The Jersey Law Review – February
2006
THE IMPACT ON
ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE TRUSTS OF ENGLISH MATRIMONIAL LITIGATION
Paul Matthews
Introduction
1 In recent years, it has been
very fashionable to discuss trusts as a means of avoiding unwelcome rules of
forced heirship, and to discuss the impact upon
forced heirship of trusts, and vice versa. But trusts
are also used in relation to matrimonial obligations, in particular to avoid
unwelcome matrimonial obligations.
These obligations may be ones existing during the marriage, or, more
likely, taking effect at its end (typically through divorce). But trusts also have an impact on those
obligations. Conversely, those
obligations have an impact on trusts.
Indeed, increasingly today they can have an impact on commercial
transactions being carried out by one spouse, and even litigation in which one
party is engaged. It is an unusual
characteristic of matrimonial litigation that it can be launched not only to hinder
the other spouse in the conduct of his or her commercial life, but sometimes
also to assist him or her.
2 The law of matrimonial regimes
differs significantly from one system to another, and in particular between the
common law systems and the civil law systems of the world. Foreign matrimonial regimes generally
accord spouses a fixed entitlement to property rights. This may be because the assets belonging
to the spouses form part of some community of property, or because the property
acquired after the marriage is treated in a different way from property before
the marriage and so on.[1] On divorce there is a rather
mathematical analysis of the assets subject to the different sets of rules, and,
unless there is provision for alimony to be awarded (but that would be a personal
obligation of one of the spouses), that is that.[2]
3 The common law world typically
did not have any such regimes.
Before the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, in English law the
husband was the owner at common law of the wife’s
assets,[3] although
equity permitted the wife to have separate property held on trust.[4] Certainly, in English law there is no
equivalent system provided by the state.
However, it should be borne in mind that in England and some other common law
countries it was very common in the 18th, 19th and even
the 20th centuries to provide for a functional equivalent to a matrimonial regime by means of a
marriage settlement. This was an
arrangement involving the use of the trust, being entirely voluntary (in the
sense that it was not necessary for anybody to have such a settlement), using a
private sector device, namely the trust, drafted to fit the exact circumstances
required in the particular case, and providing for the devolution of
matrimonial assets and indeed for the capture and inclusion in such devolution
of after acquired matrimonial assets.
Mainly for fiscal reasons, such settlements are rare these days.[5]
The matrimonial context
4 Although the state rules of
matrimonial obligations are generally fixed in civil law legal systems, they
are not normally fixed in common law systems. The state’s power, conferred on
the judges, is either to work out which individual spouse owns what (the old
approach),[6] or to
exercise discretion at the termination of a marriage, and award assets or a
share in assets to whichever of the spouses it is considered should receive
them (the new approach). Certainly,
in England
today the judges of the Family Division of the High Court have a very wide
discretion to make orders to provide for the financial well-being of a spouse
to a marriage but also the children of the marriage. In general terms, an English judge on a
divorce can look at the combined wealth of both parties and allocate it as he
sees fit.[7] The breadth of this power sometimes
leaves foreigners aghast. In the
past it was common, in so called ‘big money’ cases (where the
amount of assets available to the parties far exceeded what
they could reasonably need) for the court to take a very narrow view of its
discretion and simply to award a sum that was sufficient for the needs of the
‘other’ spouse.
However, in the last 5 years the courts in England have begun to take a much
wider view and in big money cases they are now apt to look at matters in terms
of fairness rather then need.[8] A result other than 50:50 has to
be justified. It has even reached
the point where some academic lawyers argue that this discretionary regime
amounts to a kind of common law version of ‘community of
property’. In Jersey and Guernsey the
discretion is not perhaps as wide as in England, but it is still very
large.[9]
5 The idea plainly is that the
judges should be able to do justice in each individual case. Unfortunately many judges fall victim to
‘judgitis’, the idea that they can
– and, by golly, they will
– do justice in the one case before them, ignoring the thousands of cases
that need never come to court if they give clear guidance for the future by
drawing a simple line. So every case
is reduced to one where more or less complete discretion is exercised, and each
decision “turns on its facts”.
