these were never practical issues.
127. The
Client had resigned as a director of P Holdings in January 2020 because he did
not want to be named on a public register; he was a ‘private person’ said Mrs.
Wilkinson. Asked by counsel if this should have raised a red flag with her as
regards AML, she replied that she didn’t know.
128. On
the annual personal declaration form which she was required to fill in she
expressly certified that she had received no gifts or hospitality [1/25/3].
Again she replied that she had regarded these things as non-declarable because
they were given in the context of a personal friendship. Moreover, why should
she be singled out? Graham Fairlie, for example, had been entertained by a
client at the Bahrain Grand Prix and had not declared it. This was not put to
Mr. Fairlie and I gave it no weight.
129. Counsel
put it to her that the hospitality given to her in London over two week-ends
including hotel stays and a box at the opera, together with the gift of a
£1,200 bicycle ran to the value of thousands of pounds. Mrs. Wilkinson did not
demur but insisted that these things came about between friends in her personal
time.
130. Counsel
took her through the steps which she had missed out on the Conflicts of
Interest form, pointing out the considerable deficiencies. She replied that no
one had come back to her querying it. Counsel put it to her that the
responsibility was hers, and it was not for others to investigate the form and
cross-examine the facts from her.
131. Counsel
put the Company’s case squarely to her, that she had done the minimum she could
in the hope of slipping the matter past further scrutiny by the company. She
was referred, as an example, to a document (74/) in which she had told Mark
Andrews that the Client was not a director. She accepted that it was misleading
but it had not been her intention to deceive Mr. Andrews or the company at any
time.
132. As
for pressuring Mrs. Jervier into signing the Conflicts form, they were peers in
the Company and she was not placed to exert pressure. If Mrs. Jervier were open
to pressure of that sort, she would be a poor money laundering guardian – which
she was not.
133. She
accepted that Graham Fairlie had told her to declare the bicycle on the gifts
register, but panicked by this, she had instead gone to see Mrs. Jervier.
134. Mrs.
Wilkinson had told the Client that declaration of the bicycle was a fiduciary
and regulatory requirement and that this was ‘non-negotiable’ (78/2). Later,
however, they had discussed it together and decided that it need not be
declared to the company.
135. Re-examined,
Mrs. Wilkinson related how the Client had come to Jersey to meet with a variety
of service providers before deciding with which of them to place his business.
It was during that visit that she had lunch on one day with him, and dinner the
next (at Bohemia Restaurant and the Longueville Manor Hotel respectively). He
had not at that point placed his business with the Company and therefore it was
wrong to say that as a client he had given her hospitality. He had not yet
become a client at that point.
136. She
had told Mrs. Jervier who the client was with whom she was forming a
friendship. That was probably at the meeting of 18th December 2019. It will be
recalled that Mrs. Jervier gave evidence to the contrary.
137. Counsel
took her through the Gifts and Benefits Policy, a document separate from the
Conflicts of Interest Policy. Gifts above a value of £150 had to be raised with
Compliance, she had done exactly that by going to Mrs. Jervier, who was head of
compliance, she said.
138. She
was shown four gift declaration forms filed by different people and observed
that while they had all been signed by compliance staff, not all of them had
been signed off by an independent Director, as was a requirement. The
performance was patchy in that way.
139. She
was taken to the Mark Andrews statement and denied having described the client
to him as ‘more of an intermediary’. She said that she had named the client and
the entity and mentioned the trips to London. There was another conversation
with Mr. Andrews, in the work kitchen on 13th February where she mentioned the
gift of a bicycle from the client. She was clear that Mark Andrews told her to
make sure that the gift of a bicycle was declared.
140. Equally
on a business trip to Oman and elsewhere Mrs. Wilkinson mentioned the gift of a
bicycle to Graham Fairlie. She describes how she showed him a picture of the
bicycle and how, expressing himself in expletives, he was emphatic that the
bicycle should be declared, even though a birthday gift. He went to the length
of logging into the Gifts policy with her via the internet. She accepts Mr.
Fairlie’s account that she spoke fondly of the client and clearly cared about
him.
