POSTSCRIPT
Party politics
As party politics appears to be raising its head from
the ashes of the 19th century, this account of the experiences of Henry Inglis may be of interest. Inglis
had written accounts of various countries in Europe, and spent two years
resident in the Channel Islands in about 1830. The Channel Islands: Jersey,
Guernsey, Alderney etc. was the result, running
to two editions. Inglis’ account of the
character and way of life of the Islanders and their historic institutions is
full of perceptive observation. The following extract concerning the
composition of the Royal Court and the States is taken from the second edition
of this work published in 1835.
“It will have been gathered . . .
that the inhabitants of Jersey regard their political constitution with no
small affection; and indeed, so true is this that reform and change, are as
unpopular words in Jersey, as they are popular elsewhere. So slow is the march
of opinion in Jersey, that the political constitution which pleased the
Islanders in the days of King John, pleases them still; and, as regards the
mass of the people, there is yet no dawn of that crisis, which must ever arise,
where Intellect advances and political institutions stand still. I shall
briefly state what is the Constitution of Jersey; in
the hope, that by making its evils and absurdities more generally known, one
step may be made towards amendment. The legislative power in Jersey, resides in
an assembly called the States; but in order to understand the constitution of
this assembly, it is necessary that I should first speak of the judicial body.
The Royal Court, as it is called, consists of a president, termed the baiily of Jersey, who is appointed by the king; and twelve
judges who are elected for life by the people,—all heads of families
paying parochial rates, being entitled to vote; so that, in fact, the judges
are elected by almost universal suffrage. This privilege of electing their
judges, the people esteem as their highest privilege but it is easy to
perceive, that it is on the contrary, the source of incalculable evil. I have
already mentioned the existence of party spirit in the island; and at no time
does party run as high, as the election of a judge. Upon these occasions, the
whole island is in a ferment: to vote, is to stamp a man of one party or
another. I have known respectable tradesmen, who so feared the consequences of
a vote, that they invented some pretext for leaving the island; and I have
known others swallow medicine, to make themselves incapable of attending to
give their suffrage. Waving banners, and all the loudest and most unequivocal
expressions of triumph, attend the results of an election; and in fact, the
Judge is borne into the seat of Justice on the shoulders of a party. It is
scarcely necessary I think, for me to enlarge upon the bad effects of this
system. The bench, with one or two exceptions, is composed of the most furious
partisans; the court of Justice is too often the arena for party feuds; and it
is not impossible by glancing the eye along the bench and knowing who are the parties to a suit, to guess with tolerable accuracy
what will be the issue. But this is not the only evil of the system. No
qualification is necessary for being elected to the office of judge. A farmer,
a shipowner, a merchant, —anybody may be seated
on the bench by the electors. No previous acquaintance with the law or usage is
required: no preparatory education,—no education of any kind requisite.
The electors, generally utterly uneducated
themselves,—and influenced by the most violent party spirit,
cannot be expected to fix upon the best qualified Individuals; the bench is
alike disqualified by party feeling; and by ignorance, from exercising that
sound and unbiased judgement, which alone gives
respectability to a court of Justice. It may perhaps be altogether doubted,
whether in so small a community as Jersey, where relationship, or connection of
one kind or other, is so universal, Jerseymen be the
most proper persons to fill the Judicial office; but it is at all events
certain, that so long as the right of electing the judges is vested in the
people, not only will the bench be defective in all that constitutes a perfect
judicature; but party spirit will be encouraged,—which, at the same time
that it poisons the fountains of justice,—crushes public spirit,—cripples
legislation,—and offers an impossible obstacle to the progress of civilisation. I have no intention of enlarging on the
jurisdiction of the Royal Court. It has the power of disposing of all causes
civil and criminal, Including the military code as
regards the militia; and from the full-court, an appeal lies to the Privy
Council. In criminal cases, juries decide; and the accused has many advantages.
He is allowed counsel; and from the petty jury which first sits on his case,
and which decides by a majority of votes, he has an appeal to a grand jury,
consisting of 24; of which number, five voices only, are sufficient to acquit
him of the charge. The jury in civil causes, has not
yet made its way to Jersey; and for the same reason that I doubt the
possibility of perfect impartiality among judges selected from a so limited a
community where Intermarriages are so common, where no man is a stranger to
another, and where the attachments to party are so strong, and so universal,—I
also doubt, whether the introduction of the jury in civil causes,
would be productive of much advantage. Should the administration of justice
ever be vested in English judges, I have no hesitation in saying, that the
introduction of Jersey juries would be Impolitic. The same objections which
apply to justice in civil cases, is not applicable in criminal cases. In these
latter, men are less likely to be influenced by private motives; as if they be,
the accused will probably be a gainer; and besides, it very rarely happens,
that Jersey men are the subject of criminal prosecutions. Delinquencies are almost always committed by
strangers. Attached to the Royal Court, are the two king’s
officers,—the Procureur du Roi,
and the kings advocate, who are appointed by the King; several other officers,
and six advocates, who are in the nomination of the bailly,—an
absurd and unjust nomination, both as regards the public service, and in the
manner of appointment. There ought to be no restriction upon the bar, excepting
that which depends upon competency; and yet, in this important particular,
there is at present no regulation. No course of education: no examination is
required; all is left to the judgement of the bailly,—who, possessed of such powers, and presiding
over a court composed of men without education ought to be a man possessed of
many acquirements; and distinguished by a sound and discriminating judgement. It is but just to add, that there are some
gentleman at the bar, distinguished for their acquirements and every way
competent to the discharge of their duties.
I
am now prepared to speak of the constitution of the States. The legislative
body is composed of 36 members, besides the Governor and the Bailly, consisting of 1. the 12
judges who being Judges for life are legislators for life 2. the
rectors of the twelve parishes, nominated (with the exception of the Dean) by
the Governor, also legislators for life and 3. the
twelve constables of the twelve parishes elected by the people triennially. The
king’s officers and the viscount have also seats in the States and may
speak but cannot vote. It is scarcely possible to conceive a more faulty
constitution of a legislative assembly than this. Here we have men framing laws
and executing them,—judges today, legislators tomorrow. Here we have a
legislative body, which is not a representative assembly not a responsible
assembly; since one third of the numbers, the clergy, are nominated by the
governor; and since two thirds—both the 12 judges and the 12 clergy, are
legislators for life, and are therefore never called upon to account for their
stewardship. only one third part of the legislative assembly is representative
and responsible:—viz. the 12 constables, who are chosen triennially in
each parish by the same electors who choose the jurats;
and who are in fact the heads of the police of each parish and have under them,
sundry inferior officers, and deputies. The States possess the powers (under
certain limitations) which belong to any legislative body. They originate and
pass laws; raise funds for the public service; enact appropriations of the
revenue; and preside generally, over the well-being of the island. This
assembly, however, cannot be convened without the consent of the governor, —who
has also a veto on Its deliberations, for the exercise
of which powers, however, he is accountable to the king in council; and all
acts passed by the States, if meant to continue in force more than three years,
require the king’s assent.”