Case summarIES
The
following key indicates the court to which the case reference refers:
JRC Royal
Court of Jersey
GRC Royal
Court of Guernsey
JCA Jersey
Court of Appeal
GCA Guernsey
Court of Appeal
JPC Privy
Council, on appeal from Jersey
GPC Privy
Council, on appeal from Guernsey
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Injunctions—freezing
orders—duty of full and frank disclosure—inter partes hearing
Cornish v Brelade Bay Ltd [2019] JRC 091 (Royal Ct:
Bailhache, Bailiff, and Jurats Ramsden and Thomas)
NMC
Santos-Costa for the plaintiffs; JD Garrood for the defendant
In an
application for a freezing order, the question arose as to the extent of the
duty of the applicant to make full and frank disclosure at an inter partes hearing.
Held:
(1) Duty of full and frank disclosure in ex parte applications. The
duty of full and frank disclosure which falls on an applicant for a freezing
injunction exists principally where the court is faced with an ex parte
application. Because the court in those cases hears only one side, it is the
duty of the applicant to disclose fully all matters relevant to the
application, whether of fact or of law, which are or may be adverse to it. This
is a “high duty” requiring the full, fair and accurate disclosure
of all material information, and a duty to draw the court’s attention to
significant factual legal and procedural aspects of the case: Memory Corporation plc v Sidhu[1]; Goldtron Ltd v Most Invs Ltd[2].
(2) Inter partes applications
for freezing order. However, underlying the obligation of full and frank
disclosure is that it is an ex parte
application. Where the application for a freezing order is made on notice, as
was the position here, the obligation for full and frank disclosure did not
arise in the same way. A party must be frank in its submissions to the court. But
it is no longer necessary for a party to set out in detail all the points which
might be taken against him if the other party were present, because the other
party is present and has the opportunity, through his advocate, to make his
case.
Pleading—Scott schedule
Sampurna Properties (Jersey) Ltd v Blacks
Outdoor Retail Ltd
[2019] JRC 092 (Royal Ct: Master Thompson)
JN
Heywood for the plaintiff; JD Garrood for the defendant
The
parties were in dispute as to whether the defendant had complied with
redecoration and repair works and other obligations as assignee lessor under a
lease. The question before the Master in the present interlocutory judgment was
whether a Scott schedule should be
ordered.
Held:
(1) Scott schedule. A Scott schedule
is a form of pleading which brings both parties’ cases in relation to
each of the disputed items together in tabular format in a single document
which may easily be referred to by counsel, witnesses and the judge throughout
the trial; the purpose of the schedule is to enable both sides to know what the
issues are. A bare denial of liability for a particular item does not advance
matters (see N Dowding
QC and A Oakes, Dilapidations—The Modern Law and Practice, Westlaw, at para 38–18).
(2) Guidance as to use. The English Civil Procedure Guide 2019 vol
2, para 2C 40/5.6, at 592, also
contains guidance on Scott schedules
and their use in the Technology and Construction Court in England including the
following—
“The secret of an
efficient Scott Schedule lies in the information that is to be provided and its
brevity, excessive repetition is to be avoided. It is important that the
defendant’s responses to any such Schedule are as detailed as possible . . .
nevertheless before any order is made or agreement is reached for the
preparation of a Scott Schedule both the parties and the court should consider
whether this course (a) will generally lead to a saving of costs and time or
(b) will lead to a wastage of costs and effort [because the Scott Schedule will
be simply be duplicating earlier schedules or experts reports]. A Scott
Schedule should only be ordered by the court or agreed by the parties in those
cases where it is appropriate and proportionate.”
(3) Appropriate on case-by-case basis. It will be necessary to consider
on a case-by-case basis whether the ordering of a Scott schedule is needed and is proportionate and if so at what
stage. In addition, just because the court has power to order a Scott schedule, this power should not
detract from parties in their pleading setting out all material facts relied
upon, which, the Master noted had not occurred in this case.
(4) Disposal. In the present case it was appropriate to order a Scott schedule to be provided before
discovery. This was because the plaintiff’s case in relation to why the defendant
had failed to keep the premises in a state of good repair and why repair works
had not been carried out had not been set out or pleaded in its order of justice
beyond a bare assertion. The alternative would be otherwise to require
discovery for every item of works carried out in the schedule of works even if
not disputed. That would not be proportionate.