141. Her
evidence was that because the bicycle was a birthday gift, she was still not
sure that it needed to be declared. She gave the analogy at the hearing of Mrs.
Bracken-Smith’s husband, a client of the firm, buying Mrs Bracken-Smith an
expensive ski-jacket which was not declared. She therefore turned to Mrs.
Jervier once more. It seems fair to say that at this point she was swimming
against the strong tide of the opinions already received. She relied on what
the Head of Risk, Mrs. Jervier told her, she said.
142. However,
it is also the case that on her evidence Christine Jervier relied on what Mrs.
Wilkinson told her – namely that Mrs. Bracken-Smith had decreed that personal
gifts sent to the home need not be declared. Mrs. Wilkinson was referring back
to the gift of wine from the client, as mentioned above.
Investigation,
hearing, and appeal
143. I
do not propose to lengthen this judgment further by dating and describing each
step of the investigatory process, of the disciplinary hearing and of the
appeal. The relevant details are given in the witness statement of Mr. Ebbrell
[1/8]and, additionally, material dates are included in the chronology prepared
and included in the hearing file on behalf of the company.[1/2/17] Suffice it
to say that I find the processes closely to have followed the practices
recommended by JACS and to have been noticeably thorough. Minutes have been
very well kept at every stage.
144. Those
who conducted the appeal, Messrs. Cookson and Robson were briefly
cross-examined. Both had understood Mr. Ebbrell’s email of 7th January 2020 to
Christine Jervier to suggest that the position could be accommodated by the
company if a person in Mrs. Wilkinson’s position were to make proper
disclosure; if that took place, arrangements such as a Chinese wall or other
lockdown of the information on a need-to-know basis might be arranged.
145. Taken
to the conflicts form which had been filed, Mr.Robson pointed to the absence of
a client name and the absence of information sufficient to enable the issuing
of protective warnings within the company. I find as a fact that the conflicts
form which was submitted by Mrs. Wilkinson was defective in all of the ways
described by the company’s witnesses and that she should have declared a
conflict at least when the client was taken on in August 2019 but deliberately
did not do so; equally I find that the gift of the bicycle should have been
declared under the Gifts and Benefits policy and that Mrs. Wilkinson did not
disclose it.
Submissions
of the Parties
Counsel for Mrs.
Wilkinson:
146. Turning
to the facts, counsel said that had Mrs. Wilkinson been acting deliberately she
could have remained silent about the friendship with the client, including the
hospitality provided by him and the expensive bicycle. No one need ever have
known. That would have been a case of gross misconduct, but here she had been
completely open about the relevant things – she had told Christine Jervier,
Mark Andrews, Graeme Fairlie, and her own team at the office.
147. Meals
taken with the client in June were at a time when he was exploring the option
of placing his business with the firm. At that time he was not a client and in
any event the sharing of those meals was widely known within the firm
148. When
the client’s business was taken on in August, she was aware of her
responsibility in the matter and wanted to meet it by disclosing the
relationship and its incidents at the same time as retaining a measure of
privacy as regards the company generally – the very formula suggested by Mr.
Ebbrell as head of HR, said counsel.
149. The
conflicts form was not as full as it might be, but it did register the
conflict. It was signed off by Christine Jervier and counsel reminded me of the
seniority of her position as Head of Risk and Compliance, managing a team of 7
reporting to her. Mrs. Jervier chairs risk and compliance meetings, and Mrs.
Wilkinson is her deputy there. Mrs. Jervier not only signed the form but
completed part of it herself, ticking the ‘personal relationship’ box. She
approved the form and when asked by Matt Ebbrell if the matter had been dealt
with, she said that all was well.
150. Counsel
enjoined me to remember throughout that Mrs. Jervier was the Global Head of
Risk and Compliance and therefore a person of very great seniority within the
company. I have taken that point. Yes, said counsel, the form might have been
completed more fully, but discovering the client identity was no great
challenge, given that P Holdings was named and that it only had two principals,
one of them female.