The difficulty with this approach is not that it is not fair (it
may be fair in the individual cases),
but that it is unpredictable.
It therefore requires litigation, and considerable expenditure in time
and money, in every case. Indeed
the big money cases are the worst of all, because the ill-feeling between the
spouses is not restrained from turning into litigation by the usual preventive,
i.e.
sheer cost. This unpredictability
and the need for litigation therefore means that the costs overall are greater
then they would be if there were clearer and more fixed rules of entitlement. So there is a choice between greater
individual case fairness at greater communal cost and less individual fairness
at a smaller communal cost.[10] Unfortunately the value of certainty and
lower costs seems rarely to be taken into account by the legislator. (Nor do they consider the
unfairness of having a discretion exercised by lots of different judges, so
that like cases are not treated alike.
But that is for another occasion.)
6 In this discretionary context,
then, judges must look at the overall circumstances and make up their
minds. The judges of the Family Division of the English High Court are, as one would
expect, very clever people. They
are all former advocates, at the top of their profession, and well used to
litigants who do not tell the truth, who seek to hide their assets, or who use
whatever structures are legitimately permitted in order to make it more
difficult or even impossible for the court to award an appropriate fraction of
assets to the other spouse.
7 This of course is where the
trust comes in. The trust is par
excellence a device for separating the ownership or management of property
from its enjoyment. One person, the
trustee, is the legal owner of the property, but another person or persons is
or are the beneficiaries of the trust and have the right to enjoy it. Such a device lends itself well to
estate planning exercises, looking after children or other relatives who either
for mental or other reasons are not able to look after their own financial
affairs. But it also lends itself
to the avoidance of mandatory rules which would otherwise apply, such as rules
imposing taxes. Spouses have
learned that trusts may be used also in an attempt either to avoid, or at least
to mitigate, the impact of matrimonial obligations. Consequently, the experience of Family
Division judges of the High Court has been that trusts are often a suspicious
device, they are only a means to hide assets or obfuscate issues and they are
therefore there to be seen through. They are there to be shown up for what
they are, mere devices and not matters of substance. The attitude of the family judge is thus
rather ‘anti-trusts’, to be contrasted with that of the Chancery
Division judge, for whom (by contrast) the trust is one of the greatest
products of the English legal intellect.
The relevance of trusts to matrimonial litigation
8 Trusts may become relevant to
matrimonial litigation in a number of contexts.
Disclosure of trusts
9 The first of these is at a
preliminary stage, when information is disclosed by the parties to matrimonial
litigation as to the assets which are available to them.[11] This will undoubtedly include reference
to trusts of which either spouse is a beneficiary. It may be that one
spouse knows of the existence of a trust of which the other is a beneficiary,
or it may be that the first spouse does not know. In the former case it is obviously
easier for the disclosure by the other spouse to be policed. But it is desirable from a tactical
point of view not to suppress reference to relevant trusts, particularly
offshore ones. Failure to do so, if
later uncovered (as often happens) leads to a presumption by the judge of
anything up to and including “skulduggery”.[12] It is much safer to disclose, and to
ride out the resultant storm of information requests. This will include demands to know what
information is available to be supplied to the other party. An English court will typically
order a spouse beneficiary to disclose such information to the other spouse,[13] and, in
an appropriate case, so too may an offshore one.[14]
10 One common response in cases where a trust
is known to exist is that the spouse beneficiary does not have the right to
obtain information, in particular trust documents, from the trustees.[15] (This has long been a response –
not usually well received – to Revenue requests of taxpayers who are
beneficiaries of offshore trusts.)
Indeed, this point has now reached the attention of trusts draftsmen,
even in offshore jurisdictions that know little of English matrimonial
litigation, so that commonly such trusts are drafted in such a way that spouse
beneficiaries expressly have no rights to information. Even more sophisticated versions perhaps
confer such rights at the outset but withdraw them from the spouse at the point
when the matrimonial litigation begins.