COMPANIES
Compulsory
winding up—distribution of assets
In re Conqueror
Holdings Ltd [2019] GRC 038 (Royal Ct: Collas, Bailiff)
MJ Adkins and JA Tee appeared for the applicants; the respondent
was not represented
Conqueror Holdings Ltd (“the company) was a
Guernsey company formed as an SPV to acquire land with planning permission to
construct a 50-room hotel in North Greenwich (“the property”). The
project was financed by secured lending and by 41 “off the plan”
sales on long leases of individual rooms to investors (“the room buyers”)
all of whom had entered into individual agreements with the company (“the
agreements”). The room buyers had, pursuant to the agreements, paid
deposits as part payment of the purchase price. The company did not have
sufficient funds to complete the work. In 2017, it was placed into
administration. The administrators wrote to the room buyers notifying them that
their agreements had been terminated. The administrators subsequently sold the
property for £4.6m and the following day paid £1,990,953 to the
secured loan note holders. On 20 March 2018, on the administrators’
application, the Royal Court ordered that: (i) the administration be
terminated, having achieved its purpose; (ii) the company be compulsorily wound
up; and (iii) the administrators be discharged and re-appointed as joint
liquidators of the company. Prior to insolvency, the company had received
notices of rescission from 12 of the room buyers. In November 2018, the
liquidators applied to the Royal Court seeking orders that the room buyers be
admitted as creditors of the company and rank as unsecured creditors in the
distribution of the company’s assets in the respective amounts paid to
the company by each of them. They sought, alternatively, amongst other things,
a direction from the court as to the proper admission and ranking of the room buyers
in the liquidation and/or their rights with respect to the proceeds of sale.
The question arose as to whether the room buyers could be said to have a
beneficial interest (in the form of an equitable lien) in the proceeds of sale
of the property; in other words, whether the liquidators held the proceeds of
sale on trust. Expert evidence on this issue in English law was adduced as that
was the governing law of the agreements and the property was located in
England. English counsel opined that the room buyers had no beneficial interest
in the proceeds of sale of the property under English law.
Held: The
Guernsey rules governing the distribution of assets of an insolvent company
would be applied as the company was a Guernsey company and the Royal Court had
appointed the liquidators under the Companies (Guernsey) Law 2008 (“the Companies
Law”). Further, the distribution of assets of the insolvent company was
governed by s 419 of the Companies Law and the net proceeds of sale had
been transferred to a bank account on the Island. The room buyers did not have
any beneficial interest in the proceeds of sale of the property under English
law and the position did not change when the net proceeds of sale were
deposited into a Guernsey bank account. Section 1 of the Trusts (Guernsey) Law
2007 (as amended) sets out the circumstances in which a trust is said to exist.
No Guernsey trust could have come into existence when the proceeds of sale were
transferred to Guernsey. Identifying whether Guernsey law recognised the room buyers
as having an equitable lien over the proceeds of sale required the application
of conflict of laws principles. The Guernsey court will generally recognise an
equitable lien over proceeds of sale which have arisen under English law,
subject to any overriding rule of Guernsey law granting title to someone else.
The question of whether the lien afforded a room buyer priority over other
creditors in the distribution of the assets of the company fell to be
determined by reference to ss 418 and 419 of the Companies Law. After a
liquidator’s remuneration, the second priority was given to “any
rule of law as to preferential payments” (s 419(a)). This provision
was a reference to s 1(7) of the Preferred Debts (Guernsey) Law 1983, the
effect of which in the instant case would require any security interest to be
discharged before paying any other liabilities of the company. For an equitable
lien under English law to amount to a security interest within the meaning of
the relevant legislation, a written security agreement between the secured
party and the debtor was required. Since the equitable liens arose by operation
of English law, there was no written security agreement. With the exception of
pledge in respect of chattels, no form of security interest in moveable
property is capable of being created under Guernsey customary law. Guernsey law
did not offer any remedy which would give the room buyers any right to claim a
secured interest or any priority over unsecured creditors in the distribution
of the company’s assets. In accordance with s419 of the Companies Law,
the company’s assets were to be applied in satisfaction of the its debts
and liabilities pari passu; all
creditors, including the room buyers, would recover the same proportion of the
debt they were owed. All persons who entered into contracts with the company
and paid a deposit for the construction and lease of hotel rooms were entitled
to be admitted as creditors of the company, though as unsecured creditors in
the distribution of the company’s assets, in the respective amounts paid
to the company by each of them.