151. Moreover,
Mrs. Wilkinson had tried to comply with the terms of her contract. The
Conflicts of Interest Policy in the matter of gifts refers the reader onward to
the Gifts and Business Benefits Policy. The relevant extract is set out above.
What more could Mrs. Wilkinson do? The Policies told her to go to Compliance
about gifts and she had done that very thing – actually going to the Head of
Compliance about the gift of the bicycle and being advised by her that no
declaration was necessary as it was a personal gift.
152. The
conflict declared by Mrs. Wilkinson on the form which she had filed had been
before the Board at its February quarterly meeting as a line on the Register of
Conflicts. The draft minute first circulated records that the conflicts
register had been tabled and reviewed by the board but, after circulation for
comment, had been corrected by Mrs. Bracken-Smith to add that the register
would be further reviewed after the meeting. [1/28&29]
153. Counsel
asked me to notice the prominent part that Mrs. Wilkinson’s refusal to answer
questions as to the practices of the friendship (Was it physical? Was it
romantic?) had played in the view taken at the head of the firm. Mr. Rothwell
had spoken of it in evidence as ‘an affair’; so too had Mrs. Bracken-Smith,
adding unnecessary adjectival embellishment. There had been a jump to
conclusions, and a hostility upon landing.
154. He
reminded me that Mrs. Bracken-Smith had been one of the dismissing officers and
asked me to consider what may have been on her mind when she was involved in
the decision making; equally she had concluded that Mrs. Wilkinson had acted
dishonestly in the matter of the telephone charges, despite the company having
received an explanation, despite Mrs. Wilkinson having paid the company the
necessary sum, and despite the company concluding that no further action was
needed. Again, counsel asked me to be alive to the possibility of unfair
prejudice against Mrs. Wilkinson on the part of Mrs. Bracken-Smith.
155. In
similar vein, counsel observed that Mrs. Wilkinson had been criticized for not
taking the matter to Mrs. Bracken-Smith as line manager for sign off. He
suggested that having seen and heard Mrs. Bracken-Smith’s demeanour and
attitude during the course of her evidence, it might be readily understood if
Mrs. Wilkinson did not care to take this matter to that particular person.
Counsel
for the Company
156.
Counsel took me to the
contractual obligation which bound Mrs. Wilkinson (1/ 17 /clause 28). He
reminded me that Mrs. Wilkinson had agreed that it was a critical provision. Counsel
repeated the three separate heads of conflict which he had put to Mrs.
Wilkinson and submitted that the form submitted by her did not enable the
company to manage any of them. The fact that the ‘possible repercussions’
section had been left blank gave the misleading impression that there were
none.
157.
At every omission and defect put
to her, Mrs. Wilkinson had countered by saying that her standards were of the
highest and the company could trust her integrity. Counsel pointed out quite
simply that that is not how conflict management works.
158.
There had been so many
opportunities to bring the matter openly to the surface with proper detail
given to those who needed to know: the informal Director sandwich lunches were
just one example.
159.
It was open to the employer to
find that Mrs. Wilkinson had deliberately misled Ms. Jervier. It was clear from
the Matt Ebbrell email of 7th January 2020 that neither he nor Ms. Jervier knew
the true situation about which they thought they were corresponding. Yes, the
company might have asked more and better questions, but that did not avail Mrs.
Wilkinson in the least. She was deliberately ‘hiding in plain sight’ giving the
minimum information she could get away with, to people on the periphery. The
notion of personal gifts being exempt from the need for disclosure was absurd;
corruption would have an open door.
160.
Ms. Jervier describes herself as
having been manipulated and was not challenged.
161.
The question of an unfairly
prejudicial attitude had not been put to Mrs. Bracken-Smith, or to Mr. Rothwell
or to Matt Ebbrell who, with Mrs. Bracken-Smith, had been the other dismissing
officer.
162.
On the question of gross
misconduct it was the company’s position that Mrs. Wilkinson had acted wilfully
and deliberately in breach of her contractual obligation. Her attempt to
mislead Ms. Jervier and Mr. Andrews, for example, were calculated.
163.
She was part of the span of
control and well knew the duties of a regulated director.
164.