Thus by the time that the disclosure obligation comes to be fulfilled,
the spouse will find that it is either difficult or impossible to obtain
compliance with the disclosure obligation relating to the trust.
11 Most offshore trust laws (including that of Jersey)[16] make statutory
provision for disclosure by trustees to beneficiaries. A few (such as that of the Bahamas)[17] do the
opposite, and expressly provide that the trustees have no obligation to
disclose trust documents to the beneficiary.
12 Even in cases where the
spouse does not have a right however it is still possible for the trustee to be
asked to provide the information.
This commonly arises in relation to documents such as letters of wishes,
which fall in some jurisdictions into a different category from trust documents
strictly so called. Thus in Re Rabaiotti [18]
the Jersey Royal Court had to decide whether it was in the best interests of
the trust as a whole in that case that the trustees of a Jersey trust should
disclose information about the trust to a spouse beneficiary embroiled in
English matrimonial litigation so that it could be disclosed to the other
spouse.[19] One problem with the trustees not
allowing the information to be disclosed is that it may cause the suspicious
English judge to draw adverse inferences about the likely beneficial
entitlement and future prospects of the spouse beneficiary, and, if these are
incorrect (i.e. there are none), then this may lead to final orders
being made which are unrealistic in all the circumstances.
13 The English judge takes the view that in
normal circumstances all the information (however sensitive) must be disclosed
in order that justice may be done to the other spouse. Unfortunately this approach rather
overlooks the impact on the other beneficiaries of the genuine trusts. Why should their otherwise confidential
information be released to the spouse of one of their fellow beneficiaries who
is not herself or himself a beneficiary of the trust? The answer, of course, is that
they are innocently mixed up in the disputes of others, just like (for example)
comparison cases in other contexts,[20]
and it is every citizen’s duty to assist in the state’s resolution
of disputes between others, though this public spirited explanation is usually
of little comfort to them.
14 Where the divorcing spouses are in England, but
the trustees are offshore, the English judge has a further weapon in his
armoury. This is the issue of a
letter of request to the court for the place where the trustees are based. The traditional problem with letters of
request, however, is that they are not capable of being used to obtain general
discovery. According to decisions
of the House of Lords which have never been questioned, it is necessary to
specify the documents required, to show that they probably exist, and to
confirm that what is being sought is intended to be adduced
in evidence.[21] These principles have been held to apply
to outgoing as to incoming letters of request.[22] However, a recent English Court of
Appeal decision has now held, for the first time, that in the context of
matrimonial litigation it is not necessary in outgoing letters of request to
specify documents or to show that they probably exist.[23] This represents a sea change in
outlook for the English court, which hitherto has applied the principles laid
down by the House of Lords in all kinds of litigation.
15 Of course, that does not mean that the
foreign court to which the letter of request is addressed will accept it in all
its width. The test for the
propriety of outgoing letters of request in a given jurisdiction is not
necessarily the same as the test for incoming ones.[24] In the same case that the English Court
of Appeal had been concerned with, when the letter of request was considered by
the offshore court, it refused all the documentary requests, as being in
the nature of a fishing expedition, and only allowed six oral questions to be
put to the trustees, with no right to ask supplemental questions.[25]
16 US courts are not always so
generous to foreign third parties as even to go to the trouble of issuing
letters of request to their courts.
In one recent case the US
court, in family litigation concerning child support, simply ordered the
trustees (who were based in Jersey, and
moreover were not even parties to the litigation) to produce trust
documents. The trustee sought the
directions of the Jersey court, which were
that the trustee should not comply, and should not take any part in the US
proceedings. The court also
declined to give detailed reasons, on the basis that this might threaten the
confidentiality of the trusts![26] But, then, the US courts have
never really seen the value of the doctrine of comity.[27]
Trusts to avoid matrimonial
obligations
17 Secondly, a further context in which the
point arises is where trusts have been created (or indeed any other
transactions have been entered into) with the intention of avoiding future
matrimonial obligations. Under
section 37 of the (English) Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 such trust or other
transaction can be set aside by the court.