Comment (Natasha Newell): This judgment
establishes that the Guernsey court will generally recognise an English
equitable lien, subject to any overriding rule of Guernsey law granting title
to someone else. In the absence of a written, enforceable, security agreement,
such a lien will not, however, afford a creditor priority over other creditors
in the distribution of the assets of the insolvent company.
FAMILY
LAW
Children—appeals in public law
cases
In re Linda (Care proceedings) [2019] JCA 033 (CA: Bailhache,
Martin and Logan Martin, JJA)
MR
Godden for the applicant; PF Byrne for the Minister; MJ Haines for the mother;
RS Tremoceiro for the father.
On an
appeal against a decision of the Royal Court under para 4 of Schedule 2 to the
Children (Jersey) Law 2002, approving the placement of a child off-Island, the
Court of Appeal considered inter alia
the applicable appellate test.
Held:
(1) Test on appeal. In a public law children’s cases of this
nature, all practicable answers may to some extent be unsatisfactory. Even if
the appellate court would have preferred a different answer, it should not
interfere unless it can be said that the judge’s decision was “wrong”.
It was not useful to consider whether different shades of meaning are intended
by expressions such as “blatant error” or “clearly wrong”;
but for the purpose of such appeals an appellate court should only interfere if
the court below has not merely preferred an imperfect solution which is
different from an alternative imperfect solution which the Court of Appeal
might or would have adopted, but rather has exceeded the generous ambit within
which a reasonable disagreement is possible: In re B (a child)[3];
G v G[4]; Re B-S[5].
(2) Position where witnesses heard. If the judge below has had the benefit
of seeing witnesses and hearing evidence, the appellate court must give very
careful consideration to whether the decision below was “wrong” in
this sense: In re B (a child)[6].
MONEY
Security
interests—security trustee—blessing exercise as trustee of power of
sale
In re Bayswater
Road (Holdings) Ltd [2019] JRC 102 (Royal Ct: Birt, Commr, and Jurats
Blampied and Thomas)
JD Garrood for the representor; the respondent did not
appear and was not represented
A secured party holding a security interest in shares,
created under the Security Interests (Jersey) Law 2012 (“Security
Interests Law”), and acting as a security trustee, sought to exercise its
powers of enforcement over the collateral. It having proved impossible to sell
the collateral to a third party, a sale was now proposed to a party related to
the secured lender. The security trustee was concerned that, in effecting a
related-party sale, it might later be claimed that it had acted in breach of art
46 of the Security Interests Law. By way of protection, it sought the approval
of the court for the sale under both art 52 of the Security Interests (Jersey)
Law 2012 and art 51 of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984.
Article
46 of the Security Interests Law provides that—
“a secured party who sells collateral under this
Part owes a duty—
(a)
to take all commercially reasonable steps to obtain fair market value for the
collateral, as at the time of the sale;
(b)
to act in other respects in a commercially reasonable manner in relation to the
sale; and
(c)
to enter any agreement for or in relation to the sale only on commercially
reasonable terms.”
Article 52 of the Security Interests Law is headed “Court
may facilitate realization of collateral” and provides that the court
may, on the application by the secured party when an event of default has occurred,
make orders facilitating the realisation of the collateral—
“if it appears to the Court reasonably necessary to
do so in order to make it possible or practicable for the secured party to
exercise his or her rights under this Part.”
Held:
(1) No power under Security Interests Law to
approve exercise of power of sale. The use of the court’s powers
under art 52 was governed by the words—
“if it appears to the Court reasonably necessary to
do so in order to make it possible or practicable for the secured party to
exercise his or her rights under this Part . . .”
In the present case, the security trustee did not need
the court’s assistance in order to be in a position to sell the
collateral. It was in a position to do that now. The security trustee’s
concern was not that it was not in a position to sell the collateral, it was
that it wished to have the protection of a court order in case it is alleged
that it is not complying with art 46(2) by taking all commercially reasonable
steps to obtain fair market value for the collateral. This did not fall within art
52. The Security Interests Law did not confer a power upon the court to make an
order prior to any sale that such sale will comply with the requirements of art
46.
(2)
Court able to bless decision of a
security trustee as trustee. However, the security trustee was acting as a
trustee. The jurisdiction of the court to bless a momentous decision by a
trustee was well established, as were the principles to be applied; see In re S Settlement.