Counsel referred me to JFSC
guidelines [1/2/ annexe 3] and submitted that Mrs. Wilkinson’s ethical compass
was directed to the client and not to the company, as it should have been.
Support for this was to be found in the fact that she and the client – to the
exclusion of the company - had decided that she need not declare the bicycle
gift [2/58/3]. The company’s conclusions and the action taken accordingly were
entirely reasonable in light of the facts, many of them undisputed.
The Law
Unfair Dismissal:
165. The
law in relation to unfair dismissal is well established. Article 61 of the Employment (Jersey) Law
2003 (the “Law”) provides that an employee shall have the right not to be
unfairly dismissed.
166. Article
64 of the Law provides that the employer is required to show a fair reason for
the dismissal and specifies a number of potentially fair reasons for dismissal,
one of which is the employee’s conduct.
167. In
order to show the reason for dismissal when it relates to conduct, an employer
only needs to demonstrate to the Tribunal that it had a genuine belief in the
employee’s misconduct. That belief does not have to be correct.
168. Most
recently the Tribunal summarised its powers in respect of determining whether
or not a dismissal was unfair in the case of Tania Castanhiera v Empire
Catering Limited [2020] TRE 049 at paragraph 6 of that judgment (I confine the
extract to only that part which has proved relevant to my findings):
“when
hearing a case of unfair dismissal, a Tribunal’s powers are limited,
specifically that I am not permitted to substitute my judgment for that of the
employer. Rather, it is for me to say whether both the decision to dismiss
(Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones [1983] ICR 17 EAT) and the way in which the
investigation was conducted (J Sainsbury Pic v Hitt [2003] ICR 111 CA) fell
within the range of responses of the reasonable employer, in the circumstances
in which the Respondent found itself. If the dismissal or the conduct of the investigation
falls within the range, it is fair, if outside, then it is unfair.”
169. Where
the employee’s conduct is the reason for dismissal, the Tribunal is guided by
the legal test established in the English case of British Home Stores Limited v
Burchell [1980] 1CR 303. The employer
has to show that:
a) he
believed the employee was guilty of the conduct;
b) he
had in his mind reasonable grounds upon which to sustain that belief, and
c) at
the stage at which he formed the belief on those grounds, he had carried out as
much investigation into the matter as was reasonable in the circumstances.
170. On
the pleading submitted by Mrs. Wilkinson it had been claimed that the supposed
misconduct was simply a blind to cover the true reason, namely cost-cutting by
the company. That had been the suggestion of Mrs. Wilkinson but was unsupported
by any evidence; indeed the company made it clear that she was an asset which
they regretted having to lose. They truly did not want to be in this position. The
cost-cutting suggestion was not pursued at the hearing and it was accepted by
counsel for Mrs. Wilkinson that misconduct was the reason for the dismissal.
171. I
canvassed the following with counsel and understand them to share the view
expressed: The Tribunal should not substitute its own factual findings about
events giving rise to the dismissal for those of the dismissing officer; nor
should it impose its view of the appropriate sanction in exchange for that of
the employer. Accordingly, I warned myself against substituting my own view for
that of the employer.
Finding
on Unfair Dismissal
172. I
reminded myself of the reasons given by the company for the summary dismissal,
as follows:
“Gross
misconduct by failing to adhere to the Policies on Declarations of
Interest/Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest Policy, and the Gifts and Business
Benefits Policy, resulting from lack of transparency, openness, and honesty.
These things led to a complete breakdown in trust and confidence.”
That
distills into notification of dismissal for deliberate, calculated breach of
the Policies mentioned.