It is a kind of fraud on a special kind of contingent future
creditor. Such cases are not these
days very common, in England
at least, because the court has such wide powers of asset division in the first
place. But in the past, when the
court had fewer discretionary powers in relation to the assets of the parties,
it was used more. There is no
direct equivalent of s 37 in Jersey or Guernsey,[28] though in
an appropriate case it may be that such a trust could be set aside under the
insolvency legislation.[29]
Sham trusts
18 Thirdly, an apparent complex trust for the
benefit of many others may be a sham, and in reality amount to no more than a
bare trust or nomineeship for the settlor spouse.
There is nothing special about such claims in the matrimonial context.[30] Claims of sham here are like claims of
sham elsewhere.[31] In this case, if a sham is established,
and the real trust is one for the settler spouse absolutely, the trust
assets would belong to that spouse and hence be clearly subject to the English
court’s redistributive powers.
Trusts as resources
19 A fourth area, and perhaps the most
important, is that trusts are regarded as resources which may be
available to a spouse in appropriate circumstances.[32] So, for example, if a spouse is a
beneficiary of a trust (say, discretionary) in an offshore jurisdiction, and
the trustees have hitherto looked with favour upon any requests made from time
to time by the spouse by income or capital, then the court is very likely on a
divorce to treat the assets of that trust as assets ‘available to’
the spouse and so take them into account in deciding what orders should be made
for the distribution of assets on divorce.[33] This may go to the extent of making an
order for payment of a sum by one spouse to another, which the spouse ordered
to pay cannot in fact pay out of his or her own resources, but can only pay
with the assistance of the trustees.
There have even been instances in the past where spouses were actually
committed to prison because of a failure to pay sums they had been ordered to
pay, which could have been obtained from the trustees, but which the spouse in
question refused to do.[34] On the other hand, the trustees of a
discretionary trust, faced with the order against one of their beneficiaries to
pay a sum beyond his or her means, may very well properly form the view that it
is in the best interests of the beneficiary to make the payment on his behalf,
and the court asked for its approval may well give it.[35]
Variation of trusts
20 A final area is where a trust in some way
involved in matrimonial litigation is varied by an order of the High Court
Family Division.[36] The curiosity here is that variation by
the English court may be of a trust whose proper law is not English, say the
law of Jersey or the Isle of Man etc.[37]
Some offshore courts have expressed the view that such a variation, where the
trust had offshore trustees and administration, and no connection with England
save the residence of beneficiaries, would infringe “the normal bounds of
comity”.[38] Nonetheless, in one recent English case,
Charalambous v Charalambous,[39]
the Court of Appeal in England
held that it was open to the High Court to vary a Jersey
trust with just those characteristics as part of its disposal of the
matrimonial litigation between the spouses. And it is notable that some
offshore jurisdictions’ matrimonial laws also contain a power to vary at
least some marriage and post-nuptial settlements, and expressly even though
governed by foreign law.[40]
21 One problem with this
approach is that a trust may have been created with specific attainable
advantages in mind, whether fiscal or commercial, the attainment of which
depends on particular features being maintained in the form of the trust. Varying the trust may wreck this
exercise and reduce the value to everyone.
At the very least, therefore, local legal advice must be taken before
any variation is implemented. Under
English law, the trustees must be served with notice of the application,[41] though
taking this step this does not of itself make the trustees parties to the
proceedings.[42] And if they are not parties, it will
usually be necessary to bring further proceedings in their home jurisdiction to
make the variation effective.[43] But if the trust assets are in the
variation jurisdiction, of course, the position may be otherwise.