Given the unqualified requirements of art 46(2) of the Security Interests Law,
a security trustee will invariably owe the duty set out in that article to the
person who has provided the collateral. There must therefore be a substantial
risk that a breach of that duty would give rise to a claim for compensation. In
the circumstances, it was entirely appropriate that in this sort of case a
security trustee should be able to request the court to bless its decision to
realise collateral if this is considered to be a momentous decision. On the
facts, the court was satisfied that the proposed sale price was comfortably in
excess of the market price, that the trustee had taken all commercially
reasonable steps to obtain fair market value for the collateral and had acted
in all other respects in a commercially reasonable manner in relation to the
sale and the terms of the proposed share purchase agreement. Accordingly the
court approved the decision.
SUCCESSION
Wills—revocation—oral revocation
In re Voisin Executors Ltd [2019] JRC 080 (Royal Ct:
Clyde-Smith, Commr, and Jurats Ramsden and Dulake)
AD Hoy
for the representor; JC Turnbull for the first respondent; an affected party
appeared in person
The
executors of a will sought directions as to how they administer it. Under the
terms of the will, the residue was left to the testator’s nephew and
niece. However it was contended that the gift to the nephew had been orally
revoked by the testator at a meeting with her advocate shortly before she died.
The advocate’s contemporaneous note of the meeting was that the residue
“would now go to [the niece]
alone.”
Held:
(1) Revocation of testamentary disposition. “Le testament est
un acte révocable à volonté” (Le Gros, Droit
Coutumier de Jersey, at 124).
Revocation requires an
act of revocation, accompanied by the intention to revoke (“animus revocandi”): In re Beaugié[8];
Basnage, Commentaire sur la coutume de Normandie, 3rd ed, vol 2, art
412, at 171 (1709).
(2) Method of revocation. The statutory restrictions on the methods of
revocation which apply in England under the Statute of Frauds 1677 and the
Wills Act 1837 had no application in Jersey. Jersey customary law does not
prescribe any particular formality for the revocation of a will provided that
there is an act of revocation, accompanied by the intention to revoke (animus revocandi). Another testamentary
disposition is not necessary; the revocation may be effected by other means
such as such as tearing it up, or writing cancelled across it, provided always
that the intention is clear: In re Bull.[9]
Under Jersey law, an oral declaration made before a witness can constitute an
act of revocation. Whether there has been an effective oral declaration will be
a matter of evidence and will depend upon an analysis of the words used. They
must be clear and unambiguous and be expressed in absolute terms so as to take
effect at once (the court was concerned with a conditional revocation) and be
accompanied by the intention to revoke. It was possible for a will to be
partially revoked in writing and there was no reason why an oral revocation
should be any different, save that it would need to be absolutely clear as to
what part of the will was being revoked.
(3) Unsatisfactory to revoke a will orally. Nevertheless an oral
revocation was a very unsatisfactory way of managing one’s testamentary
affairs. If, unusually, an oral declaration has been resorted to, it would be
important to have it reduced to writing with the minimum of delay.
(4) Disposal on the facts. On the facts, the court held that at the
meeting with her advocate the testator had expressed the intention of giving
the whole of the residue of her estate to her niece, which was to be put into
legal effect, but there was on the facts of this case no clear and unambiguous
act of revocation of the gift taking effect at once. Had it been imperative for
the change to take place at once, then a simple codicil could have been written
out in hand and executed before a witness then and there. There would have been
no need to rely on the unusual and inherently unsatisfactory oral declaration.
TRUSTS
Trust assets—mistake—alternative
rights of action
In re J Settlement [2019] JRC 111 (Royal Ct: Bailhache, Bailiff,
and Jurats Crill and Hughes)
D
James for the representors; the respondents did not appear.
In an
application under art 47G of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 by a trustee or other
person to set aside the exercise of a power in relation to the trust or trust
property on the ground of mistake, it is necessary that—
“(3) . . .
where the trustee or person exercising a power—
(a) made a mistake in relation to the
exercise of his or her power; and
(b) would not have exercised the power,
or would not have exercised the power in the way it was so exercised, but for
that mistake, and
the
mistake is of so serious a character as to render it just for the court to make
a declaration under this Article.”
A
question arose inter alia as to
whether the fact that the trustee and/or settlor could pursue a claim against
professional advisers for negligent tax advice should prevent the court regarding
the mistake as being “of so serious a character as to render it just for
the court to make a declaration under this Article”.