173. Turning
then to the Burchell questions:
a) The
company found that the misconduct in the case had been deliberately designed to
evade the conflict procedures. Having listened attentively to the witnesses of
varying seniority called by the company, I easily conclude that the company had
a genuine belief, on reasonable grounds, both that there had been misconduct
and that it had been deliberate.
b) On
the question of there having been as much investigation as was reasonable in
the circumstances of the case, I noted that no criticism had been levelled by
Mrs. Wilkinson on this front and that in fact the investigation had been as
thorough as may be. That was so even when judged against the principle that it
is particularly important that employers take seriously their responsibilities
to conduct a fair investigation where on the facts of the case, the employee's
reputation, or ability to work in his or her chosen field of employment is
potentially prejudiced.
c) On
a question of the fairness of the disciplinary investigation and hearing I
recalled that both Mr. Rothwell and Mrs. Bracken-Smith had been involved and
both, during the course of their evidence, had referred to ‘an affair’ between
Mrs. Wilkinson and the client. On the evidence this was no more than an
assumption. Additionally, Mrs. Bracken-Smith had been one of the two dismissing
officers and I had to consider whether the unconcealed animus which she
displayed against Mrs. Wilkinson at the hearing might have infected the
disciplinary hearing and the decision to dismiss.
d) I
revisited the record of those proceedings and was satisfied that Mrs. Wilkinson
had been allowed properly to put her case throughout and was properly listened
to by those questioning her. It appears that Mrs. Bracken-Smith’s present
vituperation resulted from the conclusions to which she had been forced after
the disciplinary process rather than from any pre-formed attitude before it.
e) I
concluded in particular that the company’s finding of deliberate misconduct was
a finding which was, on the whole of the evidence, within the range of
reasonable findings open to it.
Applying Burchell
across the whole of the piece:
174. I
found that the employer reasonably believed that Mrs. Wilkinson was guilty of
deliberate misconduct.
175. I
found that the company had reasonable grounds on which to base that belief.
176. I
found that the company had arrived at that decision after conducting a
reasonable investigation.
177. Following
Iceland Frozen Food -v- Jones [1983] ICR
17, I reminded myself that the employer
still had to demonstrate that the decision to dismiss Mrs. Wilkinson fell
within the band of reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might have
adopted. If the dismissal falls within the band the dismissal is fair: if the
dismissal falls outside the band it is unfair.
178. In
considering whether the company has acquitted that burden, I have taken Mrs.
Wilkinson‘s case at its highest. She spoke openly of her friendship with a
client to Christine Jervier, Graeme Fairlie, Mark Andrews, and others. Although
it was defective, she did eventually file a conflict of interest form with the
company secretary in the knowledge that it would be placed before the board.
179. It
was she who had brought the gift of a bike to the attention of others; indeed,
it was she who had raised the question of conflict in the first place in the
conversation of 18 December with Christine Jervier. She was of good character
and standing and nothing of the sort had ever appeared on her record before.
Her record was that of a trustworthy professional. Put at the very highest, had
she said nothing to anyone, these matters might never have come to light.
180. In
my judgment, those things do not go to the gravamen of the conduct in question.
That gravamen is well expressed in the evidence of both Mrs. Bracken - Smith
and Alastair Rothwell. The procedures are in place in regulated entities for a
crucial purpose, namely to recognize and manage situations in which, with the
best will in the world, the entity and therefore the Island, risk becoming
vulnerable to money laundering, terrorist financing and corruption.
Non-compliance is highly dangerous and a regulatory default. By not complying,
Mrs. Wilkinson has brought questions down upon her own head.
181. Even
supposing there to be anything in what she says about forms not making a clear
distinction between clients and clients who become personal friends, and who in
the latter capacity provide hospitality and gifts, then her solution was
abundantly clear and should have been so to her. She had only to step into the office of
Alistair Rothwell or some other director once the client had assumed that
status, and to place the whole fact of the matter on the table for their
adjudication.
182. Instead,
she initiated a coffee shop chat with a colleague, who was also a friend, in
rushed circumstances approaching the Christmas break. She prevailed upon that
unauthorized person to sign off the conflict of interest form, which was
eventually submitted, incomplete though it was. She put to hazard the question
of whether the board would examine the relevant small print line on the
Register or not; in fact, it did not. Walking to or from a lunch at which wine
circulated she mentioned to Mark Andrews that she had completed such a form
and, on her evidence, asked him to field any questions about it in her absence.
Mr. Andrews remembers the conversation but not the request just mentioned. On a
trip abroad on business with Graeme Fairlie, tearfully, she told him of the
gift of the bicycle. He told her to declare it; she did not do so. Instead she
returned to Mrs. Jervier for another talk and did not declare the £1,200
bicycle.