The position of the trustees
22 It is necessary to consider the position of
the trustees. Unless the litigating spouses themselves are trustees (or one of them is a trustee),
they are not original parties to the matrimonial litigation. Nor is there usually any rule which
requires that they must be joined.[44] The reason why trustees may be joined to
the litigation is generally because the spouse who is not a beneficiary seeks
an order that the trustees should pay a sum of money or transfer some assets to
him or her, and, in order for the order to be enforced against trustees, as
with any other non-party, it is normally necessary that they should be bound by
it by becoming parties.[45] If they are not so bound, it will be
necessary to bring proceedings in their home jurisdiction for this purpose.[46] The rules on whether trustees should be
joined as a party to the proceedings must depend on the particular forum of the
matrimonial litigation.[47] In England, for example, third parties
should not be joined merely to obtain disclosure of information.[48]
23 If the trustees are in
another jurisdiction, then there is an additional aspect to the matter, and
that is whether the trustees having been joined to the litigation should
actually take any part in it. In
general terms, if the trustees having been joined by order of the court of the
forum decide to take part in the proceedings then they will not normally
thereafter be able to argue that the court of the forum did not have
jurisdiction over them.[49] This may mean that a ground of defence
against the enforcement in their own jurisdiction of the order made by the
court is no longer available to them.
24 On the other hand, if the trustees are
joined to the proceedings by the court of the forum, but they take no part in
those proceedings, and remain outside the jurisdiction,[50]
then it will be much more difficult to enforce that order against the trustees
in the offshore jurisdiction. The
question may therefore turn on whether or not the trustees are either present
or have assets within the jurisdiction of the court of the forum. If they do, then having been joined as
parties to the proceedings it may not matter to the non beneficiary spouse
whether the trustees take part or not.
The order can be enforced against the assets within the jurisdiction, or
their person can be attached and committed to prison. But if there are no assets and no
presence within the jurisdiction, then the trustees may consider it more
appropriate not to take part in the proceedings, on the basis that the order
will have to be enforced if at all outside the jurisdiction of the court of the
forum and, in particular, in the jurisdiction where the trustees are. But without their active participation,
they have not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of the forum, and
therefore the order cannot be enforced against them in that jurisdiction
either. Seeking to set aside
the joinder order will normally mean submitting to the jurisdiction.[51]
25 In some cases it is not the non beneficiary
spouse that seeks to have the trustees joined in order to make it easier to
enforce an order against them. The
non-beneficiary spouse is not obliged to sue persons she or he does not wish
to.[52] Instead it is the trustees who
themselves seek to intervene in the proceedings. Now this may be, for example, because
the danger from the trustee’s point of view is
perceived to be that the bona fides of the trust itself is attacked. The non beneficiary spouse may say that
the trust instrument is a sham, and the trustees fear that without their active
participation this allegation is likely to succeed.[53] Another argument may simply be that if
the matrimonial litigation is taking place in a civil law country, where trusts
are not understood,[54] the trust
will be treated as some other kind of device or legal institution, and the
wrong rules will be applied, or even the appropriate proper law of the trust
will not be applied, but instead the law of the forum will be applied.[55] In such cases the trustees may consider
that there are advantages to be gained by taking part in the proceedings and
therefore they seek to intervene.
The problem with intervening is of course that the trustees thereby
submit to the jurisdiction of the court of the forum, and if any question
thereafter arises as to the enforceability of the order made by the court of
the forum in their own jurisdiction offshore, then that point of submission will
have been made against them.[56]
26 Where the trustees decide not to seek to
intervene, it is conceivable that the other beneficiaries of the trust will
seek to do so. Generally speaking,
the English courts prefer that where there is a dispute about who should
benefit from a trust fund, it is better fought between the existing
beneficiaries on the one hand and those who would take it away from them on the
other, with the trustees remaining neutral.[57] On the other hand, some offshore courts
have supported the desire of trustees of discretionary trusts to defend the
integrity of their trusts.[58]
27 Of course, the trustees may not need to be
joined to put pressure on them to satisfy any award in favour of the
non-beneficiary spouse. We have
seen how a spouse beneficiary may be threatened with imprisonment in case of
non-payment.[59] Another potent threat, where the spouse
beneficiary is a professional person, is the spectre of bankruptcy. The trustees may well
consider that it is in the interests of the spouse beneficiary not to be made
bankrupt, and provide the funds needed to avoid this. Alternatively, if he is made bankrupt,
this may create further risks for him and for the trust funds.[60]
Forum shopping
28 One of the features of the global village in
which we now live is forum shopping.