Held:
(1) Position where beneficiaries have a claim against trustee. It was
not obvious that courts should come to the rescue of a trustee or his
professional advisers for a mistake that one or other might have made in
circumstances where, had there been no trust, the trustee as client would have
sued the professional adviser for the loss in question. However, the court is
not attracted by the proposition that beneficiaries should be left to a remedy
of bringing litigation against trustees or professional advisers. Beneficiaries
are usually not at fault and (in the case of tax-related mistakes) will have
already incurred loss by reason of unnecessary tax charges. To force them to
incur further expense in what may be uncertain litigation when the law allows
for the avoidance of a decision made in breach of the trustees’ duties
was unnecessary, undesirable and unjust: In
re Onorati Settlement.[10]
(2) Position similar where trustee has claim against adviser. The
question in the present case was whether the same approach should be taken
where the potential plaintiffs in a negligence action would be the trustee
and/or the economic settlor, rather than the beneficiaries. It was not obvious
that it would be in the interests of beneficiaries to drive trustees down a
route of seeking funding for litigation purposes, or alternatively risking
trust monies for such a venture. The approach should therefore be extended to
trustees in circumstances such as these. Accordingly, it was just in the
present case to grant relief under art 47G in respect of the trustee’s
mistake.
Trust
assets—mistake—different kinds of mistake
In re G Trust [2019] JRC 056 (Royal Ct: Bailhache, Bailiff,
and Jurats Blampied and Averty)
MW
Cook for the representors; DP Le Maistre for the minor and unborn
beneficiaries.
The
representors, as settlors, sought pursuant to art 47E of the Trusts (Jersey)
Law 1984 the setting aside of certain transfers into trust which had mistakenly
been made by them from UK bank accounts. The UK source of the funds had
resulted in a UK inheritance tax liability, although neither of them were at
any material time resident, ordinarily resident or domiciled in the UK, and nor
were they British citizens. A question was raised as to whether Jersey law
relating to the setting aside of voluntary dispositions into trust follows
English law in making fine distinctions between different types of mistake, not
all of which are sufficient for this purpose.
“Mistake” for the
purposes of art 47E (and 47G) is defined in art 47B(2) as including (but not
limited to)
“(a)
a mistake as to—
ii(i) the effect of,
i(ii) any consequences of, or
(iii) any
of the advantages to be gained by,
a transfer or other disposition of property to a trust,
or the exercise of a power over or in relation to a trust or trust property;
(b)
a mistake as to a fact existing either before or at the time of, a transfer or
other disposition of property to a trust, or the exercise of a power over or in
relation to a trust or trust property; or
(c)
a mistake of law including a law of a foreign jurisdiction.”
Held, as to the meaning of mistake:
(1) Distinctions between different kinds of mistake under English
principles of equity. As is pointed out by the authors of Goff & Jones on the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Westlaw,
9th ed, at paras 9–41 – 9–54, English law distinguishes three
different situations:
(i) incorrect conscious beliefs, where, owing to the claimant’s
ignorance of some fact or facts, he held an incorrect conscious belief which
caused him to act;
(ii) incorrect tacit assumptions, where the claimant acted on the basis
of a tacit assumption about some fact which was falsified by some other fact of
which he was ignorant, or simply he acted on the basis of an incorrect tacit
assumption about a fact; and
(iii) mere causative ignorance, where the claimant made neither an active
nor a tacit mistake and simply acted in a state of what is called mere
causative ignorance. The English position appears to be that a court has no
power to give relief where there is mere causative ignorance: Pitt v Holt.[11]
(2)
Application of statutory definition in Jersey. However this was not the approach
under the law of Jersey when the court receives applications under art 47E. The
jurisdiction to give relief is statutory and requires the court to decide whether
there was any mistake as defined by art 47B(2) of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984.
The court was pleased to reach the conclusion that it was inappropriate to make
these distinctions; the distinction between an incorrect tacit assumption and
mere causative ignorance was rather artificial, and the intellectual space
between incorrect tacit assumptions and mere causative ignorance was almost
impossible to find because tacit assumptions will invariably be mistakes only
when the maker of the assumption is ignorant of some material fact.
Security
trustee—blessing exercise as trustee of power of sale. See MONEY
(Security interests—security trustee)