183. By
not following the procedure – contractually necessary and easy of compliance –
she caused the loss of that bright line which should have existed between her
private life and her business responsibilities. She simply did not permit the
Conflict of Interest form to fulfill the purpose for which it was designed.
184. Naturally,
it is permissible to discuss a position with a friend and colleague,
particularly one who specializes in compliance and with whom one has worked in
that very area. Naturally, it is permissible to mention matters to colleagues
generally. What the company found to be impermissible in the circumstance in which Mrs. Wilkinson
found herself, was to circumvent these crucial contractual procedures by
measures of her own choosing, particularly when they included such occasions as
a coffee shop conversation and remarks to friendly colleagues, be they in a
kitchen, on a St.Helier street, or in a
hotel lobby in Oman.
185. Another
employer might - just conceivably - have attempted to deal with this breach in
some other way, but that is not the question. The question is whether what the
company did in the circumstances with which it was presented was within the
range of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer. Having considered the
position of this company, the fact that Mrs. Wilkinson had alienated all of her
senior colleagues, the company’s need to preserve a reputation for propriety,
the fact that its business is regulated, the fact that it conducts its business
in the heart of Jersey’s finance industry, and considering the risks which I
have identified at which the company was placed, I have concluded that summary
dismissal was comfortably within the range of
reasonable responses available to a reasonable employer in the
circumstances in which the company found itself, and was therefore fair.
The Wrongful
Dismissal Claim
186. Counsel
for Mrs. Wilkinson reminded me that gross misconduct is to be found only where
there is a repudiatory breach of the contract of the employment – knowledge of
the contractual obligation and a deliberate decision not to honour it. The
cases, local and English on which he relied are set out in the Appendix to
these reasons. He claimed that the conduct of Mrs. Wilkinson in this case was
not of the kind which could properly be characterised as gross misconduct.
There was no calculated deception, no deliberate decision to act against a
contractual obligation. It is not gross misconduct simply to get something
wrong.
187. Both
counsel referred me to the seminal cases of Wilson v Racher [1974]ICR 428,CA;
Pepper v Webb [1969] 1 WLR 514; and Laws v London Chronicle [1959] 1 WLR 698. There
is a clear distinction between the Tribunal’s fact-finding role in unfair
dismissal claims on one hand and wrongful dismissal claims on the other. In the
latter case, fact finding is for the Tribunal, on the balance of probability. I
have concluded that the contractual breach was, as the company has submitted,
calculated and deliberate for the reasons advanced by the company. I have had
particular regard to Mrs. Wilkinson’s long experience and the high level of her
compliance expertise.
188. Not
every breach of a contractual term will amount to gross misconduct, and not
every instance of gross misconduct will inevitably warrant summary dismissal. I
have therefore gone on to consider the effects of the conduct in this case. It
has implicated others, it has put the company to considerable expense, it has
left the company vulnerable to a finding of fault by the regulator, it has left
the company vulnerable to loss of reputation, it was careless of the
vulnerability of the company and the Island to money laundering, terrorist financing,
and corruption.
189. In
those circumstances, I find that Mrs. Wilkinson was guilty of gross misconduct
and that the company was entitled to dismiss her without notice.
Trust
and Confidence
190. There
was mention throughout of the company having lost trust and confidence in Mrs.
Wilkinson. I note that breach of the implied contractual term to that effect
was not pleaded, presumably because the breach of the express term was patent.
I have not needed to consider the question of breach of an implied term but I have
nevertheless found consistent evidence of the loss of trust and confidence
helpful in fortifying the conclusion that lesser sanctions were not reasonably
available in this case.
191. I
should say that I have taken account throughout of Mrs. Wilkinson’s previous
record of unexceptionable service and the good things which others have said
about her character. The finding in this case is one that gives no pleasure.
192. The
appendix which follows forms an integral part of this judgment.
APPENDIX
1. The
hearing took place over 4 days (January 18-21 2021).