This means that a party bringing a claim chooses to bring it in one
jurisdiction rather then in another, because of some perceived juridical or
other practical advantage. The
question here is whether there is room for forum shopping in relation to trust
litigation when there are matrimonial proceedings on foot. Suppose that there are matrimonial
proceedings ongoing between spouses in the English High Court. Some question may arise in the future as
to a trust (let us say offshore) one of the beneficiaries of which is one of
the spouses. Obviously the trustees
could simply wait for the issue to arise in the English proceedings and then
decide what to do. If the non
beneficiary spouse seeks their being joined to the proceedings, then they can
decide at that point what their attitude should be. If, on the other hand, the non
beneficiary spouse does not seek to join them to the proceedings, they can
decide whether or not they should intervene. There will of course be significant potential
costs consequences in being joined or intervening.
29 But, instead of waiting for this issue to
arise, they might decide to take the bull by the horns and bring proceedings in
another jurisdiction. Typically,
this would be the jurisdiction in which the trustees are themselves based. Or it might be the jurisdiction where
the trust assets are, if that jurisdiction has a court system used to giving
directions to the trustees and dealing with trust litigation. The typical procedure in such a case in
any event will be that the trustees having decided what they were going to do,
would seek the directions of the court of their own jurisdiction for
confirmation that it was appropriate for them to take the steps to which they
proposed to take. This would be the
equivalent of a kind of Beddoe proceeding in England.[61] In most jurisdictions,[62] the
beneficiaries will be parties to the application. But in some offshore
systems this is not the practice, and the trustees approach the court ex parte.[63]
30 However the question is whether the trustees
in fact should go further. Suppose,
for example, that the trustees fear that in the English matrimonial proceedings
an allegation will be made that the trust is a sham or is simply some nominee
arrangement for the benefit of the beneficiary spouse. In such a case the trustees might decide
that they will get a more sympathetic hearing of that issue in their own
jurisdiction then they will in the English court. For one thing, the judge to whom the
matter would be referred in their own jurisdiction may be a trust
specialist, rather then a divorce specialist, whereas in the English
court the reverse is likely to be the case. The other point is that the English
family judges are perhaps rather unsympathetic to the use of trusts, especially
offshore, whereas in the offshore trust jurisdiction the judges will see the
importance of trusts to the local economy.[64]
31 So the trustees might consider it
appropriate to bring an action straight away in the local jurisdiction for a
declaration that the trust is not a sham.[65] There is a little difficulty in the
formulation of the issue, because almost certainly it will not have been
precisely formulated yet in context of the English matrimonial proceedings. Yet correspondence may have passed
between the parties making allegations, particularly if there has been
disclosure of the existence of the
trust, and so on. So it
should be possible in most cases for the trustees to formulate some kind of
general statement of the issue which is likely to be raised later on in the
English proceedings. Plainly the
next question is, Who should be the parties to these proceedings? Obviously the trustees would be the
claimants and the spouse beneficiary will be a defendant. Another beneficiary may also need to be
a representative defendant.
32 The more interesting question is whether the
non beneficiary spouse, being
the person who will raise the issue in the English proceedings, ought also to
be a party. The trustees and the
spouse beneficiary would obviously wish that person to be bound by the
decision. So, in order to provide a
kind of issue estoppel in the English proceedings, normally that non
beneficiary spouse should also be a defendant.[66] The difficulty then is that the
proceedings may have to be served out of the jurisdiction, which may require
special formality, or at least the permission of the court. In any legal system basing itself on the
English rules of court (and most of the offshore jurisdictions –
including Jersey and Guernsey – fall into this category) if the
proceedings are brought by the trustees against some beneficiaries (who could
be relied on to submit to the jurisdiction), then the non beneficiary spouse
(who will not submit willingly) can be brought in under the ‘necessary
and proper party’ provision which will undoubtedly form part of the local
rules.[67]
33 The next issue will be what the stance
should be of the non beneficiary spouse.
The non beneficiary spouse probably does not want to submit to the
jurisdiction of the offshore court, fearing that it will reach a decision which
will be inimical to his or her own interests. If the non beneficiary spouse does
become a party then he or she will be bound by the result, and if the issue is
then raised in the matrimonial proceedings it is likely that the English court
would recognise that the matter could not be raised again but was settled.[68] (Of course, it would depend on the
precise issue being raised. The
English court might – ingeniously – find that another issue arises
peculiar to English matrimonial law, which has not been decided in the offshore
proceedings, and then the offshore decision would not be conclusive).
34 If the non beneficiary spouse decides not
to take part in the offshore proceedings for fear of an issue estoppel arising,
the question is, What is the effect of the offshore proceedings? As a general proposition the offshore
proceedings will not constitute an issue estoppel binding on the English court. However, it may be relevant when
considering the extent to which the English court should allow issues to be
raised which have been raised and indeed decided, and where the defendant had
the opportunity to take part, but decided not to. In other words it goes very much to a discretionary aspect of the procedure
and not to a substantive legal
aspect.
35 The English court may also be unsympathetic
to the trustee’s tactics in this case, seeking to produce a favourable
result in another jurisdiction.
However, it cannot normally come straight out and
say that they do not trust the decision reached by the offshore judge. The comity of nations[69] demands
at least politeness, if not trust in the decisions of offshore courts.
Representation
36 It goes without saying that the trustees
should have legal representation distinct from that of the spouse
beneficiary. Nothing is more
calculated to excite the suspicion of the English judge then seeing that the
lawyers instructed by the husband have also been advising or in any way
suggesting to the (offshore) trustees the position they should adopt and the
tactics which they should follow.
There are obvious conflicts of interest between the trustees of a
genuine trust and one of their beneficiaries who has become embroiled in
matrimonial litigation, and especially so when there are many other
beneficiaries or potential beneficiaries than the spouses themselves.
Pre-nuptial agreements
37 A further point here concerns the impact of
prenuptial agreements. These are
becoming more popular, particularly in the United States, but now also in the UK. Although in many civil law states a
marriage contract can override the general law of matrimonial regimes,[70] in
English law prenuptial agreements are not directly and automatically
enforceable.[71] Certainly
such an agreement could not oust the jurisdiction of the English court in
matrimonial proceedings. Nonetheless they are taken into account by judges
exercising a discretion in England,
as a factor which weighs in some cases quite heavily on the exercise of that
discretion. It appears that they
have more impact in the case of short childless marriages then they do in the
cases of long marriages where there have been children.
38 Do such prenuptial agreements have any
effect in relation to trusts?
Plainly it is possible for the parties of a prenuptial agreement to
agree that such and such a trust which is already established is not to be
treated in any way as the resource of a particular party and is not to be
treated as a sham. Whether such agreements will weigh heavily on the judge before whom the
allegation is made of something different must depend on the
circumstances. But if the parties
have had the opportunity to review the whole situation at the time, all the
evidence was available, and the parties entered into an agreement to that
effect, it is thought that an English judge would not view with great
enthusiasm an allegation apparently made, for purely mercenary reasons, that
went in the opposite direction.
Offshore legislation
39 Finally there is the question of legislation
passed in the offshore jurisdictions which seeks to protect assets settled in
those jurisdictions against orders made in home jurisdictions which in some way
shape or form attack those trusts.[72] In a sense such legislation could be
described as generally anti creditor legislation. For this purpose it does not much matter
whether the creditor concerned is a commercial creditor of the settlor, a
person entitled to inherit the property of the deceased settlor, or the
disgruntled former spouse of the settlor.