2. The
Hearing Bundle comprised 3 lever arch files containing, with documents produced
in the course of the hearing, something roughly to the order of 1,000 pages.
3. I
heard evidence from 9 witnesses, including Mrs. Wilkinson as Claimant.
4. While
hearing the witnesses I took the opportunity to assess the demeanor and levels
of clarity with which they answered the various questions put to them.
5. When
making my judgment I considered all the written evidence provided by each of
the parties as well as the oral evidence provided by them and their witnesses.
6. My
findings of fact based on the evidence provided are set out in the body of this
judgment. In this judgment only the facts that are relevant to the issues to be
determined have been summarised. Where there have been factual disputes which
fall to me to resolve I have done so on the balance of probabilities based on
my assessment of the credibility of the Claimant and the consistency of the
witnesses’ accounts with the rest of the evidence.
7. A
Case Management Meeting took place on 23rd September 2020. I take the following
verbatim from the Deputy Chairman’s order of that day. It is limited to the
extracts which remain relevant to these reasons:
“Reason
for dismissal
What was
the reason for the dismissal? The respondent asserts that it was a reason
related to conduct, which is a potentially fair reason for dismissal.
Although
not required to do so, the Claimant states they do not accept this is the real
reason for the dismissal which they say was because of wishes to cut costs.
When
deciding on the reason for the dismissal the tribunal will decide, on the
balance of probabilities and based on the evidence, what was at the forefront
of the Respondent’s mind when dismissing the Claimant.
Dismissal
within range of reasonable responses
Was the
decision to dismiss a fair decision, that is, was it within the reasonable
range of responses open to a reasonable employer when faced with these facts?
Breach of
Contract - Wrongful Dismissal
It is not
in dispute that the respondent dismissed the Claimant without notice.
Does the Respondent
prove that it was entitled to dismiss the claimant without notice and without a
payment in lieu of notice because the claimant had committed gross misconduct?”
8. It
was accepted at that meeting that the Claimant passed the threshold tests
necessary to bring a claim for unfair dismissal, namely she was an employee;
she was dismissed; and she had sufficient continuous employment at the time of
the dismissal to present a claim of unfair dismissal.
9. The
following authorities were placed before me by counsel and I considered all of
them:
Jersey
Authorities:
Speak v
Sutherland [2012 135/2011]
Upton v
SEB [2014 134/2012]
Bonney v
Rabeys [2014 10/2013]
English
Authorities:
Laws v
London Chronicle [1959] 1 WLR 698.
Wilson v
Racher [1974]ICR 428,CA
Pepper v
Webb [1969] 1 WLR 514
BHS v
Burchell [1978] ICR 303
Neary v
Dean of Westminster [1999] IRLR 288
Mbubaegbu
v Homerton University Hospital [2018] UKEAT/0218/17/JOJ
Legislation
Art 61 Employment
(Jersey) Law 2003
10. Suitably
in advance of the hearing dates I contacted counsel through the Registrar of
the Tribunal and mentioned that I knew Mr. Ebbrell slightly because he worked
at JFSC during my tenure as a Commissioner there. Counsel confirmed that they
were content for me to sit.
11. I
canvassed with counsel how the question of the Mexico telephone charges should
be treated. Both counsel were content for them to be regarded as a neutral
matter, relevant only to the narrative of how Mrs. Wilkinson’s breaches of the
employment requirements at the centre of this case came to light. I treated
them in that way accordingly.
12. I
have set out the evidence at considerably greater length than is most often the
case in Tribunal judgments. I believe that to be appropriate in cases where, on
the facts, the employee's reputation, or ability to work in his or her chosen
field of employment is potentially prejudiced.
13. This
case was prepared by mature counsel working collegiately. Of their own
initiative they agreed in advance the running times and witness order and other
practical matters. The extensive hearing files were jointly prepared and
immaculately presented, and counsel treated each other, their opposing cases,
the witnesses, and the Tribunal with great respect. That was of particular
value in a difficult case in which feelings ran high. The approach of counsel
in this case might well be taken as an appropriate model.
Advocate
C.E. Whelan, Deputy Chairman Date:
27.01.2020