In each case there is a claim on the settlor, but the settlor has
transferred assets away from himself or herself to trustees. Offshore jurisdictions have enacted anti
creditor legislation of different kinds.
Some have restricted themselves to legislation which is intended to
protect against claims arising from forced heirship.[73] Others have done so in relation to both
forced heirship and matrimonial claims.[74] Yet others have done it in relation to
all including commercial claims.[75] The particular stance of a particular
jurisdiction must depend on political choices to be made there as to what kind
of business it wishes to attract.
40 Where legislation intended to protect trusts
in that jurisdiction against claims arising from matrimonial proceedings is
concerned, the question to be asked is, What exactly is the legislation aiming
to protect against? What other
things is the legislation not intending to protect against? For example, it would be rare to find a
jurisdiction whose anti creditor legislation sought to protect the settlor
against the allegation of a sham trust.[76] If there is no
intention to create a real trust, but documents are created to dress up the
situation and make it appear that there is a trust, it would be a bold
jurisdiction which said that the appearance of the trust was, in that
jurisdiction at least, to be treated as the reality. (Plainly it would not be so treated
elsewhere.)[77] On the other hand it may be that the
legislation is intended to prevent the claim being made under the order of the
foreign court to some assets which the settlor used to have once they have been
transferred into trust and (let us say) a certain period of time has
elapsed. This would be a kind
of limitation provision.
41 Whether the particular legislation achieves
its objective must depend again on a number of factors. First and foremost amongst these will be
the wording actually used. It is
not uncommon to find that the wording used does not cover all the possible
ramifications, simply because nobody thought of them all at the time of the
enactment of the legislation. That
is the nature of law making. It is
a static process, compared to the dynamic process of case development. If the legislation indeed achieves its
objective, it may mean that assets that are within the offshore jurisdiction
are protected from the claims of the other spouse in the home
jurisdiction. But that is not
always the case. In some situations
it may be that that assets are not in the trust jurisdiction at all but in the
home jurisdiction[78] or in
some third jurisdiction and it may be possible for the order of the home court
to be enforced directly there or in the third jurisdiction. That will depend on other features such
as whether or not there are conventions or treaties which apply to the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
There may also be an issue in the future as to whether the home court
– say, English – can vary a trust governed by a foreign law with
anti-matrimonial order legislation – say, Caymanian, when the trust
assets are not within the home jurisdiction (whether in Cayman or
otherwise). No English case has yet
gone so far.[79]
Civil partnerships
42 My main theme ends here. But there is a kind of postscript, which
may turn out in future to have been in fact a preface. I have spoken throughout of matrimonial
proceedings and matrimonial litigation. But we live in interesting times. A number of jurisdictions
now have instituted legal relationships which fall short of marriage, typically
because the partners are of the same sex.
In England
in particular the Civil Partnership Act 2004 has as from 5 December 2005 introduced such a
legal regime into English law. In
order to equalise the position between opposite sex persons who get married and
same sex persons who become civil partners, much of the existing law relating
to matrimonial breakdown and property allocation and distribution on divorce
will be automatically applied to the civil partnership regime. So when we consider in the future the
possibility of English matrimonial litigation having effect on the offshore
trust industry, we must also bear in mind that this English litigation may in
future concern civil partners and not merely married persons.
Conclusion
43 I hope that this short survey of the
trust/matrimonial litigation interface has shown how far matrimonial litigation
may impinge on trusts, both on and offshore. It also points up the importance of
obtaining ‘joined-up’ specialist divorce and trust law advice for
all concerned, not only for the warring spouses but also for the trustees. The appropriate teams should include
both kinds of specialist. The
trustees also need to realise that they cannot simply sit on the fence,
refusing to take any positions for as long as possible. They must instead decide their strategy
and their tactics, at an early stage.
Careful planning is the key.
Paul Matthews is a solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and
Wales and a consultant with the firm of Withers LLP, 16, Old Bailey, London,
EC4M 7EG.